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With $49 trillion of assets under management and thousands of funds in the market, the mutual 
fund industry around the world has been one of the biggest and most important financial 
intermediaries. Whether fund-families offer high-quality products to their investors affects the 
wealth, and in particular the after-retirement wealth, of millions of households. Protecting 
investors’ interests requires weeding out worse performing funds. In the light of this, this thesis 
aims to investigate market clearing mechanisms, i.e. mutual fund exit decisions in the U.S. and 
the U.K markets. 
There is no reason to assume that fund-families’ exit decisions are time invariant. This thesis 
argues that while fund-families had sufficient motivations to close down or re-organise the 
worse performing funds during non-financial-crisis times, this may not be so during the 2008 
financial crisis. The distortion of the market clearing mechanisms during the financial crisis 
existed in both the U.S. and in the U.K. market. The thesis finds some evidence that funds’ exit 
decisions were affected by directors’ own remuneration and career concerns and that this was 
more visible during the financial crisis than during the other times. 
Industry structure can affect the strength of market forces to exit low-quality products. As the 
asset allocation of US funds is not closely monitored or highly regulated, fund managers are 
free to ‘game’ their investment objectives, which makes it hard to separate the whole U.S. 
market to create meaningful and distinguished sectors suitable for industry structure analysis. 
Fortunately, the U.K. mutual fund industry is suitable for such a study. In the UK, the asset 
allocation of a fund is closely monitored by the Investment Association (IA) to make sure that 
funds make investments according to their official investment objectives. This makes the actual 
asset allocation of a fund reflect well the fund’s official (declared) investment objectives. Thus, 
it is more meaningful to separate the UK market into different sectors according to funds’ 
declared investment objectives in comparison with the US market. The empirical analysis for 
each sector in the U.K. market indicates that the market clearing mechanisms were only 
effective in competitive sectors. 
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The thesis contributes to the literature on the determinants of mutual fund exits by arguing that 
the role of poor performance in determining a fund’s fate weakened during the financial crisis. 
It deepens the understanding of the role of fund boards in protecting shareholders’ interests in 
different times. It fills the gap in the U.K. mutual fund research by comprehensively 
investigating, for the first time, the determinants of fund exits over time. Finally, the thesis 
adds to the organisation studies literature by confirming the importance of industry structure 




CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The importance of the mutual fund industry has been rising rapidly around the world in the 
past decade. As at the year-end 2017, the total assets of worldwide open-end funds more than 
double compared to 10 years before, reaching $49 trillion (ICI Investment FactBook, 2018). 
This trend reflects investors’ high demands of this collective investment instrument, expecting 
its high liquidity, professional asset management and long-term competitive returns for their 
after-retirement wealth. Although the mutual fund industry develops rapidly around the world, 
there are still large differences in the development stage of the market across countries. As at 
year-end 2017, the U.S. has the largest mutual fund industry in the world, with $18.7 trillion 
assets under management, accounting for 38% of the worldwide total assets of open-end funds. 
The U.S. also leads the world in the role of mutual funds servicing pension savings. Among 
the 57.3 million households (equivalent to 101.9 million individuals) owing mutual funds, 92 
percent of them indicated that saving for retirement was one of their financial goal, and 75 
percent treated it as their primary financial goal. More specifically, out of the $28.2 trillion 
assets in the retirement market, $8.8 trillion of individual retirement account (IRA) and defined 
contribution (DC) plan assets were invested in mutual funds. This indicates that every 
investment decision of mutual funds can have a large impact on households’ after-retirement 
wealth, and that it is necessary to understand the practices of the industry in order to better 
protect investors’ welfare. 
The U.S. mutual fund industry provides a vast variety of funds to customers. According to the 
calculation of Investment Company Institute of 2018, the number of mutual funds1 in the U.S. 
market increased from 68 in 1940 to 7,956 in 2017. Along with the rapid increase in the number 
of funds provided to the public, there were a large number of funds exiting the market in every 
year. It is natural to think of such fund exiting as the result of market competition and only best 
performing funds can survive on the market. However, poor performance is not the only factor 
determining a fund’s fate (Zhao, 2003; Ding, 2006; Dukes et al., 2006). The final re-
organization decisions are made by fund-families2 in the boardroom. As fund-families may 
change their business strategies according to the changes in market conditions and board 
 
1 Funds of funds (Fofs) were excluded in the calculation. 
2 A mutual fund-family is a group of mutual funds that share the same mutual fund sponsor. In this thesis, a 
fund-family refers to a fund sponsor.  
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members have concerns of their own interest, it can be expected that the process of making a 
decision to close down poorly performing funds is not always straightforward.  
The number of fund exits during the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) reached a record high. 
According to my calculation, 474 funds exited the market per annum during the period between 
2000 and 2007, the number of exits jumped to 650 in 2008 and further to 945 in 2009. One 
could argue that the increasing number of fund exits is the result of the universal poor fund 
performance in the collapsed financial market. However, the impact of GFC is not only on the 
performance of financial products, but also the behaviours of involved parties (investors and 
fund-families etc.) in the market. When the interactions among different parties vary under 
extreme market conditions, the natural market clearing mechanisms of mutual funds may be 
distorted consequently. Whilst extant research has investigated the determinants of fund exiting, 
none dealt with whether the determinants vary under different market conditions. 
This thesis is to fill this gap in our knowledge. I focus on the U.S. mutual fund industry, which 
is the largest market in the world and has the longest data history. Although the U.S. has the 
largest financial market since the early 20th century3 and the most competitive mutual fund 
industry, there is strong evidence of low financial literacy of investors, weak ethical standards 
of corporates, and agency problems which may erode shareholders’ interests, especially during 
market downturns. The 2008 GFC creates a context where the conflicts of interests between 
investors and fund-families may be severer. Therefore, the thesis attempts to investigate if those 
market imperfections distort the market clearing mechanisms in forcing poorly performing 
mutual funds out of the market during the GFC and the non-GFC times.  
The thesis deals with two main issues. The first one is to understand if the market clearing 
mechanism works in all times, i.e. if the negative relationship between fund performance and 
the propensity of exiting holds under all market conditions. The past literature documents that 
poor performance is the most important determinant of fund exits. Consistent with intuition, 
fund-families will lose active investors, i.e. the investors who are sensitive to their fund 
performance and will withdraw their investments from poorly performing funds, and their fee 
revenues if they do not take actions on those badly performing funds. However, these studies 
 
3 See https://www.trendfollowing.com/whitepaper/FINANCIAL_MARKET_HISTORY.pdf . 
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did not consider the situation in extreme market conditions where mutual funds perform 
universally badly, investors lose confidence in themselves finding better investment 
opportunities, and fund-families pay more attention to their own profits instead of investors’ 
interests. In such a crash market, some of the active investors leave the market completely 
anyway rather than search for better funds and passive investors hold on to their initial 
investments regardless of fund performance. In this case, even if a fund-family conducts re-
organizations of poorly performing funds, the number of active investors retained would be 
less than that in a non-crash market. Thus, the fund-family may be less willing to bear the costs 
of re-organizations and deal with badly performing funds during a crash market than during 
the other times. In other words, fund-families can maximize their profits by taking advantage 
of passive investors, with less need to take actions on poor performers in order to keep active 
investors staying with the family. In this respect, the GFC may distort the market clearing 
mechanism as the external governance, i.e. the pressure of losing active investors, on fund-
families becomes weaker during the GFC. 
The second issue is to investigate if the internal governance of fund-families mitigates or 
aggravates the distortion of market clearing mechanisms. Past research suggests that both 
external and internal monitoring mechanism are needed to protect investor welfare in face of 
the conflicts of interests between fund management and investors. Fund boards are expected to 
represent investors’ interests, especially when investors may have already experienced huge 
financial losses during a crash market. Therefore, board members are supposed to approve the 
re-organizations of worst performing funds for the interests of investors. However, as the 
reduction of the number of funds in a family may reduce directors’ remuneration, such conflicts 
of interests could further distort the decision-making process and erode investor interests, in 
particular when directors’ own interests are in higher risk during the GFC than during the other 
times.  
Furthermore, the thesis also looks into the performance-exit relationship in the UK mutual fund 
industry. To my best knowledge, no comprehensive research has been done on the exit 
decisions of UK mutual funds due to the lack of a survivorship-bias-free database for the UK 
fund market. The UK mutual fund market ranks the third following France and Germany in 
terms of number of funds (3,033 as at year-end 2018) and assets under management ($1.683 
trillion as at year-end 2018) in Europe, except for the two large offshore markets of Ireland and 
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Luxembourg (ICI Investment FactBook, 2019). Besides the similarities shared in the US and 
the UK markets such as common law systems, security regulations in the sense of disclosure 
requirements, liability standards, and public enforcement (La Porta et al., 2006; Ferreira et al., 
2013), and investor sophistication 4 , there are large differences in the maturity and 
organizational structure of the mutual fund industry between the two markets. The UK is still 
lagging behind the US in terms of total mutual fund assets ($21.078 trillion in the US versus 
$1.683 trillion in the UK at the year-end 2018), and the number of mutual funds on the market 
(10,066 in the US versus 3,033 in the UK at the year-end 2018). It is natural to expect that the 
competition among mutual funds and fund-families in the US market is fiercer than that in the 
UK, which may result in a weaker performance-exit relationship in the UK than in the US 
mutual fund industry. Furthermore, the U.K. mutual fund industry is unique relative to the U.S.’ 
mutual fund industry in terms of the regulations that funds compete within separated sectors, 
which creates a context in which the impact of industry structure on fund exiting mechanisms 
could be investigated. Thus, the thesis attempts to investigate the performance-exit relationship 
in the UK mutual fund industry to understand whether market competitiveness impacts the 
strength of market clearing mechanisms, both at country-level (i.e. the comparison between the 
US and the UK) and at sector-level within a country (i.e. the comparison among different 
sectors in the UK market).  
The thesis makes use of the monthly U.S. fund data during the period between January 2000 
and June 2015 provided by the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Mutual Fund 
Database for the first research question. In order to examine the impact of fund governance on 
exit decisions, a large unique hand-collected dataset of fund board characteristics covering 15 
years from 2000 to 2014 was obtained from 485ABOP/485BPOS reports on the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) website via the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and 
Retrieval (EDGAR) system. This dataset makes it possible to study the time-varying board 
characteristics of mutual funds and the impact of fund governance on exit decisions in different 
times. Moreover, Morningstar Direct was used to examine mutual fund exits in the UK market. 
The information of UK exit funds was not launched till 2008 in Morningstar Direct and the 
thesis makes use of this new dataset to fill the gap in the knowledge of UK mutual fund exits. 
 
4 See Ferreira and Ramos (2009) which used stock market turnover as a proxy as investor sophistication.  
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The first main finding documented in the thesis is that the negative relationship between fund 
performance and the probability of fund exits exists during non-GFC times, but disappears 
during the GFC. This evidence adds to our understanding of fund-families’ changing profit-
maximisation strategies in different periods. It also gives support to the past wisdom that the 
ethical standard of businesses is lower during market distresses (Campbell, 2007). The finding 
that the distortion of the market clearing mechanism brought by the GFC exists in both the US 
and the UK markets indicates that this is not a sample-specific phenomenon, but is supposed 
to bring the attention of the authorities in each country to improve the ethical standards and 
further regulate the practices of the asset management industry.  
The second main finding in the thesis is that the mergers in the US market improve the 
performance of the target funds but worsen the performance of the acquirers, whilst the mergers 
in the UK market improve the performance of both the targets and the acquirers. This is 
probably explained by the average smaller size of the UK funds relative to the US funds and 
the consequent economies of scale achieved for both the targets and the acquirers through 
mergers. 
The third main finding in the thesis is that the effects of board characteristics on exit decisions 
differs in different periods. To be more specific, directors work on protecting the remuneration 
of their own at the expense of the best interests of investors during the GFC. This evidence 
reveals another side of conflicts of interest-between directors and investors in the asset 
management industry besides the conflicts between fund-families and investors stated in the 
first finding.  
The final main finding in the thesis states that in the early 2000s, the market force in the UK 
mutual fund industry is not strong enough to exit the worse performing funds, which is not the 
case for its US counterpart. This is consistent with the fact that the mutual fund industries in 
the two countries were at different development stages, where the UK was lagged far behind 
during that period and the weaker competitiveness in the UK mutual fund industry was 
associated with its weaker performance-exit relationship. Focusing on different sectors within 
the UK market, it is found that stronger negative performance-exit relationship exists in more 
competitive sectors such as domestic equity and domestic non-equity sectors. Therefore, this 
17 
 
thesis also contributes to our understanding of the determinants of UK mutual fund exits, and 
the impact of market competitiveness on market clearing mechanisms. 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 investigates the market clearing mechanisms in 
the U.S. mutual fund industry. It opens with a brief description of the U.S. mutual fund market 
and the impact of the financial crisis on it. The second part summarizes the past relevant 
literature and proposes the hypothesis. Then the data and methodology used for the empirical 
analysis are introduced. The same methodology is also used in Chapter 4. The fourth part 
presents the results of the regression analysis. The chapter concludes with a summary of the 
main findings, contributions, limitations and implications for future research and policy makers. 
The structure of Chapter 2 applies to Chapters 3 and 4. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes with a 
summary of the main findings and contributions of this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 2: MARKET CLEARING MECHANISMS IN THE U.S. 
MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY 
2.1 Background 
With $18.7 trillion assets under management at year-end 2017, the U.S. mutual fund industry 
is the largest in the world. Among the 57.3 million U.S. households (or 101.9 million 
individuals) owning mutual funds, 92 percent of them indicated that saving for retirement was 
one of their financial goal, and 75 percent treated it as their primary financial goal (ICI 
FactBook, 2018). Over the past two decades, the mutual fund industry has been developing 
rapidly, the number of funds and total net assets going up, with the exception of the GFC period 
during which mutual funds experienced heavy outflows and the number of funds exiting the 
market reached to a record high. This trend continued even in the post-crisis growth period. 
Given such unprecedented shock to the mutual fund industry and the important role this 
industry plays in saving for the old age, it is important to understand changes the industry was 
going through in the GFC and post-crisis periods. 
The stock market experienced the heaviest losses during the GFC since the start of the 21st 
century. Figure 2-1 plots the weekly values of the U.S. market index for the period between 
January 2000 and December 20145. Figure 2-1 clearly splits the 2000-2014 period into four 
periods: (1) January 2000-March 2003, a decline period after the burst of the dotcom bubble, 
referred to as the dotcom correction period; (2) April 2003-August 2007, a growth period 
between the two decline periods; (3) September 2007-March 2009, the GFC period, and (4) 
April 2009-December 2014, the recovery period after the GFC. The up and down of the market 
index indicates the sufficiency and lack of good investment opportunities on the market. Indeed, 
the numbers of mutual fund exits co-moved, but in a reverse direction, with the stock market 
index, as shown in Figure 2-26,7.  
 
5 The separation of sub-periods in this chapter is based on the ups and downs of the U.S. market index. An 
alternative cut-off point between the second and the third subperiod can be the month when Lehman Brothers 
collapsed, September 2008. It can be expected that the market touched the bottom and the investment opportunities 
may dry up since its breakdown. The empirical analysis in this chapter was also done based on this alternative 
choice of subperiods, and the results were preserved. 
6 This is based on my own calculation using the data during the 2000-2014 period, collected from the CRSP.  
7 The numbers of fund exits in each year are reported in the Appendix TableA2-1. 
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Figure 2-2 shows that, on average, 474 funds exited the market per annum during the period 
between 2000 and 2007, with more funds (541) exiting in 2002 when the dotcom bubble burst 
shocked the market. Another peak of fund exits occurred in year 2009 when 945 funds exited 
the market. That a large number of funds exited the market did not even discontinue after the 
GFC, and, on average, 626 funds exited the market per annum during the post-crisis period 
between 2010 and 2014. Translating to the proportion of the total funds, 5.25%, 7.73%, and 
5.04% of the funds on the market were delisted during the periods of 2000-2007, 2008-2009, 
and 2010-2014, respectively. A fund exits the market in the form of liquidations, within-family 
mergers (WFM, being merged by a fund within the family same as the target fund), or across-
family mergers (AFM, being merged by a fund from another fund-family), and Figure 2-2 
shows that during the sample period, funds mainly took the form of liquidations and within-
family mergers when leaving the market. The percentage of liquidations increased significantly 
during period 2012-2014, reaching around 55% of all exits per year, and the percentage of 
across-family mergers declined steadily from 14% in 2000 to 1.30% in 2014.  
 
Figure 2-1. The weekly values (in U.S. dollar) of the U.S. market index for the January 2000 
– December 2014 period. Data Source: Datastream, S&P 500 Composite Index 
 





























































































































































































Figures 2-1 and 2-2 confirm that a larger number of funds exited the market during the two 
periods with lower financial performance, but it also shows that the GFC years were 
substantially distinguished from any other years, even the years of the dotcom correction. 
Although the U.S market index declined in both the dotcom correction and the GFC periods, 
the shock of the GFC to the market was much heavier than that of the dotcom correction. The 
S&P 500 index lost 43% in a period of 39 months between January 2000 and March 2003, 
whilst it lost 53% in the 19 months during the GFC between September 2007 and March 2009, 
and the S&P 500 index reached the bottom in March 2009 at 683.38 since 2000. 
Table 2-1. The returns of the indices of 10 S&P economy sectors during the four periods, in decimal. Data Source: 
Datastream, S&P 500 sector indices. 
 Jan 2000-Mar 2003 Apr 2003-Aug 2007 Sep 2007-Mar 2009 Apr 2009-Dec 2014 
Financial -0.088 0.580 -0.737 1.730 
Energy -0.114 1.879 -0.367 0.693 
ConsumerStaples -0.068 0.467 -0.214 1.246 
Info technology -0.736 0.807 -0.393 1.808 
Industrials -0.315 0.937 -0.546 1.964 
Materials -0.281 1.126 -0.449 1.223 
Utilities -0.325 1.080 -0.335 0.837 
Communication  -0.713 0.809 -0.402 0.443 
Consumer Disc. -0.383 0.618 -0.471 2.625 
Health care -0.043 0.267 -0.292 1.806 
Average -0.307 0.857 -0.421 1.438 
In addition, the adverse impact of the dotcom correction was mainly restricted to technology 
and communication sectors, whilst almost all sectors suffered heavy losses during the GFC. 
Table 2-1 reports the returns8 of the 10 sectors included in the S&P 500 index calculation 
during the four periods separately. On average, the 10 sectors lost 30.7% during the dotcom 
correction and lost 42.1% during the GFC, whilst they gained 85.7% and 143.8% during the 
two growth periods, respectively. Although the whole market lost heavily between January 
2000 and March 2003, the adverse impact of the dotcom correction on sectors varied largely 
across sectors. For instance, the information technology and communication sectors lost 73.6% 
and 71.3% respectively, but the health care and consumer staples sectors only lost 4.3% and 
6.8% respectively. However, during the GFC, all of the ten sectors suffered heavy losses of 
over 20%, creating an extremely tough environment for investors.  
 
8 The returns were calculated as the percentage changes in the daily index price of each sector from the starting 
day to the end day of the periods questioned.  
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This pattern was more obvious when the returns of individual industries were examined of the 
ten sectors. Table 2-2 shows the returns9 of the 51 industries10 included in the S&P 500 index 
calculation during the four periods. The first column of Table 2-2 shows that 11 industries 
gained profits for investors during the dotcom correction period, of which the health care 
service industry gained the highest return of 47.5%. However, none of the 51 industries earned 
positive returns during the GFC. Apart from the biotechnology industry which lost only 0.026%, 
the other 50 industries all lost over 15%. This confirms that a unique crash market formed 
during the GFC period, characterized by largely reduced investment opportunities across all 
industries, more than a bear market such as the dotcom correction period where investors could 
dig out good investment opportunities in several industries.  
In the light of the distinct market characteristics and fund exit patterns in the four periods, this 
chapter aims to investigate whether fund exiting is related to poor performance and whether 
the performance-exit relationship changes in different market conditions, in particular during 
the GFC.  
To test the research questions, the data for 6,600 funds that exited the market between 2000 
and 2014 and for over 10,000 funds that remained operational between January 2000 and June 
2015 were collected and analysed. In the empirical analysis, quarterly logit regressions of the 
exit and the surviving funds on fund performance, after controlling for fund characteristics are 
adopted. In addition, to ensure the robustness of the analysis, each exit fund is matched with a 
comparable surviving fund which shares similar basic characteristics with the exit fund using 
Nearest-Neighbour-Matching (NNM). The quarterly logit regressions are repeated on the 
matched sample to ensure that any effects of fund performance on the probability of exits are 
not driven by the distributional differences between the exit and the surviving funds.  
The empirical results show that there is a negative relationship between fund performance and 
exits during the non-GFC periods, but this relationship disappears during the GFC. A 
theoretical model is proposed to illustrate the changes in the performance-exit relationship 
across market regimes. Faced with the lack of investment opportunities on the market, a 
significant portion of active investors may leave the market completely during the GFC. As 
 
9 The returns were calculated as the percentage changes in the daily index price of each sector from the starting 
day to the end day of the periods questioned. 
10 Only the industries which had complete price history in the period between January 2000 and December 2014 
were taken into account in Table 2-2.  
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profit-maximisers, fund-families may consequently have less motivation to exit the poorly 
performing funds when the external pressure, i.e. the share withdrawal by active investors, 
weakens. 
This chapter contributes to the literature on the determinants of fund exits by expanding the 
evidence that the performance-exit relationship changes across market regimes. It adds 
evidence to the fund-family behaviour literature by showing that the profit-maximisation 
practice of fund-families may change with market conditions, according to the potential 
changes in the behaviour of active investors. It also shows another side of the agency problem 




Table 2-2. The returns of the indices of 51 S&P industries during the four periods, in decimal. Data Source: 
Datastream, S&P 500 industry indices. 
 Jan 2000-Mar 2003 Apr 2003-Agu 2007 Sep 2007-Mar 2009 Apr 2009-Dec 2014 
MEDIA & ENT     -0.527 0.313 -0.542 3.649 
AUTO COMPONENTS     -0.388 1.003 -0.703 3.001 
AUTOMOBILES     -0.576 0.076 -0.788 3.689 
CONSUMER SERVICES     -0.310 1.582 -0.295 1.562 
HOTELS REST & LEIS   -0.310 1.705 -0.327 1.805 
HH. DURABLES     0.001 0.426 -0.639 3.746 
LEISURE PRODUCTS     0.285 0.177 -0.403 1.387 
MULTILINE RETAIL     -0.213 1.035 -0.508 1.436 
SPECIALTY RETAIL     -0.414 0.638 -0.378 2.534 
TEXTILES & APPAREL     0.206 1.032 -0.406 2.718 
BEVERAGES IN     -0.104 0.405 -0.159 1.122 
FD/STAPLES RTL     -0.207 0.123 -0.155 1.329 
FOOD PRODUCTS     0.122 0.521 -0.259 1.380 
HH. PRODUCTS     -0.156 0.412 -0.259 1.030 
PERSONAL PRODUCTS     -0.058 0.960 -0.432 0.982 
TOBACCO     0.263 2.195 -0.243 1.630 
ENERGY EQUIP & SERV     -0.216 2.664 -0.590 1.023 
GAS & CONS. FUELS     -0.093 1.737 -0.305 0.655 
BANKS     0.065 0.456 -0.739 2.235 
CAPITAL GOODS     -0.360 1.019 -0.585 1.912 
INSURANCE     -0.145 0.611 -0.725 1.881 
BIOTECHNOLOGY     -0.200 0.328 -0.026 3.315 
HC EQUIP & SUPP     0.203 0.564 -0.309 1.261 
HC PROV & SERV     0.475 1.130 -0.461 2.846 
PHARMACEUTICALS     -0.110 0.020 -0.276 1.363 
AEROSPACE&DEFENCE     -0.189 1.595 -0.472 2.088 
AIR FREIGHT&COUR.    0.026 0.462 -0.405 1.427 
AIRLINES     -0.421 -0.020 -0.581 4.328 
BUILDING PRODUCTS     -0.288 0.687 -0.643 2.774 
CS & SUPP IN     -0.153 0.512 -0.477 1.052 
CONS & ENGINEERING     -0.032 2.748 -0.429 0.504 
ELEC. EQUIPMENT     -0.214 1.410 -0.480 1.621 
INDUSTRIAL CONG     -0.465 0.573 -0.700 1.744 
MACHINERY     -0.066 1.735 -0.555 2.223 
COML/PROF SVS     -0.153 0.512 -0.476 1.142 
ROAD & RAIL     0.148 1.598 -0.306 3.562 
TRADING COMP & DIST  0.010 1.125 -0.327 2.124 
TRANSPORTATION     -0.064 0.745 -0.373 2.519 
COMM. EQUIPMENT     -0.926 1.162 -0.431 0.775 
ELT/EQ/INS/CM     -0.814 0.688 -0.617 1.625 
IT SERVICES     -0.694 0.025 -0.351 1.719 
SOFTWARE     -0.641 0.505 -0.320 1.498 
TECH HWARE & EQUIP     -0.757 1.185 -0.391 1.906 
CHEMICALS     -0.217 0.897 -0.342 1.630 
CONS MATERIALS     -0.232 1.925 -0.508 0.302 
CONTAINERS & PACK  -0.184 0.723 -0.453 1.651 
METALS & MINING     -0.393 2.443 -0.542 0.008 
PAPER & FOREST  -0.358 0.486 -0.687 3.553 
ELECTRIC UTILITIES     -0.043 1.141 -0.315 0.613 
GAS UTILITIES     -0.380 0.723 -0.358 2.760 





2.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.2.1 Literature review 
Factors associated with mutual funds’ exits are well documented in extant literature. The 
primary reason for fund exits is believed to be funds’ poor performance (Jayaraman et al., 2002; 
Zhao, 2003; Ding, 2006; Khorana et al., 2007; Wang and Huang, 2013). Zhao (2003) also states 
that the worst performing funds are more likely to be liquidated than to be within/across-family 
merged. Other determinants include fund flows, age, size, expense ratios, and family 
characteristics. The likelihood of a fund being merged is inversely related to fund sizes and 
flows (Zhao, 2003) and positively related to expense ratios (Jayaraman et al., 2002, Zhao, 2003). 
It is also recognised that funds with high 12b-1 fees11 and management fees are liquidated more 
slowly than funds with low or no 12b-1 fees, and that funds with high 12b-1 and management 
fees are merged within the family more quickly (Dukes et al., 2006). At fund-family level, 
Zhao (2003) points out that fund-families will consider a portfolio’s uniqueness, client sources 
and distribution channels when making fund exit decisions. There is also research relating fund 
failures to different market conditions. Cogneau and Hübner (2015) document that the 
predictability of performance in fund termination improves on bullish markets.  
In the decision-making process of closing and reorganizing funds, a fund-family has to measure 
both the profit reduction from keeping running the badly performing funds and the costs of 
closing/merging them. The size of the factors may vary under different market conditions, 
resulting in probable changes in fund exit strategies in different times.  
The amount of profit reduction from running poorly performing funds depends largely on 
investors’ sensitivity to fund performance. Numerous papers document that sophisticated 
investors react actively to the past fund performance, investing in the funds with good recent 
performance and withdrawing cash from bad performers (Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Jain and Wu, 
2000; Wilcox, 2003; Spiegel and Zhang, 2013).  
 
11 12b-1 fee is defined as the ratio of the total assets attributed to marketing and distribution costs. 
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However, it is also well established that some investors are not performance-sensitive, that is, 
are not sophisticated enough to make wise investment decisions.  Elton et al. (2004) find that 
investors tend to buy the funds with higher marketing costs rather than the best-performing 
funds. This evidence is consistent with the finding that advertising works for attracting more 
money into funds (Jain and Wu, 2000; Barber et al., 2005; Huang et al., 2007), and advertising 
is more effective on unsophisticated investors than sophisticates ones (Goriaev et al., 2008). 
Similarly, Cooper et al. (2005) point out that investors may disregard the underlying 
performance of a fund and instead invest in funds simply based on fund names indicating that 
a fund is in a hot style at present.  
Even for the investors who are sensitive to the fund performance, their sensitivity to the fund 
performance is documented to be asymmetric (Ippolito, 1992; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; 
Goetzmann and Peles, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Huang et al., 2007). This asymmetric 
relationship means that investors invest in recent good performers but are reluctant to withdraw 
investments from bad performers. This finding is consistent with the disposition effect that 
investors tend to sell winners too early and ride losers too long (Shefrin and Statman, 1985), 
as a result of the mental accounting, regret aversion ,self-control and tax considerations. The 
disposition effect is commonly found in individual investors (Odean, 1998; Weber and 
Camerer, 1998; Oehler et al., 2003; Scherbina and Jin, 2005; Dhar and Zhu, 2006; Frazzini, 
2006; Kyle et al., 2006; Barberis and Xiong, 2012; Della Seta and Gryglewicz, 2016), but the 
strength of the disposition effect is different across investor types. Odean (1998) and Dhar and 
Zhu (2006) provide evidence that the disposition effect exists in both active and inactive traders, 
and the effect is stronger for inactive ones. Experienced and sophisticated investors with greater 
financial literacy exhibit less of the disposition effect (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Shapira 
and Venezia, 2001; Dhar and Zhu, 2006; Talpsepp, 2011).  
These studies indicate that the profit reduction for a fund-family from running poorly 
performing funds is more likely to come from active and sophisticated investors than from 
passive and less ‘savvy’ investors. In addition, the evidence that advertising is more effective 
during bear markets than in bull markets (Aydogdu and Wellman, 2011) suggests that investors 
could be less performance-sensitive during market distresses. Thus, the profit reduction for a 
fund-family from running bad performers could be less during bad times. 
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In any default or reorganizing processes, there can be sizable direct costs (e.g. legal, filing, 
accountancy and other administrative costs etc.) as well as indirect costs (e.g. the time spent in 
the process, and the negative impacts of bankruptcy on other products of the entity etc.). Gruber 
and Warner (1977) report that the direct bankruptcy cost for railroad companies as a proportion 
of the market firm value at the time of bankruptcy equals to 5.3% on average. Ang et al. (1982) 
documents the administrative costs as 7.5% of the firm liquidating value. Altman (1984) further 
estimates the indirect costs as 10.5% of the firm value just prior to the bankruptcy. Davydenko 
et al. (2012) report that the total costs of acquisitions and liquidations as a fraction of market 
value reaches 41.4% over the period 1997-2010. Furthermore, default costs are documented to 
be larger during recessions than during other times (Hackbarth et al., 2006; Chen, 2010). 
Regardless of the sample specification and methodology applied in the previous studies, it is 
clear that default and reorganization costs are too substantial to be overlooked in a liquidation 
or re-organisation, in particular in recessions.  
This chapter is also related to the literature on the probable low ethics of fund-families, that is, 
it is possible that fund-families put the interests of their own before their investors’. Navone 
(2010) documents that investors may pay little attention to fund expense ratios when the funds 
perform well in the past, and fund-families can exploit this pattern to strategically time their 
pricing decisions to maximize family revenues. Shirley and Stark (2016) find that fund-families 
may take advantage of fund incubations by generating increased performance during the 
incubation period, in order to establish an artificially good track record, regardless of the 
possibility that this outperformance reverses in the post-incubation period. Fund-families are 
also found to favour high-fee funds at the expense of low-fee ones (Gaspar et al., 2006). This 
chapter is to contribute to this strand of literature by revealing another unethical practice 
conducted in the decision making process of fund exits by fund-families. 
The adverse impacts of recessions, and in particular the GFC on the business environments and 
financial institutions are extensively examined (Campbell, 2007; Tsalikis, 2011; Carlson et al., 
2013; DeYoung and Torna, 2013; Flannery et al., 2013; Dunham et al., 2016; Harrison and 
Berman, 2016; Anginer et al., 2017). Harrison and Berman (2016) and Campbell (2007) show 
that corporate social responsibility can decline during economy recessions. Tsalikis (2011) find 
that consumers found much more unethical company conducts in 2009. Flannery et al (2013) 
find evidence of banking firms being opaquer in crisis periods than in other times. The 
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worsening information asymmetry problem between banks and investors during the crisis time 
leads to the failure of the monitoring on banks by investors reacting to banks’ poor performance 
in a timely manner. Dunhan et al. (2016) document the opaqueness to investors of mutual funds’ 
security lending programmes and the fact that the majority of the funds do not pass on the 
profits from security lending to their investors. Funds’ engagement in security lending activities 
are found to peak during the GFC, which may imply that investors are exposed to more risks 
as well as higher possibility of being ‘skimmed’ from more profits in the GFC period. This 
chapter is to contribute to this strand of literature by investigating the market clearing 
mechanisms in different times and revealing another impact of the GFC on the business 
environment and business ethics in the asset management industry. 
2.2.2 Hypothesis development 
Past literature suggests that bad fund performance leads to a higher probability of funds’ 
subsequent exits. Therefore, one could anticipate that the large number of fund exits during the 
GFC is due to the universal bad performance of the funds in this collapse market. However, 
the impact of GFC is not only on the performance of financial products, but also on investors’ 
behaviours, and the profit-maximizing strategies and ethical practices of fund-families.  
In non-GFC times, investors make investment decisions in a flourish market which offers a 
variety of well performing funds. This gives fund-families high pressure to offer the funds that 
can earn higher net returns for investors. In other words, if a fund-family does not close down 
or re-organise worse performing funds, it will lose the active investors who are sensitive to 
fund performance. This indicates a negative performance-exit relationship in a non-crash 
market.  
However, the story in a crash market like the GFC can be different12. In such a bad time, 
numerous panic investors may leave the financial market completely, and the investors left in 
a fund are more likely to be passive investors who are insensitive to fund performance when 
they can hardly find better investment opportunities in the market. The reduction in the number 
of active investors left in the market and passive investors’ ignorance of fund performance may 
 
12 The reason why the dotcom correction period is not viewed as a crash market is given in Section 2.1. 
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motivate fund-families to correspondingly change their profit-maximizing strategies to survive 
the GFC. The families which compete with better performance during non-GFC times do not 
need to exert efforts to improve performance during the GFC anymore, in order to retain and 
attract investors. Instead, they have the choice of taking no action (to save the costs incurred in 
the process of fund liquidations and mergers) on the worse performing funds while keeping 
enjoying the fee revenues from passive investors. In addition, the documented lower business 
ethics during market distresses suggest that the possibility for a fund-family to take advantage 
of investors could be higher during the GFC. Therefore, it is likely that the negative 
performance-exit relationship weakens or disappears during the GFC.  
To build up our intuition on the subject, let us assume that in a two–period world, a profit–
maximizing fund–family has two funds, A and B. The funds are run by different managers, but 
have the same expectations with regard to their performance.13 Let us also assume that both 
funds have the same proportion of active investors, i.e. investors sensitive to their fund 
performance and likely to move if they are dissatisfied with the fund performance, and of 
passive investors, i.e. investors who stay with the fund regardless of its performance. Let us 
denote the proportion of the active investors by . By definition, there are 1- passive investors.  
At the start of period 1, it is expected that fund A and fund B will deliver the same returns. At 
the end of period 1, the fund–family observes the performance of funds A and B before the 
information is released to the investors. Let us assume that fund A performed as expected, i.e. 
it delivered the expected return, but fund B performed below the expectations. The fund–family 
realizes that the active investors of fund A will be satisfied with the fund’s performance and 
certain to invest in it in period 2. The fund–family also realizes that the active investors of fund 
B will be disappointed with the fund’s performance and likely to withdraw their investments at 
the end of period 1. Some small fraction of them may move to fund A. The remaining ones will 
move to other fund–families. To increase the proportion of fund B’s investors moving to fund 
A, the fund–family can merge fund B with fund A or liquidate it.14 If fund B is merged with 
fund A, then all investors of fund B move to fund A. If it is liquidated, some fraction, bigger 
than the one if the fund–family did not take any action, would move to fund A. To keep the 
explanation simply, both liquidations and mergers will be referred to as exits. Whether the 
 
13 It is assumed that there are many fund–families like the one we consider.  
14 To ensure that some fund B investors move to fund A, the fund–family could make considerable efforts to 
advertise fund A. The advertisement costs would be counted as part of the cost of exit. 
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fund–family prefers to exit funds or do nothing depends on the cost of exit and how it compares 
with fees paid by the investors of fund B if they move to fund A and/or stay with fund B. 
 
If all the investors in the market were passive (i.e.  = 0) then, the fund–family would have no 
incentive to bear the cost of exiting fund B. This is illustrated in Figure 2-3 by the difference 
between line  and E for  = 0, where  and E denote the fund–family profits from operating 
both funds, and operating fund A after exiting fund B, respectively. 
 
If, on the other hand, all the investors in the market were active, then the fund–family’s profit 
from exiting fund B is represented by the difference between E and  when  = 1.  ’ denotes 
the critical value of  below which the fund–family does not benefit from exiting fund B, and 
above which it does. 
 
The above situation describes a market in which investors can find attractive, alternative 
investment opportunities if they are dissatisfied with the performance of fund B. Now, let us 
imagine that the market crashes and both funds perform worse than investors have expected, 
although fund A still outperforms fund B. Let us assume that some active investors may leave 
the market entirely, even if their fund was not the worst performer. In this scenario, the fund–
family is aware that some active investors will leave regardless of the fund–family’s actions.15 
Thus, fund A will have less active investors in period 2 than in period 1. The number of the 
passive investors will remain the same.16  
 
The action of fund B’s investors will once more depend of whether the fund–family exits fund 
B or not. If the fund–family decides to run fund B in period 2, all its passive investors will stay. 
The active investors will leave with some of them leaving the market entirely, and some of 
those that do not leave the market will move to better performing funds. Some of the investors 
from the latter group will move to fund A. The fund–family’s profits when they do not take any 
action and when they exit fund B are shown in Figure 2-3 as 𝜋𝐶  and 𝜋𝐸
𝐶 , respectively. 
 
15 This a plausible assumption as Johnson (2010) shows that some investors’ decisions to sell/retain their holdings 
in current funds are driven by the existence of better investment opportunities rather than the poor performance. 
16 Schmidt et al. (2016) show that sophisticated investors of money market mutual funds redeemed more than 
unsophisticated ones in response to negative shocks to the fundamentals during September 2008. Sophisticated 
investors were also more responsive to the withdrawals of unsophisticated ones, than the other way around. 
Ivković and Weisbenner (2009) show that outflows result from absolute fund performance.  
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If all the investors in the market were passive, it would not make any difference to the fund–
families whether the market crashed or not, i.e. whether fund A also performed below the 
expectations, as no investor would exit the market or move to a better performing fund. Thus, 
𝜋𝐶   and  have the same value when  = 0. The same argument applies to E and 𝜋𝐸
𝐶 .  
However, if all the investors were active (i.e.  = 1), and the fund–family did not take any 
action to exit the worst performing fund,  their profit would be lower in  a crash market than in 
a non–crash market because in a crash some investors of fund A would leave the market, too. 
Thus, 𝜋𝐶   is steeper than  as Figure 2-3 shows If the fund–family wanted to exit fund B to 
keep some of its active investors, it would face the cost of exit as in a non–crash world, but it 
would be able to keep less active investors as some of them would leave the market 
permanently. Thus, the impact of a market crash on the fund–family net gain when they decide 
to exit fund B would be bigger than if the fund–family decided not to take any action. 
Consequently, as there is no reason to assume that the cost of exit would be lower during a 
market crash than it is in a non–crash market, exiting the poorly performing fund B during a 
crash market would be less profitable than it would be during in a non–crash market. For any 
retention level of active investors, it would require fund B having higher proportion of active 
investors to make the exit decision profitable during a crash market. This means, that the critical 










Figure 2-3. Relationship between the proportion of active investors () and the fund–family’s 
profit in a non–crash market (when the worst performing fund does not exit the market, , and 
when it does, E), and in a crash market (when the worst performing fund does not exit the 















In summary, it can be concluded that while a negative relationship between performance and 
probability of exit in a non–crash market should be observed, the relationship may weaken 
during a market crash. This leads to two hypotheses to be tested:  
Hypothesis 1. There is a negative relationship between fund performance and the probability 
of fund exits during non-GFC periods. 
Hypothesis 2. There is a weak or no negative performance-exit relationship during the GFC 
period. 
Assuming the above hypotheses are supported by empirical evidence, it is important to 
understand whether and how the breakdown of the natural market clearing mechanisms 
affected investors. Due to the unavailability of the data of where investors invest after 
withdrawing their money from funds or after funds they invested in exited the market, I focus 
on the performance involved in mergers (referred to as targets) and their acquirers. 
It is well documented in the literature that the post–merger performance of acquirers worsens 
in comparison with their pre–merger performance. The opposite seems true for the target funds. 
The drop in the performance of acquirers is commonly attributed to restructuring costs they 
have to face as the result of acquiring poor investments of their targets. However, when the 
acquired investments perform relatively well, there may not be an immediate need to redesign 
targets’ portfolios and/or restructuring may be less costly (both financially and with regard to 
the time the management needs to spend on sorting out the acquired investments).  
Therefore, if it is true that better performing funds exit the market during the GFC, the impact 
of the acquisitions that took place during the GFC may not be as negative as it typically is 
during the times with the strong market forces to remove poorly performing funds. In other 
words, it may be expected that the weakening of the market clearing mechanisms during the 
GFC may have lowered the negative impact of the mergers on the acquirers. 
So, what is the cost of the poor performers being left on the market? At some point these poorly 
performing funds that survived the GFC will need to be dealt with, i.e. they will start exiting 
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the market, and some of them will be acquired. As the acquisition of poor performers is 
negatively associated with the poor post–merger performance of the acquirers, it can be 
expected that the negative impact of the post–GFC acquisitions on the acquirers may be strong. 
This leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: The decline in the post–merger performance of acquirers is weaker for the 
mergers that took place during the GFC than in the other periods. 
Hypothesis 4: The decline in the post–merger performance of acquirers is stronger for the 
mergers that took place after the GFC than in the non–GFC periods. 
2.3 Data and methodology 
2.3.1 Data and descriptive analysis 
To test the hypotheses data from the Survivor-Bias Free U.S. Mutual Fund Database provided 
by Centre for Research in Security Price (CRSP) were used. According to CRSP 7,814 mutual 
funds exited the market between January 2000 and December 201417. These funds came from 
824 fund-families and were in 62 investment objectives (including all sectors such as domestic 
equity funds, foreign equity funds, fixed-income funds, and mixed funds etc.) as defined by 
CRSP18. Only the primary classes were used in the analysis, defined as the share classes19 with 
the longest histories. This sample was screened for funds with incomplete information of 
monthly returns. A fund was removed from the sample if its returns time series ended two or 
more months before the exit date. The funds that have two or more consecutive months’ gaps 
in their return series were further dropped. This makes sure of the continuity of quarterly returns 
within a period, i.e. under no circumstances were there two consecutive missing values of 
quarterly returns.  
 
17Across-family mergers are excluded from the analysis as they are not necessarily related to a fund’s poor 
performance, but more related to the long-term business strategies of the target’s family and the acquirer’s family. 
Another reason to exclude across-family mergers is that there are too few AFMs to be analysed. 
18  The definition methodology was described in detail in http://www.crsp.com/products/documentation/crsp-
style-code. 
19 Different share classes of a mutual fund share the same portfolio but they charge investors different expenses. 
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Out of the 7,814 exit funds, 1,660 funds did not have a specified way of exiting the market. 
Using the webpages of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)20 and of the 
Bloomberg Company Overview (BCO), the sample was manually checked and the exit forms 
of additional 824 funds were confirmed. The remaining unclassified exits were excluded from 
the analysis. 
Thus, the final sample of 6,600 exit funds has 1,140 funds in January 2000 – March 2003, 
1,604 in April 2003 – August 2007, 734 in September 2007- March 2009, and 3,122 in April 
2009 – December 2014. The numbers of liquidations and within-family mergers in each of the 
four periods are shown in Table 2-3. Table 2-3 shows that during the pre-crisis and the GFC 
periods, within-family mergers were the major way for a fund exiting the market, whilst more 
funds took the form of liquidations to leave the market after the GFC. To create comparator 
samples, the information for 10,887 funds that did not exit the market till June 2015 when the 
data was collected was also collected. In total, I collected data for 17,487 funds from 1,014 
fund-families. 
Table 2-3. Number of fund exits in four periods 
 Liquidations Within-family mergers Total 
Jan2000-Mar 2003 459 681 1,140 
Apr 2003-Aug 2007 630 974 1,604 
Sep 2007-Mar 2009 354 380 734 
Apr 2009-Dec 2014 1,660 1,462 3,122 
Total 3,103 3,497 6,600 
For each of the 17,487 funds, the following information was collected from the CRSP: 
investment objective 21 , monthly net return, monthly total net assets, inception date, and 
quarterly reported turnover ratio 22 . The investment objectives are given by the CRSP 
classification. A fund’s age is defined as the number of years that a fund was in operation till 
current month. Fund total net assets measure a fund’s size (in millions of U.S. dollars) in each 
month. Monthly returns are provided by CRSP and calculated as a change in NAV inclusion 
reinvested dividends from one period to the next, where NAVs are net of all management 
expenses and 12b-fees. A fund’s turnover ratio is defined as the minimum of aggregated sales 
 
20 http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/srch-edgar 
21 There are 56 investment objectives among the 17,487 sample funds. The numbers of funds in each of the 56 
objectives are reported in the Appendix Table A2-2. 
22 Data on 12b-1 fees were also collected but there are too many missing observations to be included in the analysis. 
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or purchases of securities, divided by the average 12-month total net assets of the fund. Besides 
these fund characteristics, two variables representing family characteristics were constructed: 
fund-family size is defined as the sum of the market values of the funds of the family, and fund-
family specialization is defined as the ratio of the number of funds belonging to a certain style 
over the total number of funds a family provides. These statistics were used to calculate 
quarterly statistics.  
In the quarterly regression analysis, Age, Size, FF-size (fund-family size), FF-spec (fund-
family specialisation) are defined as the averages of the corresponding monthly statistics within 
each quarter. Returns and Flows are defined as the cumulative quarterly net returns and flows, 
respectively. Turnover is defined as the quarterly-reported value of turnover ratio. There are 
56 investment objectives in the sample.  
Table 2-4 reports the means, medians, and standard deviations for the quarterly variables for 
the exit funds. The first panel of Table 2-4 shows that during the 15 years of the sample period, 
an average exit fund earned 0.804% net of expenses per quarter, and had a history of 9.368 
years, $166.236 million assets under management, net cash outflows of 1.634% per quarter and 
a turnover ratio of 0.966. The fund-families for the sample exit funds on average managed 
$83.696 billion assets, and had a style specialization of 0.146.  
These statistics differ a lot across the four periods. During the two growth periods, an average 
exit fund could earn positive returns (3.558% between April 2003 and August 2007, and 3.957% 
in the post-crisis period), but the exit funds on average lost 1.569% during the dotcom 
correction period and 6.028% during the GFC respectively. It can also be seen that fund returns 
were skewed to the right during the growth periods but skewed to the left during the two decline 
periods. Although the mean returns in the two decline periods were both negative, the median 
exit fund in the dotcom correction earned 0.686% but the median exit fund in the GFC lost 
4.024%. This confirms the argument in Section 2.1 that the GFC created a much tougher 




Table 2-4. Descriptive statistics of the exit funds for the whole period and the four periods. The statistics are based on all quarters within the period specified in the top row. Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) 
cumulative, percentage 3-month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till the end-month of each quarter. The Size, FF-size and FF-spec statistics are based on the quarterly means of the corresponding 
statistics. 
 1/2000–12/2014  1/2000–3/2003  4/2003–8/2007  9/2007–3/2009  4/2009–12/2014 
 Mean Median St dev  Mean Median St dev  Mean Median St dev.  Mean Median St dev.  Mean Median St dev. 
Returns(%) 0.804 1.278 9.109  –1.569 0.686 10.432  3.558 1.899 6.134  –6.028 –4.024 7.678  3.957 3.648 9.128 
Age(yrs) 9.368 7.671 7.909  6.938 6.082 5.428  9.425 7.671 7.452  9.066 8.510 6.033  10.302 8.759 8.324 
Size($mil) 166.236 24.233 776.366  71.287 16.250 256.205  119.44 26.867 398.813  60.476 11.067 213.519  150.250 9.367 955.884 
Flows(%) -1.634 -2.603 17.730  –3.116 –3.029 19.544  –3.300 –3.263 15.126  –6.314 –4.923 21.082  –4.422 –3.646 17.457 
Turnover 0.966 0.640 1.108  1.107 0.800 1.177  0.963 0.660 0.980  1.135 0.770 1.328  0.915 0.570 1.116 
FF–size($bil) 83.696 30.348 169.499  52.029 16.844 73.347  59.908 41.321 75.191  75.068 33.153 132.438  123.573 26.513 265.173 
FF–spec 0.146 0.096 0.170  0.156 0.086 0.192  0.146 0.090 0.182  0.159 0.111 0.181  0.166 0.112 0.195 
Funds 6,600 6,600 6,600  1,140 1,140 1,140  1,604 1,604 1,604  734 734 734  3,122 3,122 3,122 
Obs23 101,354 101,354 101,354  5,236 5,236 5,236  10,096 10,096 10,096  1,245 1,245 1,245  23,700 23,700 23,700 
  
Table 2-5. Descriptive statistics of the merged (Panel A) and the liquidated (Panel B) funds. The statistics are based on all quarters within the period specified in the top row. Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) 
cumulative, percentage 3-month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till the end-month of each quarter. The Size, FF-size and FF-spec statistics are based on the quarterly means of the corresponding 
statistics. 
 1/2000–12/2014  1/2000–3/2003  4/2003–8/2007  9/2007–3/2009  4/2009–12/2014 
 Mean Median St dev  Mean Median St dev  Mean Median St dev.  Mean Median St dev.  Mean Median St dev. 
Panel A. Mergers     
Returns(%) 0.826 1.272 8.759  –1.362 0.969 10.498  3.412 1.829 5.891  –5.091 –2.985 6.810  4.437 3.997 8.672 
Age(yrs) 10.461 8.504 8.764  7.708 6.836 5.957  10.266 8.338 7.955  10.254 9.549 6.206  12.691 11.337 9.667 
Size($mil) 226.675 38.200 947.611  99.998 27.200 313.614  151.740 40.200 463.245  91.441 19.133 277.261  249.173 17.833 1,320.43 
Flows(%) -1.265 -2.662 16.629  –2.238 –3.192 17.853  –2.499 –3.229 13.947  –6.089 –5.211 17.341  –4.225 –3.660 15.092 
Turnover 0.944 0.650 1.040  1.085 0.830 0.995  0.928 0.660 0.887  0.859 0.710 0.773  0.866 0.580 1.024 
FF–size($bil) 93.258 47.314 184.116  67.554 72.212 76.407  71.324 71.395 79.508  95.225 49.614 163.561  146.949 34.432 316.953 
FF–spec 0.126 0.090 0.125  0.133 0.077 0.170  0.111 0.080 0.114  0.120 0.095 0.120  0.144 0.108 0.135 
Funds 3,497 3,497 3,497  681 681 681  974 974 974  380 380 380  1,462 1,462 1,462 
Obs 64,363 64,363 64,363  3,375 3,375 3,375  7,276 7,276 7,276  708 708 708  11,497 11,497 11,497 
Panel B.  Liquidations     
Returns(%) 0.766 1.293 9.689  –1.943 –0.193 10.304  3.934 2.050 6.708  –7.262 –5.761 8.541  3.504 3.337 9.515 
Age(yrs) 7.468 6.085 5.662  5.542 4.671 3.940  7.257 5.836 5.386  7.499 6.838 5.419  8.052 5.838 6.008 
Size($mil) 61.076 13.133 267.698  19.220 7.033 46.117  36.102 11.82 78.260  19.649 7.067 38.410  57.050 6.167 337.800 
Flows(%) -2.276 -2.435 19.481  –4.709 –2.674 22.202  –5.368 –3.355 17.650  –6.611 –4.316 25.193  –4.608 –3.625 19.420 
Turnover 1.006 0.630 1.216  1.147 0.730 1.450  1.054 0.670 1.183  1.499 0.930 1.753  0.962 0.570 1.194 
FF–size($bil) 67.057 16.153 138.926  23.876 2.076 57.629  30.452 5.501 52.230  48.493 9.245 64.631  101.549 23.645 202.295 
FF–spec 0.181 0.106 0.225  0.197 0.125 0.221  0.367 0.133 0.271  0.210 0.132 0.229  0.187 0.116 0.236 
Funds 3,103 3,103 3,103  459 459 459  630 630 630  354 354 354  1,660 1,660 1,660 
Obs 36,991 36,991 36,991  1,861 1,861 1,861  2,820 2,820 2,820  537 537 537  12,203 12,203 12,203 
 
23 The number of observations in the whole period is larger than the sum of the numbers of observations in the four periods. In each sub period, the observations only include 
the statistics within the period specified in the top row of the funds that exited within that period. But in the whole period, the observations include a fund’s available statistics 




Table 2-6. Descriptive statistics of the surviving funds for the whole and the four periods. Panel A is based on the funds that remained operation for at least 6 months after the end of each period specified in the top row. 
Panel B is based on the funds that remained operational within each of the periods specified in the top row, The statistics are based on all quarters within the period specified in the top row. Quarterly returns/flows are 
(not annualised) cumulative, percentage 3-month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till the end-month of each quarter. The Size, FF-size and FF-spec statistics are based on the quarterly means of the 
corresponding statistics. 
 1/2000–12/2014  1/2000–3/2003  4/2003–8/2007  9/2007–3/2009  4/2009–12/2014 
 Mean Median St dev  Mean Median St dev  Mean Median St dev  Mean Median St dev  Mean Median St dev. 
Panel A. plus 6 months 
Returns(%) 1.833 1.852 8.434  –0.991 0.789 9.656  3.390 2.127 5.493  –7.026 –4.843 9.441  3.303 2.716 7.841 
Age(yrs) 12.192 9.923 10.454  9.584 7.173 9.585  11.190 9.173 9.610  11.471 9.923 9.803  12.759 10.838 10.540 
Size($mil) 1007.093 137.500 4049.679  633.0000 87.930 3,069.000  827.120 112.300 3,485.000  788.000 88.250 3,497  976.140 117.270 4,090.600 
Flows(%) 2.468 -0.471 18.624  2.940 –0.425 18.024  2.194 –0.687 17.742  0.871 –1.668 19.185  2.013 –0.661 18.962 
Turnover 0.819 0.490 1.074  0.970 0.630 1.119  0.870 0.530 1.109  0.839 0.530 1.069  0.791 0.470 1.068 
FF–size($bil) 175.129 40.716 316.017  94.260 45.170 157.050  128.570 44.352 228.990  159.930 39.035 289.040  199.140 38.169 357.580 
FF–spec 0.144 0.093 0.174  0.138 0.083 0.167  0.132 0.086 0.151  0.139 0.095 0.161  0.151 0.100 0.182 
Funds 10,499 10,499 10,499  7,661 7,661 7,661  8,011 8,011 8,011  9,313 9,313 9,313  10,499 10,499 10,499 
Obs.24 292,591 292,591 292,591  57,498 57,498 57,498  95,964 95,964 95,964  39,764 39,764 39,764  159,639 159,639 159,639 
Panel B. plus 0 month 
Returns(%) 1.821 1.838 8.413  –1.039 0.765 9.702  3.372 2.118 5.503  –7.049 –4.874 9.424  3.286 2.687 7.822 
Age(yrs) 12.117 9.841 10.372  9.514 7.167 9.524  11.185 9.173 9.577  11.403 9.836 9.793  12.702 10.838 10.459 
Size($mil) 979.402 129.300 3991.253  677.900 84.200 3,035.000  813.770 109.430 3,454.000  758.450 81.000 3,426.000  948.600 109.630 4,031.000 
Flows(%) 2.338 -0.542 18.620  2.817 –0.464 18.013  2.087 –0.743 17.704  0.782 –1.708 19.170  1.820 –0.751 18.956 
Turnover 0.834 0.500 1.098  0.980 0.640 1.122  0.875 0.540 1.112  0.841 0.530 1.070  0.806 0.470 1.092 
FF–size($bil) 173.195 41.199 312.818  92.930 44.794 155.628  127.476 44.281 227.709  155.892 38.239 284.403  196.997 38.247 354.206 
FF–spec 0.143 0.092 0.173  0.139 0.083 0.168  0.132 0.086 0.152  0.139 0.095 0.160  0.150 0.099 0.182 
Funds 10,905 10,905 10,905  7,846 7,846 7,846  8,822 8,822 8,822  9,717 9,717 9,717  10,905 10,905 10,905 
Obs. 301,722 301,722 301,722   58,856 58,856 58,856   97,802 97,802 97,802   41,503 41,503 41,503   164,638 164,638 164,638 
 
 
24 The number of observations in the whole period is smaller than the sum of the numbers of observations in the four periods. The restricted surviving sample for 1/2000-
12/2014 only includes the funds that did not exit the market till June 2015. Yet, the surviving sample for the four periods includes the funds that were operational for at least 6 
months after the end of a period, before June 2015. This also means there is overlap in the funds that were counted as surviving funds in each period, thus, the sum of the 
numbers of observations in the four periods is larger than the number of observations in the whole period. 
37 
 
Table 2-4 also shows that the mean and median age of the exit funds increased from period to 
period. The average (median) age increased from 6.938 years (6.082 years) in the dotcom 
correction to 10.302 years (8.759 years) in the post-crisis growth period. The average size of 
the exit funds was larger in the two growth periods than the decline periods, but the median 
size ($9.367 million) in the post-crisis period was the smallest in comparison with the other 
periods. The size in all periods was skewed to the right. In every period, the exit funds suffered 
net cash outflows and the heaviest outflows occurred in the GFC period (-6.314% of the 
average and -4.923% of the median). The distribution of the turnover ratio was skewed to the 
right, and the exit funds in the decline periods rebalanced portfolio holdings more frequently 
(1.107 in the dotcom correction and 1.135 in the GFC) in comparison with the two growth 
periods (0.963 in the pre-GFC growth, and 0.915 in the post-GFC growth). The average fund-
family size of the exit funds increased from period to period and was skewed to the right in 
every period. The fund-family specialisation did not differ much across periods. 
Table 2-5 reports the means, median, and standard deviations for the quarterly variables for 
within-family mergers and liquidations in Panels A and B, respectively. The differences 
between growth markets and decline markets, and the skewness of variables suggested in Table 
2-4 are confirmed in the sub-samples. Besides this, Table 2-5 shows the large differences 
between liquidations and mergers. The first panel in Table 2-5 shows that liquidated funds 
earned 0.6% less than merged funds on average during the 15 years, although the 
underperformance of liquidations was not confirmed by the medians. However, the evidence 
that in three out of the four periods the liquidated funds underperformed merged funds is 
consistent with the finding in Zhao (2003) that the worst performing funds tend to be liquidated 
rather than be merged. The liquidated funds were younger, and smaller than the merged funds 
on average. The average net flow of the liquidated funds was lower than that of the merged 
funds, and the liquidated funds traded more frequently than the merged ones. The fund-families 
of the liquidated funds were smaller than those of the merged funds, which is consistent with 
the argument in Zhao (2003) that a larger family is more likely to find suitable funds (e.g. 
sharing the same investment objective, management teams or distribution channels, etc.) to 
acquire a fund in the family. The fund-families of the liquidated funds were more specialised 
in investment objectives in comparison with the merged funds. 
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To assess the performance-exit relationship, a comparator sample needs to be constructed in 
comparison to the exit funds. A natural way of constructing the comparator is to classify the 
funds that were in operation in the last quarter of a period as the surviving funds. However, this 
definition may include the funds that exited the market soon after the end of a period, so a more 
restricted comparator was constructed to ensure robustness of the analysis which consists of 
the funds that remained operational six months after the end of a period. For example, the 
surviving comparator for the exit funds between January 2000 and March 2003 consists of the 
funds that were in operation between January 2000 and September 2003. If the exit decision is 
related to fund performance, it can be expected that the performance differences between the 
exit sample and the restricted comparator sample are larger than that between the exit and the 
comparator sample without the six-month restriction. Thus, the restricted comparator creates a 
more challenging sample to test the performance-exit relationship and whether the relationship 
becomes weaker during the GFC period.  
Table 2-6 reports the means, medians, and standard deviations for the quarterly variables for 
the surviving funds that were in operation six months after the end of a period (Panel A) and 
the sample without this restriction (Panel B). These two Panels give very similar statistics, and 
the values in Panel A are used to illustrate the differences between the exit and the surviving 
samples. Table 2-6 Panel A shows that, on average during the 15 years, the surviving funds 
outperformed exit funds by 1.029% per quarter, and were 2.824 years older than exit funds. 
The size of surviving funds was over 6 times that of exit funds. The surviving funds received 
net cash inflows of 2.468% per quarter, and had lower turnover ratio than the exit funds. In 
addition, the surviving funds belonged to larger fund-families in comparison to the exit funds, 
and the survivors’ families were slightly more diversified than the exit funds’ families indicated 
by the lower family specialisation.  
The differences between the surviving funds and the exit funds were preserved in the four 
periods except for the GFC period when the average (median) return for exit funds of -6.028% 
(-4.024%) was higher than that for the surviving funds of -7.026% (-4.843%). This pattern was 
preserved in the post-crisis period. This comparison suggests that the role of performance in 




2.3.2.1 Performance-exit relationship 
To test the role of performance in determining fund exits, quarterly logit regressions were used 
where the dependent variables take the value of one for the exit funds and zero for the surviving 
funds, and the independent variables are funds’ Return, Age, Size, Flows, Turnover, FF-size 
and FF-spec, plus the investment objective and time dummies. All the regressions are clustered 
by investment objectives. As a small number of clusters (less than 30 or 4025) may cause the 
underestimation of standard errors (Cameron et al., 2008), besides clustering by investment 
objectives, the regressions clustered by funds were used to ensure robustness of the analysis, 
and the clustering that gave higher standard errors (less statistical significance) were used as 
the main results. Specifically, the logit regressions are estimated using the following 
specification, where i refers to fund i, and t refers to quarter t for each fund. 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡)𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡      (1) 
All the regressions were run on the whole sample period between January 2000 and December 
2014, and the four sub-periods, to test the performance-exit relationship in different times. In 
quarterly regressions, the funds that exited within the first three months were dropped in each 
period. This is motivated by the possibility that it took months to implement an exit decision, 
thus the exit decision of the funds that exited at the very start of a period was not driven by the 
performance within that period. Therefore, the exclusion of these funds makes a fund’s exit 
decision more related to its performance in each period.  
Quarterly regressions were preferred to monthly regressions as quarterly observations were 
less volatile and reflected longer-term fund performance and characteristics in comparison 
monthly observations. However, the regressions were repeated on monthly statistics to show 
the robustness of the analysis. Regressions on monthly observations increase the number of 
 




observations and the sample size, as the funds that exited in the first three months of a period 
were included.  
The Section 2.3.1 shows that there were substantial differences in the distributions of fund 
characteristics such as Size and Age, etc. between the exit and the surviving funds. In order to 
mitigate the potential biases induced by the differences in data distributions, the Nearest-
Neighbour Matching (NNM) method26 was applied to pick up a surviving fund for each exit 
fund sharing similar fund characteristics. It is commonly mentioned that only variables that 
affect both the group exposure and outcomes are selected as the matching covariates 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Heckman et al., 1998; Augurzky and Schmidt, 2001; Ravallion, 
2001; Bryson et al., 2002). Thus, the matching was done on funds’ Size, Age, and Investment 
objectives27 which are believed to have significant effects on both fund performance (outcomes) 
and exit decisions (group exposure), with replacement. The regressions on the matched sample 
examined whether performance is related to the exit decisions of the funds that share the same 
investment objectives, and similar sizes and ages in the whole market. Given the fact that the 
exit decisions were made in a fund-family, the matching was repeated after adding Fund-family 
as another covariate. The regressions on the new matched sample examined the role of fund 
performance in determining the exit decisions within a fund-family. 
In summary, two sets of matching were adopted in this chapter. The first one matches on fund 
Size, Age, and Investment objective, and the second one matches on fund Size, Age, 
Investment objective, and Fund-family. It can be expected that the imposition of the restriction 
of both the exit and the surviving fund coming from the same fund-family reduces the size of 
the matched sample, which may worsen the matching quality. 
Figure 2-4 shows the standardized differences in means (SDMs) in Panel A and the variance 
ratios (VRs) in Panel B for the NNM on fund Size, Age, and Investment objective28. Panel A 
 
26 Other matching techniques-Propensity Score Matching with the nearest neighbour matching (PSM-NN) and 
Propensity Score Matching with kernel matching (PSM-K) were also performed, but their matching quality is not 
as good as NNM indicated by the standardized differences and variance ratios of the treated and control groups. 
The detailed matching statistics for the three methods are reported in the Appendix Tables A2-3 –A2-8. 
27 Funds’ Flows, and Expenses can also affect fund performance and exit decisions. However, the matching quality 
after adding either Flows or Expenses, or both was worsened in comparison to the matching without these two 
variables.  
28 The values of SDMs and VRs are reported in the Appendix. 
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shows that the absolute values of the SDMs of Size and Age were substantially reduced to 
nearly 0 after matching, and this was true for both the liquidations and mergers sub-samples, 
and for each of the four periods. Panel B shows that the VRs of Size and Age were approaching 
to 1 after the matching, regardless of the period and the form of fund exits. Therefore, Figure 
2-4 confirms that the NNM on fund Size, Age, and Investment objective successfully reduced 
the distributional differences between the exit and the surviving funds. 
Figure 2-5 shows the equivalent statistics after the NNM on funds’ Size, Age, Investment 
objective and Fund-family29. Panel A shows that the absolute values of the SDMs in Size and 
Age were reduced for both the liquidation and mergers samples and for the four periods, but 
the reduction was not as much as that in the matching without restricting on fund-families. 
Panel B shows that although the majority of the VRs were approaching to one after the 
matching, there were some becoming further away from one, e.g. the VR of Size for mergers 
in the post-crisis period, and the VR of Age for liquidations in the post-crisis period. Figure 2-
5 confirms the expectation that imposing the matching restriction of funds belonging to the 
same family worsens the matching quality. 
Table 2-7 reports the means, medians, and standard deviations of all variables (not only the 
matching variables) for the exit and the surviving funds determined by the NNM on funds’ 
Size, Age and Investment objective. After the NNM, the differences in all the variables between 
the exit and surviving samples were reduced in comparison with Tables 2-4 and 2-6. For 
example, the difference in Returns (Flows) before the matching is 1.029% (4.102%) but only 
0.513% (2.719%) after the matching, during the whole sample period. This confirms that the 
NNM was effective in reducing the distributional differences in data. Table 2-8 reports the 
equivalent statistics for mergers (Panel A) and liquidations (Panel B) separately, and generally 
confirms the pattern presented in Table 2-7. Table 2-8 also shows that the return differences 
between surviving and liquidated funds were generally larger than those between surviving and 
merged funds, even after the matching.  
Tables 2-9 and 2-10 report the equivalent statistics to those presented in Tables 2-7 and 2-8, 
but for the matching on funds’ Size, Age, Investment objective and Fund-family. It is obvious 
 
29 The values of SDMs and VRs are reported in the Appendix. 
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that imposing the restriction that the exit and surviving funds coming from the same family 
considerably reduced the size of the matched sample, as it caused the problem with finding 
matches within the same family as an exit fund. In addition, the characteristics of the exit and 
matched surviving funds became more similar when they were requested to belong to the same 
fund-family. The two tables also show that surviving funds underperformed exit funds only 
during the GFC period, and this was true for both the liquidation and the merger groups. 
2.3.2.2 Market-risk factors  
To assess any potential differences in the post– and the pre– merger performance of the 
acquirers and of their targets, I compare funds alphas estimated from a multifactor risk model 
similar to the one used by Fung and Hsieh (1997). For this purpose, I collected data on the three 
Fama–French factors (Fama and French, 1972; Fama and French, 1973)30, the US Benchmark 
10-year DataStream Government Bond total return index, JPMorgan Global Government Bond 
total return index and the S&P GSCI Gold total return index. Their corresponding time series 
of monthly returns are denoted as MKTRF, SMB, HML, USGB, GGB and Gold. The bond and 
gold indices were downloaded from Datastream. The Fama–French three factors replace the 
three equity market indices (e.g. the domestic equity index, the developed markets’ equity 
index and the emerging markets’ equity index) used by Fung and Hsieh (1997).  This is done 
to avoid the high correlation of the US domestic and foreign equity indices. Specifically, funds’ 
alphas are estimated by the following six-factor model: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖4𝑈𝑆𝐺𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖5𝐺𝐺𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖6𝐺𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  (2) 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the fund return in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate. Table 2-11 shows 






Figure 2-4. Standardized differences in means (Panel A) and the variance ratios (Panel B) for 
the NNM, matched by investment objectives, age, and size. The surviving sample definition: 
plus six months. 
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Figure 2-5. Standardized differences in means (Panel A) and the variance ratios (Panel B) for 
the NNM, matched by investment objectives, age, size and fund–family. The surviving sample 
definition: plus six months. 













Table 2-7. Descriptive statistics of the exit and surviving funds determined by the Nearest–Neighbour matching for the four periods. The exit funds are defined by the periods 
specified in the top row. The matching funds were selected from the funds that remained operational for at least six months after the end of period specified in the top row. The 
matching is done by Size, Age, and investment objective. Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative, percentage 3-month returns/flows. Age is the number of years 
in operation till the end-month of each quarter. The Size, FF-size and FF-spec statistics are based on the quarterly means of the corresponding statistics. 
  1/2000–12/2014  1/2000–3/2003  4/2003–8/2007  9/2007–3/2009  4/2009–12/2014 
  Exit    Surviving  Exit    Surviving  Exit    Surviving  Exit    Surviving  Exit    Surviving 
Returns Mean 0.758  1.271  –1.560  –0.657  3.604  3.853  –5.478  –5.304  4.056  4.317 
 Median 1.300  1.565  0.701  1.098  1.961  2.135  –3.366  –2.831  3.726  3.903 
 St Dev. 9.325  9.010  10.500  9.680  6.225  6.196  7.279  7.747  9.264  9.098 
Age Mean 9.051  9.880  6.923  7.024  8.693  8.978  9.007  9.036  9.803  10.372 
 Median 7.175  7.838  6.167  6.167  7.088  7.334  8.258  8.090  7.753  8.255 
 St Dev. 7.875  8.830  5.274  5.765  6.397  6.629  6.362  6.676  8.274  9.026 
Size Mean 163.804  170.758  63.149  64.134  105.618  98.902  48.051  61.388  189.244  184.236 
 Median 24.567  30.267  16.333  16.300  26.733  24.067  9.400  9.017  10.000  12.600 
 St Dev. 754.352  962.444  167.081  158.912  299.572  283.889  171.942  344.534  1,168.19  1,596.37 
Flows Mean -1.279  1.440  –3.053  2.488  –3.373  1.076  –6.817  0.276  –3.584  1.087 
 Median -2.417  -1.232  –3.058  –0.708  –3.192  –1.272  –5.744  –2.596  –3.189  –1.467 
 St Dev. 18.205  19.790  19.483  21.640  15.181  19.228  23.166  23.186  17.498  21.131 
Turnover Mean 1.012  0.941  1.109  1.055  0.979  0.958  1.120  1.029  0.978  0.911 
 Median 0.680  0.610  0.790  0.710  0.680  0.660  0.770  0.650  0.590  0.580 
 St Dev. 1.139  1.124  1.186  1.150  1.002  1.060  1.250  1.218  1.199  1.149 
FF–size Mean 81.678  95.085  52.507  61.460  60.423  75.188  57.252  107.473  129.149  129.818 
 Median 28.694  20.522  17.232  17.232  35.512  18.832  22.004  30.220  26.443  24.480 
 St Dev. 174.163  212.893  73.959  125.947  82.879  157.697  81.377  225.458  286.219  281.153 
FF–spec Mean 0.150  0.155  0.153  0.161  0.154  0.154  0.148  0.134  0.173  0.162 
 Median 0.097  0.103  0.086  0.093  0.087  0.100  0.111  0.097  0.115  0.109 
 St Dev. 0.179  0.172  0.188  0.188  0.197  0.168  0.171  0.154  0.202  0.185 
Funds  4,445  2,360  1,017  740  1,136  883  420  357  1,885  1,357 
Obs.  66,537 
 










Table 2-8. Descriptive statistics of the merged (Panel A)/ liquidated (Panel B) funds, and their corresponding surviving funds determined by the Nearest–Neighbour matching for the 
whole and the four periods specified in the top row. The matching is done by Size, Age, and investment objective. Quarterly statistics. Quarterly returns and quarterly flows are (not 
annualised) cumulative 3– month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till the end–month of current quarter. Size, family size and family specialisation are the mean 
statistics of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. 
  1/2000–12/2014  1/2000–3/2003  4/2003–8/2007  9/2007–3/2009  4/2009–12/2014 
Panel A. Mergers Exit    Surviving  Exit    Surviving  Exit    Surviving  Exit    Surviving  Exit    Surviving 
Returns Mean 0.837  1.208  –1.375  –0.390  3.444  3.736  –4.574  –4.641  4.616  4.816 
 Median 1.325  1.485  0.956  1.243  1.910  2.007  –2.797  –1.975  4.197  4.248 
 St Dev. 8.927  8.865  10.575  9.196  5.978  6.064  6.399  7.042  8.784  8.917 
Age Mean 10.165  10.878  7.633  7.745  9.425  9.702  9.680  9.896  12.162  12.855 
 Median 8.167  8.759  6.838  6.759  7.756  7.921  8.510  8.759  10.756  11.507 
 St Dev. 8.722  9.477  5.729  6.263  6.675  6.901  6.638  6.970  9.665  10.187 
Size Mean 219.302  209.743  86.932  83.212  134.908  125.361  65.923  90.053  315.209  279.594 
 Median 38.450  41.400  27.167  23.867  40.333  36.200  13.200  13.600  19.817  23.450 
 St Dev. 906.491  1106.797  200.669  183.853  348.692  327.004  216.134  443.803  1,595.86  2,091.97 
Flow Mean -0.839  0.929  –2.207  2.253  –2.478  0.748  –6.214  –0.982  –3.755  –0.053 
 Median -2.511  -1.349  –3.200  –0.828  –3.136  –1.386  –5.841  –2.928  –3.461  –1.732 
 St Dev. 17.203  17.826  17.788  19.975  13.937  16.788  20.233  17.505  15.032  17.38 
Turnover Mean 0.969  0.924  1.081  1.002  0.942  0.897  0.793  0.949  0.885  0.903 
 Median 0.660  0.610  0.820  0.670  0.670  0.630  0.580  0.620  0.570  0.590 
 St Dev. 1.057  1.082  0.998  1.103  0.901  0.966  0.777  1.139  1.065  1.153 
FF–size Mean 92.297  96.808  67.815  61.325  73.065  75.621  73.885  141.638  157.898  139.291 
 Median 43.992  20.932  72.212  18.145  70.900  18.538  46.697  36.630  26.494  25.222 
 St Dev. 191.497  211.958  76.988  120.359  89.212  157.376  94.154  276.788  347.849  293.312 
FF–spec Mean 0.127  0.150  0.135  0.168  0.113  0.159  0.114  0.125  0.149  0.146 
 Median 0.091  0.101  0.077  0.096  0.077  0.101  0.095  0.095  0.117  0.106 
 St Dev. 0.128  0.160  0.171  0.193  0.122  0.176  0.114  0.115  0.133  0.150 
Funds  2,468  1,567  625  502  676  580  244  215  936  761 
Obs  42,880  31,745  3,294  2,942  5,199  4,677  471  422  7,652  6,546 
Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns Mean 0.615  1.234  –1.901  –1.028  3.988  4.405  –6.911  –6.239  3.499  3.913 
 Median 1.241  1.666  –0.134  0.667  2.088  2.590  –5.005  –4.007  3.298  3.538 
 St Dev. 10.004  9.554  10.356  10.340  6.768  6.746  8.301  8.593  9.687  9.367 
Age Mean 7.003  7.201  5.613  5.481  6.933  6.930  7.938  7.766  7.454  7.642 
 Median 5.586  5.753  4.753  4.629  5.585  5.838  7.753  6.127  5.333  5.416 
 St Dev. 5.498  5.584  3.995  3.965  5.274  5.187  5.749  5.994  5.708  6.081 
Size Mean 63.211  55.297  19.260  19.417  35.186  27.154  19.708  19.427  63.868  56.152 
 Median 12.533  11.367  7.233  7.083  10.967  9.017  7.067  7.100  6.033  6.133 
 St Dev. 308.801  265.651  46.474  53.133  78.513  66.614  33.446  36.555  395.92  414.89 
Flows Mean -2.076  2.139  –4.614  2.815  –5.526  1.650  –7.772  2.052  –3.413  1.9110 
 Median -2.140  -1.109  –2.711  –0.685  –3.229  –0.996  –5.365  –1.346  –2.730  –1.332 
 St Dev. 19.867  23.465  22.195  24.812  17.638  23.455  27.186  29.475  19.648  24.600 
Turnover Mean 1.090  1.009  1.160  1.130  1.066  1.147  1.638  1.146  1.072  0.924 
 Median 0.700  0.640  0.740  0.750  0.690  0.800  1.160  0.700  0.630  0.590 
 St Dev. 1.271  1.213  1.470  1.211  1.207  1.255  1.629  1.315  1.312  1.150 
FF–size Mean 62.429  82.423  24.257  61.369  30.022  72.270  30.874  57.085  100.534  112.206 
 Median 13.892  18.550  2.275  13.224  5.082  19.420  7.689  22.126  26.311  24.818 
 St Dev. 135.166  196.122  58.29  137.860  54.234  152.78  44.103  94.411  203.46  250.290 
FF–spec Mean 0.192  0.160  0.188  0.143  0.251  0.143  0.200  0.147  0.197  0.172 
 Median 0.105  0.104  0.118  0.087  0.134  0.094  0.156  0.100  0.113  0.110 
 St Dev. 0.241  0.185  0.210  0.170  0.288  0.158  0.225  0.197  0.251  0.205 
Funds  1,977  1,257 
 392  322  460  375  176  151  949  724 







Table 2-9. Descriptive statistics of the exit and surviving funds determined by the Nearest–Neighbour matching for the whole and the four periods specified in the top row. The exit 
funds are defined by the periods specified in the top row. The matching funds were selected from the funds that remained operational for at least six months after the end of period 
specified in the top row. The matching is done by Size, Age, fund-family, and investment objective. Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative, percentage 3-
month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till the end-month of each quarter. The Size, FF-size and FF-spec statistics are based on the quarterly 
means of the corresponding statistics. 
  1/2000–12/2014  1/2000–3/2003  4/2003–8/2007  9/2007–3/2009  4/2009–12/2014 
  Exit    Surviving  Exit    Surviving  Exit    Surviving  Exit    Surviving  Exit    Surviving 
Returns  Mean 0.966  1.327  –1.194  –0.776  3.425  3.643  –5.478  –5.753  4.184  4.363 
 Median 1.394  1.599  0.891  1.121  1.867  2.126  –3.545  –3.166  3.849  3.911 
 St Dev. 8.806  8.944  9.550  9.327  5.931  5.823  7.385  8.253  8.926  9.184 
Age Mean 9.401  10.084  7.142  7.862  8.724  10.018  8.782  10.004  10.314  11.572 
 Median 7.510  8.586  6.334  6.586  6.838  8.586  8.425  10.255  8.671  11.008 
 St Dev. 8.124  7.753  5.547  7.467  6.596  8.116  6.200  5.990  8.394  7.865 
Size  Mean 185.495  361.803  81.571  215.689  123.794  212.771  36.816  134.977  216.081  417.643 
 Median 26.433  66.000  21.800  45.300  32.733  59.367  9.367  33.167  9.667  44.333 
 St Dev. 836.801  2084.631  201.049  578.085  338.874  532.235  71.342  340.465  1,266.00  3,030.15 
Flows Mean -1.048  1.748  –2.459  2.702  –2.615  0.939  –6.438  –1.209  –3.827  0.679 
 Median -2.402  -1.157  –2.854  –1.034  –2.942  –1.777  –5.343  –2.869  –3.389  –1.603 
 St Dev. 18.216  18.706  19.391  20.730  15.224  17.296  21.903  18.614  16.774  18.374 
Turnover Mean 0.942  0.926  1.057  1.061  0.920  0.966  1.183  0.992  0.900  0.901 
 Median 0.630  0.620  0.810  0.680  0.630  0.640  0.650  0.690  0.560  0.580 
 St Dev. 1.057  1.057  1.137  1.211  0.898  1.053  1.422  1.224  1.110  1.164 
FF–size Mean 98.286  110.257  74.771  72.129  73.452  74.780  71.528  79.741  148.17  169.343 
 Median 47.830  43.992  77.326  72.212  69.844  64.809  46.697  51.165  34.138  32.451 
 St Dev. 193.217  224.067  82.526  87.804  89.612  95.945  90.73  95.642  306.499  338.937 
FF–spec Mean 0.129  0.121  0.113  0.114  0.114  0.117  0.120  0.115  0.143  0.136 
 Median 0.099  0.088  0.077  0.075  0.084  0.085  0.106  0.095  0.116  0.104 
 St Dev. 0.114  0.120  0.112  0.127  0.097  0.098  0.094  0.095  0.118  0.134 
Funds   2,929  1,546  590  404  740  521  266  202  1,468  924 







Table 2-10. Descriptive statistics of the merged (Panel A)/ liquidated (Panel B) funds, and their corresponding surviving funds determined by the Nearest–Neighbour matching for 
the whole and the four periods specified in the top row. The matching is done by Size, Age, fund-family, and investment objective. Quarterly statistics. Quarterly returns and 
quarterly flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3– month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till the end–month of current quarter. Size, family size and family 
specialisation are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. 
  1/2000–12/2014  1/2000–3/2003  4/2003–8/2007  9/2007–3/2009  4/2009–12/2014 
Panel A. Mergers Exit    Surviving  Exit    Surviving  Exit    Surviving  Exit    Surviving  Exit    Surviving 
Returns  Mean 0.984  1.344  –1.032  –0.536  3.284  3.478  –4.461  –4.857  4.554  4.848 
 Median 1.377  1.580  1.070  1.291  1.822  2.007  –2.603  –2.192  4.197  4.405 
 St Dev. 8.490  8.697  9.608  9.215  5.743  5.595  6.305  7.040  8.670  8.924 
Age Mean 10.359  10.623  7.878  8.555  9.387  10.724  9.651  10.701  12.226  12.897 
 Median 8.342  9.167  7.005  7.252  7.671  9.008  9.507  10.674  10.838  12.422 
 St Dev. 8.919  8.011  5.909  7.904  6.749  8.704  6.482  6.196  9.692  8.190 
Size  Mean 232.377  425.424  100.600  213.430  142.520  237.680  48.117  133.120  336.960  588.490 
 Median 39.933  77.850  31.967  52.500  41.883  66.383  13.583  23.467  20.6  57.933 
 St Dev. 961.148  2427.664  224.69  478.3  370.3  577.300  84.065  372.2  1,655  3,949 
Flows Mean -0.648  1.594  –2.057  3.193  –2.035  0.750  –6.080  –1.021  –3.766  0.446 
 Median -2.405  -1.246  –2.967  –1.163  –2.875  –1.904  –5.759  –3.301  –3.433  –1.584 
 St Dev. 17.521  17.756  18.162  20.358  14.326  16.203  22.903  19.99  14.864  16.494 
Turnover Mean 0.912  0.881  0.998  1.004  0.915  0.912  0.733  0.705  0.829  0.769 
 Median 0.630  0.620  0.800  0.640  0.630  0.600  0.505  0.630  0.540  0.530 
 St Dev. 0.995  0.954  0.855  1.067  0.874  0.985  0.793  0.625  0.997  0.913 
FF–size Mean 103.844  120.134  82.593  78.548  79.255  82.866  94.406  98.414  168.12  199.29 
 Median 51.165  49.151  82.969  80.919  73.132  73.47  51.165  51.165  30.419  34.138 
 St Dev. 205.113  240.773  81.357  87.155  93.666  102.06  102.32  107.67  358.95  393.25 
FF–spec Mean 0.127  0.120  0.113  0.111  0.109  0.112  0.100  0.103  0.148  0.138 
 Median 0.099  0.090  0.078  0.074  0.080  0.083  0.090  0.090  0.119  0.108 
 St Dev. 0.110  0.113  0.112  0.124  0.091  0.093  0.069  0.076  0.123  0.127 
Funds   1,889  1,039  429  302  513  368  189  143  833  546 
Obs.  36,464  23,988  2,411  1,785  4,442  3,342  340  297  7,096  5,064 
Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns  Mean 0.920  1.153  –1.744  –1.406  4.062  4.366  –7.287  –7.666  3.739  3.809 
 Median 1.445  1.542  –0.424  0.332  2.050  2.614  –5.786  –4.721  3.472  3.334 
 St Dev. 9.533  9.434  9.335  9.634  6.682  6.609  8.722  10.069  9.206  9.410 
Age Mean 7.069  8.757  4.648  5.748  5.735  7.365  7.236  8.471  8.010  9.922 
 Median 5.671  7.334  4.167  4.337  4.422  6.921  7.504  7.964  5.838  8.425 
 St Dev. 5.034  6.656  2.948  5.474  4.834  4.253  5.339  5.234  5.664  7.016 
Size Mean 71.360  184.562  17.06  207.08  39.245  117.57  16.698  137.460  70.381  180.28 
 Median 10.833  47.500  6.000  28.817  10.417  41.967  5.733  45.467  5.000  30.600 
 St Dev. 370.946  534.797  30.138  761.000  74.328  277.04  30.874  260.120  440.310  679.470 
Flows Mean -2.021  2.052  –3.820  2.283  –5.234  1.745  –7.075  –1.648  –3.901  0.981 
 Median -2.388  -1.009  –2.211  –0.502  –3.551  –1.138  –4.653  –2.170  –3.287  –1.600 
 St Dev. 19.772  20.901  23.038  24.037  18.534  20.495  20.044  15.254  18.822  21.026 
Turnover Mean 1.016  1.031  1.258  1.189  0.946  1.131  1.984  1.595  0.986  1.057 
 Median 0.660  0.660  0.830  0.800  0.620  0.810  1.430  0.920  0.580  0.630 
 St Dev. 1.190  1.245  1.774  1.484  1.000  1.229  1.873  1.809  1.227  1.383 
FF–size Mean 87.191  81.926  48.247  54.001  47.256  45.015  30.802  39.602  124.13  126.28 
 Median 37.260  29.063  16.041  34.767  20.224  16.307  9.245  16.109  44.200  29.184 
 St Dev. 160.077  157.907  80.982  84.369  61.991  59.203  40.997  40.921  225.45  237.510 
FF–spec Mean 0.134  0.122  0.110  0.118  0.141  0.135  0.155  0.143  0.138  0.133 
 Median 0.098  0.086  0.075  0.075  0.098  0.094  0.156  0.120  0.112  0.097 
 St Dev. 0.123  12.627  0.112  0.130  0.117  0.112  0.120  0.122  0.112  0.140 
Funds  1,040  666  161  125  227  170  77  63  635  426 








Table 2-11. Summary statistics of the monthly returns of the risk factors (%). MRTRF, SMB and HML are returns on the 
three Fama – French factors, US GOV BOND  are returns on the US Benchmark 10-year DataStream Government Bond 
total return index, GLOBAL  GOV BOND are returns on the JPMorgan Global Government Bond total return index and 
GOLD are returns on S&P GSCI Gold total return index. 
2000-2014 Mean  Median  Std. dev  Min  
 Max   Obs 
MKTRF  0.333  1.130  4.568  -17.230 
 11.350  180 
SMB  0.441  0.190  3.231  -14.910 
 18.320  180 
HML  0.107  0.015  3.282  -11.100 
 12.900  180 
USGB  0.513  0.523  2.226  -6.432 
 11.496  180 
GGB  0.440  0.408  2.007  -5.145 
 6.456  180 
Gold  0.882  0.733  5.127  -18.027 
 13.843  180 
1/2000-3/2003            
MKTRF  -1.457  -1.940  5.415  -10.720 
 7.940  39 
SMB  1.003  0.550  5.333  -14.910 
 18.320  39 
HML  1.463  1.690  5.233  -9.930 
 12.900  39 
USGB  0.835  0.991  1.997  -3.339 
 3.885  39 
GGB  0.586  0.453  2.075  -3.949 
 5.466  39 
Gold  0.546  -0.258  3.543  -5.914 
 9.432  39 
4/2003-8/2007            
MKTRF  1.068  1.400  2.594  -4.060 
 8.220  53 
SMB  0.451  0.080  2.265  -4.030 
 5.780  53 
HML  0.503  0.230  1.503  -3.340 
 4.100  53 
USGB  0.202  0.383  2.009  -6.432 
 4.614  53 
GGB  0.431  0.467  2.120  -4.654 
 6.426  53 
Gold  1.258  1.035  4.310  -9.554 
 11.485  53 
9/2007-3/2009            
MKTRF  -2.849  -0.930  6.360  -17.230 
 8.950  19 
SMB  -0.053  0.030  2.309  -3.890 
 3.670  19 
HML  -0.978  -0.960  4.248  -11.100 
 6.330  19 
USGB  1.192  0.711  3.206  -3.585 
 11.496  19 
GGB  0.657  0.391  2.710  -3.796 
 6.456  19 
Gold  2.010  5.079  7.929  -18.027 
 13.843  19 
4/2009-12/2014            
MKTRF  1.657  2.520  3.979  -7.890 
 11.353  69 
SMB  0.253  0.130  2.442  -4.780 
 6.730  69 
HML  0.117  -0.210  2.297  -4.500 
 7.760  69 
USGB  0.384  0.424  2.174  -4.242 
 5.713  69 
GGB  0.305  0.277  1.666  -5.145 
 3.979  69 





2.4 Empirical evidence 
2.4.1 Performance-exit relationship 
Following Section 2.3.2, quarterly logit regressions were firstly done on the unmatched 
samples and then on the matched samples to ensure robustness of the analysis. There are two 
definitions of a surviving sample, the plus-six-month, and the plus-zero-month definition31. All 
regressions are clustered by investment objectives and then on funds, in order to reduce the 
problems with the underestimation of standard errors induced by small numbers of clusters32 
and ensure robustness of the analysis. The statistical significances are less for most of the 
variables in the regressions clustered by investment objectives than in the regressions clustered 
by funds. Thus, the results obtained from the objective-clustered regressions are reported as 
the main results and those obtained from the fund-clustered regressions are reported in the 
Appendix Tables A2-9 to A2-17. These two bunches of results are pretty similar and indicate 
the robustness of the analysis. The regressions were repeated on monthly observations. With 
larger number of observations and larger sample sizes, monthly regressions do not change the 
main results much. The results of monthly regressions are reported in the Appendix Tables A2-
18-A2-36. 
Table 2-12 shows the marginal effects of the logit regressions where the dependent variables 
take the value of one for every quarter for the funds that exited the market within the period 
specified at the top of the columns, and take the value of zero for every quarter for the funds 
that were operational for at least six months beyond the end of corresponding periods (Panel 
A), or the funds that were operational within the corresponding periods (Panel B).  
The first column of Table 2-12 Panel A confirms the past literature that a fund’s poor 
performance is related to a higher propensity towards exiting the market, and that a fund’s 
flows and size are negatively related to the probability of exiting. Older funds have a higher 
probability of leaving the market. The more frequently a fund rebalances its portfolio, the more 
likely it exits the market. The funds belonging to a more diversified family have a higher 
probability of exiting the market. Consistent with Zhao (2003), this indicates that fund-families 
 
31 See Section 2.3.1. 
32 See Section 2.3.2. There were at most 56 investment objectives in a regression, and there were cases when we 
had less than 30 investment-objective clusters in a regression.  
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prefer to close down unique funds in terms of investment objectives, research development, or 
distribution channels etc., in order to cut down the relevant costs. The negative impact of a 
fund’s poor performance on its survival is confirmed in the dotcom correction, the pre-GFC, 
and the post-GFC periods but not in the GFC period.  The positive marginal effect (0.074) of 
Returns during the GFC of 5% statistical significance supports the hypothesis that the negative 
performance-exit relationship disappears during the GFC. Surprisingly, it even shows a strong 
positive performance-exit relationship in the crash market, which is an indication of the 
distortion of the ‘normal’ market clearing mechanism brought by the GFC and the consequent 
strategy changes of fund-families. However, the effects of other variables on fund exiting do 
not differ much in different periods. Smaller funds experiencing lower inflows have a higher 
probability of exiting in all periods. The funds coming from smaller families are more likely to 
exit the market in all except for the post-GFC period. 
Table 2-12 Panel B basically confirms the results presented in Table 2-12 Panel A. As the 
surviving sample in Panel B includes the funds that exited the market soon after each period, 
it can be expected that the differences in fund performance and characteristics between the exit 
and the surviving funds are smaller in comparison with the exit and the surviving samples in 
Panel A. The results confirm this intuition. The marginal effects of all variables (except for FF-
size) become slightly smaller in comparison in Panel A, and the direction of their impacts and 
statistical significances are not changed. As the two surviving sample definitions give much 
similar results, only the results obtained from the six-month surviving sample definition will 
be interpreted from this point onwards. 
The result presented in Table 2-12 supports the hypothesis that the negative performance-exit 
relationship disappears during the GFC. Yet, it is surprising to have a statistically significant 
positive performance-exit relationship during the GFC. Given that the regressions for Table 2-
12 were conducted on all the surviving and the exit funds, the positive relationship may be 
driven by the distributional differences in the characteristics of the surviving and the exit funds. 
To reduce the potential biases, the quarterly logit regressions were repeated on the samples 
after NNM.  
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Tables 2-13 and 2-14 report the marginal effects of the logit regressions on the matched sample 
determined by the NNM on funds’ Size, Age, and investment objective (Panels A), and the 
NNM on funds’ Size, Age, investment objective, and fund-family (Panels B), for the six-month 
and zero-month surviving sample definitions, respectively. Table 2-13 Panel A confirms the 
negative performance-exit relationship in the non-GFC times and its disappearance during the 
GFC, after controlling for same investment objectives, similar funds’ sizes and ages. The 
negative impact of lower inflows on funds’ survivals does not change after the matching. 
However, the effect of funds’ Age on exiting becomes negative after the matching. This 
indicates that among the funds sharing the same investment objectives and similar basic 
characteristics, younger funds are more likely to exit the market. Also, the effect of Size 
becomes weaker in terms of the statistical significance and the magnitude, in comparison with 
the results obtained from the whole (unmatched) sample.  
After adding the fund-family into the matching algorithm, the basic patterns of the effects of 
each variable are not changed. However, the magnitude of the effect of Size becomes larger 
while the effect of Returns on fund exits becomes slightly smaller. With the restriction that the 
exit and its matched surviving fund come from the same family, it is been found that during 
the GFC, the better performing funds exit the market. In order to shed some light on why it is 
the case, separate regressions on liquidations and within-family mergers are done, as the past 
literature suggests that the motivations for a fund-family to re-organise and close down a fund 
are different. Specifically, fund-families may conduct liquidations to reduce internal costs as 
some small funds may have unique portfolio design or distributors which would increase fund-
families’ costs if the funds do not perform well. In contrast, if a poor performer can be allocated 
an appropriate acquirer which is able to redesign the target fund’s portfolio and to improve its 
performance, fund-families may conduct within-family mergers. In addition, the intuition 
suggests that the costs of mergers and liquidations, and investors’ responses to mergers and 
liquidations may differ much. 
Tables 2-15 and 2-16 report the marginal effects of the logit regressions for the within-family 
merged funds (Panels A), and the liquidated funds (Panels B), using the six-month and zero-
month surviving definitions, respectively. The breakdown of the market clearing mechanisms 
during the GFC found in previous regressions is confirmed by both the mergers and 
liquidations. In addition, better performing funds are over twice likely to be merged than 
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liquidated, indicated by the marginal effect of Returns of 0.06 for mergers and 0.025 for 
liquidations. This is consistent with past literature (Zhao, 2003) and the intuition that a better 
performing fund is easier to find an acquirer in comparison with a poorly performing fund. In 
the post-crisis period, although the liquidated funds perform worse than surviving funds, there 
are no statistically significant differences in the performance of the merged funds and the  
surviving funds. The effect of Flow, Size and FF-spec is similar on mergers and liquidations. 
However, older funds tend to be merged rather than liquidated. A larger fund-family is more 
likely to re-organise rather than liquidate the worse performing funds. 
Again, the regressions are repeated on the matched sample determined by the NNM on Size, 
Age, and investment styles, and the NNM on Size, Age, investment style, and fund-family for 
within-family mergers and liquidations separately. The marginal effects of the logit regressions 
are reported in Tables 2-17 - 2-20. Regardless of the definition of the surviving sample and the 
matching covariates, the findings presented in Tables 2-15 and 2-16 are preserved. This makes 
sure that the findings are not driven by the differences in distributional characteristics between 
the merged (or liquidated) funds and the surviving funds.  
The results presented in Tables 2-19 and 2-20 for the GFC period show that the statistically 
significantly positive relationship between Return and exit are mainly driven by within-family 
mergers. There is no statistically significant difference in the performance of the liquidated 
funds and the surviving funds, but the merged funds statistically significantly outperform the 
surviving funds during the GFC. This evidence is consistent with the past literature in the sense 
that merged funds tend to outperform liquidated funds which makes the target funds valuable 
for the acquirers. Yet, this cannot explain the fact that the merged funds outperform the 
surviving funds during the GFC. One possible explanation is that the acquisitions during the 
GFC tend to be driven by the need of acquirers, not by the need to deal with the poorly 
performing funds. In other words, fund-families may exert efforts to create ‘star’ funds through 
combining the recourses of several well performing funds to retain investors within the fund-
families under such tough market conditions.  
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2.4.2 Pre- and post-merger performance 
Numerous papers document that the shareholders of target funds considerably benefit from 
mergers but acquisitions are not beneficial to the shareholders of the acquirers (Carhart et al., 
2002; Jayaraman et al., 2002; Khorana et al., 2007; Namvar and Phillips, 2013; Park, 2013). 
Following Jayaraman et al. (2002), the post-merger performance of the acquires is compared 
(i) against their pre–merger performance and (ii) against the pre-merger performance of the 
target funds, i.e. funds that were referred to as merged funds in the previous sections. Funds’ 
performance is measured by their alphas obtained from regressing the funds’ excess returns 
(relative to the one-month Treasury bill rate) against the six factors specified in Section 2.3.2.2, 
i.e. the Fama–French three factors, returns on two bond indices and on the gold index. The 
performance of the acquirers and of the targets is assessed when all the mergers that occurred 
in 2000–2014 are taken into account, and for each of the four sub-periods separately. 
Table 2-21 shows the results of the analysis. The first two columns of Table 2-21 show the 
average pre–merger alphas of the targets, of the acquirers and the results of the t–tests of 
whether the acquirers’ alphas are statistically significantly different from those estimated for 
the targets (rows named ‘Acquirer–Target’).  The alphas are calculated for year one before the 
mergers (column headed ‘-1’), and for year two before the mergers (column headed ‘-2’).  
Consistent with the literature, the results confirm that the pre–merger performance of the 
acquirers is statistically superior to the performance of the targets.  
The next two columns of Table 2-21 show the average alphas for year one (column ‘1’) and 
year two (column ‘2’) of the post-merger funds. The following four columns compare the post–
merger and the pre–merger performance. First, the differences in the post– and the pre–merger 
performance of the acquirers are shown. Then, the differences in the post–merger performance 
of the acquirers and of the targets are shown.  The differences in the performance are calculated 
as the differences between year one after the merger and year one before the merger (columns 
headed ‘1-(-1)’), and between year two after the merger and year one before the merger (‘2-(-
1)’). 
The results obtained for the sample of all the mergers that took place between 2000 and 2014 
are consistent with the literature, i.e. mergers, on average, are not good news for the 
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shareholders of the acquirers. The post–merger alphas of the acquirers are statistically 
significantly lower than their pre–merger alphas.  There is no statistically significant benefit 
for the shareholders of the target funds, although their differences between the post– and the 
pre–merger alphas are positive.  
The separation of the mergers into those that occurred during the growing and the declining 
markets sheds a new light on the benefits of the mergers. The differences between the post– 
and the pre–merger alphas of the acquirers are negative for all the non–GFC periods, and those 
obtained for the post–GFC period are highly statistically significant. In contrast, the differences 
obtained for the GFC mergers are positive even though they are not statistically significant.  
The differences between the post–merger alphas of the acquirers and the pre-merger alphas of 
the targets are positive over the whole period, and for the first three sub–periods. Those 
obtained for the GFC are highly statistically significant. In contrast, the differences obtained 
for the post–GFC period are negative and one of them is statistically significant at 10%. 
To further understand the properties of the post–GFC mergers, the post–GFC period is split 
into two sub–periods. If clearing of the market from poorly performing funds that survived the 
GFC was to happen, it is more likely that it would happen at the start of the post–GFC period, 
i.e. in 2009, 2010 and maybe even 2011, rather than after several years after the market lifted 
itself up from the bottom of the GFC.  
The last two sets of the results in Table 2-21 show the results when the 4/2009-12/2014 period 
is split into two sub–periods, 4/2009–6/2011 and 7/2011–12/2014. Thus, the five–year and 
eight–month period is split into two years and three months, and three years and six months. 
This allows for nearly even split of the number of the mergers that took place in the post-GFC 
period. 
The separation of the post–GFC period into two sub–periods shows that the first years after the 
GFC are very different from the latter years. While the results obtained for 2011-2014 are 
comparable with those obtained for the pre–GFC periods (i.e. negative nut statistically 
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insignificant), those obtained for the years following the GFC are statistically significantly 
negative. Thus, both the shareholders of the acquirers and of the target funds are statistically 
significantly worse off.  
These results are consistent with the argument of the market forces regaining their strength 
after the GFC. Even if poorly performing funds managed to survive the GFC, there would be 
no room for underperformers in the post–GFC markets. The results suggest that, straight after 
the GFC, the acquirers of the poorly performing funds must have had a pretty tough time. The 
performance was so heavily affected by the acquisitions of bad investments that even the 
shareholders of the target funds did not gain from these acquisitions. 
However, once the markets shook off the GFC irregularities, the market processes returned to 
what they were before the financial crisis. Thus, in the latter years of the post–GFC period, the 





Table 2-12. Marginal effects of logit regression clustered by investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every quarter for funds that exited within the window specified 
at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for funds that have not exited the market before the end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns. The surviving 
funds are requested to remain operational for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding period (Panel A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B) 
Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3–month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till the end–month of current quarter. Size, family size and family size 
are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014  1/2000–3/2003   4/2003–8/2007   9/2007–3/2009   4/2009–12/2014 
 Panel A  
Returns -0.077***  –0.078***  –0.124***  0.074***  –0.038*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Flows -0.248***  –0.132***  –0.172***  –0.076***  –0.189*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.059***  –0.028***  –0.024***  –0.012***  –0.037*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.021***  0.011  0.020***  0.008**  0.012** 
 (0.003)  (0.276) 
 (0.000)  (0.041)  (0.028) 
Turnover 0.008**  0.004  –0.002  0.004**  0.003 
 (0.018)  (0.227)  (0.271)  (0.050)  (0.433) 
FF–size -0.002  –0.010***  –0.005*  –0.004**  0.001 
 (0.479)  (0.000) 
 (0.082)  (0.028)  (0.755) 
FF–spec -0.089***  –0.091**  –0.043  –0.010  0.022 
 (0.001)  (0.015) 
 (0.543)  (0.550)  (0.412) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 393,919  56,843  105,714  32,609  183,292 
Clusters 56  37  40  39  53 
r2_p 0.234  0.189  0.169  0.169  0.226 
LL 
-171960   –14166   –27680   –4392   –54579 
Panel  B 
Returns -0.076***  –0.075***  –0.115***  0.072***  –0.037*** 
 (0.000) 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Flows -0.241***  –0.128***  –0.168***  –0.073***  –0.179*** 
 (0.000) 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.057***  –0.027***  –0.024***  –0.011***  –0.035*** 
 (0.000) 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.020***  0.01  0.019***  0.008**  0.010* 
 (0.006) 
 (0.331)  (0.000)  (0.032)  (0.070) 
Turnover 0.006*  0.003  –0.002  0.004*  0.001 
 (0.087)  (0.325)  (0.210)  (0.053)  (0.792) 
FF–size -0.003  –0.010***  –0.005  –0.003*  –0.000 
 (0.253) 
 (0.000)  (0.106)  (0.069)  (0.983) 
FF–spec -0.084***  –0.091**  –0.042  –0.003  0.019 
 (0.000) 
 (0.014)  (0.544)  (0.851)  (0.411) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 403,050  57,992  107,552  34,015  188,291 
Clusters 56  37  40  39  53 
r2_p 0.227  0.182  0.166  0.157  0.216 
LL -175693   –14389   –27927   –4500   –55813 
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Table 2-13. Marginal effects of logit regression clustered by investment objectives after matching by Age, Size, investment style (Panel A), and by Age, Size, fund-family, and investment style 
(Panel B). The dependent variable is equal to one for every quarter for funds that exited within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for funds 
that have not exited the market for at least six months beyond end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns. Quarterly data.  Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 
3–month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till the end–month of current quarter. Size, family size and family size are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively 
over the three months in a quarter. P–values in brackets.  *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000–3/2003   4/2003–8/2007   9/2007–3/2009   4/2009–12/2014 
 Panel A. NNM on Size, Age, and investment style 
Returns -0.102***  –0.194***  –0.333***  –0.105  –0.073** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.483)  (0.025) 
Flows -0.219***  –0.336***  –0.453***  –0.502***  –0.348*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.012***  –0.002  0.007**  –0.009  –0.008** 
 (0.003)  (0.662)  (0.034)  (0.297)  (0.049) 
Age -0.032***  –0.002  –0.003***  –0.000  –0.002** 
 (0.001)  (0.139)  (0.003)  (0.979)  (0.015) 
Turnover 0.017***  0.017  0.002  0.012  0.014 
 (0.005)  (0.301)  (0.877)  (0.641)  (0.187) 
FF–size 0.008*  –0.018**  –0.007  –0.016  0.017*** 
 (0.089)  (0.019)  (0.483)  (0.451)  (0.003) 
FF–Spec 0.003  –0.245  –0.057  –0.036  0.223** 
 (0.959)  (0.120)  (0.778)  (0.874)  (0.047) 
Time & IS dummies    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 109,963  9324  13823  1475  27034 
Clusters 55  37  39  33  53 
Pseudo R2 0.0181  0.0264  0.0193  0.0412  0.0232 
LL -72440   –6256   –9368   –979.1   –18066 
 Panel B. NNM on Size, Age, investment style, and fund-family 
Returns -0.075***  –0.164***  –0.260***  0.465**  –0.025 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.021)  (0.375) 
Flows -0.223***  –0.376***  –0.415***  –0.414***  –0.381*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.055***  –0.061***  –0.051***  –0.072***  –0.059*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.004  0.001  –0.001  0.002  –0.001 
 (0.824)  (0.684)  (0.754)  (0.698)  (0.613) 
Turnover 0.012***  0.009  –0.021  0.006  0.001 
 (0.004)  (0.566)  (0.323)  (0.805)  (0.850) 
FF–size 0.029***  0.021***  0.011  –0.028*  0.030*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.112)  (0.079)  (0.000) 
FF–Spec 0.096**  –0.046  –0.087  –0.240  0.189*** 
 (0.041)  (0.497)  (0.299)  (0.242)  (0.000) 
Time & IS dummies                                        Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 84,758  5515  9640  957  21792 
Clusters 50  30  34  23  45 
Pseudo R2 0.0610  0.063  0.049  0.076  0.09 




Table 2-14. Marginal effects of logit regression clustered by investment objectives after matching by Age, Size, investment style (Panel A), and by Age, Size, fund-family, and investment style (Panel B). The 
dependent variable is equal to one for every quarter for funds that exited within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for funds that have not exited the market at the 
end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns. Quarterly data.  Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3–month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till the end–month 
of current quarter. Size, family size and family size are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. P–values in brackets.  *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical 
significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000–3/2003   4/2003–8/2007   9/2007–3/2009   4/2009–12/2014 
 Panel A. NNM on Size, Age, and investment style 
Returns -0.101***  -0.172***  -0.313***  -0.143  -0.065* 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.464)  (0.083) 
Flows -0.207***  -0.333***  -0.441***  -0.502***  -0.331*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.012***  -0.002  0.006*  -0.008  -0.008** 
 (0.001)  (0.742)  (0.083)  (0.377)  (0.036) 
Age -0.002***  -0.001  -0.003**  -0.001  -0.002*** 
 (0.004)  (0.373)  (0.014)  (0.725)  (0.006) 
Turnover 0.010*  0.012  -0.001  0.021  0.008 
 (0.098)  (0.442)  (0.929)  (0.459)  (0.418) 
FF–size 0.005  -0.018**  -0.005  -0.020  0.013** 
 (0.264)  (0.020)  (0.636)  (0.358)  (0.024) 
FF–Spec -0.004  -0.254  0.001  -0.047  0.174* 
 (0.946)  (0.106)  (0.996)  (0.855)  (0.087) 
Time & IS dummies    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 110,705  9,406  13,842  1,482  27,033 
Clusters 55  37  39  33  53 
Pseudo R2 0.0160  0.0249  0.0184  0.0420  0.0206 
LL -73270   -6328   -9391   -983.2   -18113 
 Panel B. NNM on Size, Age, investment style, and fund-family 
Returns -0.075***  -0.154***  -0.272***  0.474**  -0.024 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.022)  (0.393) 
Flows -0.216***  -0.369***  -0.418***  -0.398***  -0.367*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.056***  -0.058***  -0.050***  -0.071***  -0.058*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.002  0.001  -0.001  0.001  -0.001 
 (0.244)  (0.743)  (0.583)  (0.788)  (0.581) 
Turnover 0.010**  0.008  -0.019  0.004  -0.000 
 (0.011)  (0.616)  (0.318)  (0.857)  (0.953) 
FF–size 0.029***  0.021***  0.011*  -0.030*  0.030*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.097)  (0.067)  (0.000) 
FF–Spec 0.110**  -0.044  -0.037  -0.278  0.175*** 
 (0.013)  (0.485)  (0.576)  (0.189)  (0.002) 
Time & IS dummies                                         Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 85,176  5,544  9,750  956  21,952 
Clusters 50  30  34  23  45 
Pseudo R2 0.0585  0.0580  0.0478  0.0753  0.0861 




Table 2-15. Marginal effects of logit regression clustered by investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every quarter for funds that exited within the window specified 
at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for funds that have not exited for at least 6 months after the end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns. Panel 
A:   mergers; Panel B: liquidations. P-values in brackets.  *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Panel A. Within-family mergers 
Returns -0.060***  -0.062***  -0.093***  0.060***  -0.007 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.197) 
Flows -0.177***  -0.090***  -0.114***  -0.047***  -0.105*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.046***  -0.019***  -0.018***  -0.007***  -0.021*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.045***  0.018*  0.025***  0.009***  0.032*** 
 (0.000)  (0.060)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Turnover 0.006***  0.004  -0.001  -0.001  -0.000 
 (0.001)  (0.132)  (0.499)  (0.252)  (0.911) 
FF-size 0.007**  0.001  0.003  -0.000  0.004* 
 (0.037)  (0.644)  (0.350)  (0.734)  (0.051) 
FF-spec -0.155***  -0.056  -0.144**  -0.032*  -0.009 
 (0.004)  (0.268)  (0.033)  (0.061)  (0.779) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 354,697  54,313  101,701  30,529  168,822 
Clusters 48  34  35  24  42 
Pseudo R2 0.236  0.135  0.142  0.150  0.215 
LL -128367  -10944  -22474  -2858  -32922 
 Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns -0.042***  -0.027***  -0.049***  0.025**  -0.033*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.000) 
Flows -0.144***  -0.052***  -0.059***  -0.036***  -0.116*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.035***  -0.012***  -0.008***  -0.007***  -0.024*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age -0.014***  -0.010***  -0.006*  0.001  -0.010** 
 (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.079)  (0.812)  (0.027) 
Turnover 0.003  0.001  -0.001  0.003***  0.003 
 (0.344)  (0.603)  (0.314)  (0.004)  (0.402) 
FF-size -0.011***  -0.011***  -0.007***  -0.003***  -0.003 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.107) 
FF-spec -0.036***  -0.055***  0.007  0.000  0.012 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.603)  (0.986)  (0.419) 
Time & IS dummies                                             Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 329,556  52,579  97,355  30,121  171,519 
Clusters 56  33  35  23  52 
Pseudo R2 0.247  0.332  0.310  0.219  0.239 





Table 2-16. Marginal effects of logit regression clustered by investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every quarter for funds that exited within the window specified at the top of the columns, 
and it is equal to zero for every quarter for funds that have not exited the market at the end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns. Panel A:   mergers; Panel B: liquidations. P-values in brackets.  *** - 
1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
  1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Panel A. Within-family mergers 
Returns -0.060***  -0.059***  -0.088***  0.058***  -0.008 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.165) 
Flows -0.171***  -0.087***  -0.111***  -0.045***  -0.098*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.044***  -0.018***  -0.018***  -0.006***  -0.020*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.044***  0.017*  0.024***  0.009***  0.030*** 
 (0.000)  (0.067)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Turnover 0.005**  0.004  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001 
 (0.019)  (0.174)  (0.439)  (0.332)  (0.396) 
FF-size 0.006**  0.001  0.003  -0.000  0.003* 
 (0.048)  (0.601)  (0.317)  (0.972)  (0.063) 
FF-spec -0.144***  -0.056  -0.141**  -0.027  -0.009 
 (0.004)  (0.268)  (0.033)  (0.111)  (0.760) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 363,818  55,457  103,488  31,884  173,811 
Clusters 48  34  35  30  45 
Pseudo R2 0.229  0.130  0.140  0.141  0.207 
LL -130907   -11069   -22640   -2917   -33563 
 Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns -0.041***  -0.026***  -0.043***  0.025***  -0.032*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.008)  (0.000) 
Flows -0.141***  -0.050***  -0.059***  -0.035***  -0.111*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.033***  -0.011***  -0.008***  -0.006***  -0.023*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age -0.015***  -0.010***  -0.006*  0.001  -0.011** 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.051)  (0.772)  (0.013) 
Turnover 0.002  0.001  -0.002  0.003***  0.002 
 (0.528)  (0.737)  (0.258)  (0.005)  (0.612) 
FF-size -0.012***  -0.011***  -0.007***  -0.003***  -0.003* 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.060) 
FF-spec -0.034***  -0.055***  0.006  0.003  0.010 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.611)  (0.733)  (0.467) 
Time & IS dummies                                            Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 338,687  53,716  99,175  31,464  176,518 
Clusters 56  33  38  30  52 
Pseudo R2 0.239  0.322  0.306  0.206  0.229 





Table 2-17. Marginal effects of logit regression clustered by investment objectives after matching for Age, Size and investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every 
quarter for funds that were merged (Panel A) and liquidated (Panel B) within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for funds that have not 
exited the market for at least 6 months after the end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns. Quarterly data.  Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3-month 
returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till the end-month of current quarter. Size, family size and family size are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively over the 
three months in a quarter. P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Panel A. Within-family mergers 
Returns -0.084***  -0.219***  -0.317***  -0.079  -0.066** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.006)  (0.770)  (0.026) 
Flows -0.174***  -0.330***  -0.383***  -0.428***  -0.390*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Size -0.011**  -0.007*  0.002  0.005  -0.007 
 (0.033)  (0.082)  (0.758)  (0.687)  (0.147) 
Age -0.030***  -0.000  -0.002*  0.001  -0.002** 
 (0.000)  (0.719)  (0.085)  (0.738)  (0.010) 
Turnover 0.014*  0.030*  0.013  -0.057  -0.006 
 (0.060)  (0.063)  (0.380)  (0.124)  (0.566) 
FF-size 0.025***  0.021*  0.023  -0.003  0.026*** 
 (0.002)  (0.082)  (0.125)  (0.922)  (0.004) 
FF-spec -0.161  -0.131  -0.453*  -0.347  0.271 
 (0.135)  (0.594)  (0.058)  (0.549)  (0.243) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 74,575  6,231  9,872  891  14,180 
Clusters 44  34  35  24  42 
r2_p 0.0241  0.0311  0.0384  0.0358  0.0226 
ll -49631  -4175  -6567  -594.3  -9563 
 Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns -0.108***  -0.138***  -0.345***  -0.091  -0.097* 
 (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.633)  (0.065) 
Flows -0.238***  -0.298***  -0.482***  -0.535***  -0.306*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size 0.004  0.009  0.013  -0.036***  0.005 
 (0.233)  (0.265)  (0.127)  (0.000)  (0.224) 
Age -0.030*  -0.008**  -0.006*  0.001  -0.003 
 (0.072)  (0.034)  (0.059)  (0.785)  (0.129) 
Turnover 0.016  0.023  -0.028*  0.046*  0.032* 
 (0.137)  (0.238)  (0.068)  (0.060)  (0.056) 
FF-size -0.012**  -0.065***  -0.048***  -0.033  0.007 
 (0.029)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.216)  (0.350) 
FF-spec 0.047  -0.328**  0.134  0.038  0.162* 
 (0.422)  (0.033)  (0.420)  (0.895)  (0.052) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 41,156  3,441  4,198  584  13,803 
Clusters 55  33  35  23  52 
r2_p 0.0268  0.0978  0.110  0.102  0.0297 




Table 2-18. Marginal effects of logit regression clustered by investment objectives after matching for Age, Size and investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every quarter for funds that were 
merged (Panel A) and liquidated (Panel B) within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for funds that have not exited the market at the end of the periods as specified 
at the top of the columns. Quarterly data.  Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3-month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till the end-month of current quarter. Size, family size 
and family size are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical 
significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Panel A. Within-family mergers 
Returns -0.083***  -0.195***  -0.278***  -0.104  -0.066** 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.767)  (0.018) 
Flows -0.159***  -0.335***  -0.380***  -0.379***  -0.349*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Size -0.012***  -0.008*  0.001  0.002  -0.009** 
 (0.005)  (0.051)  (0.873)  (0.896)  (0.036) 
Age -0.002***  -0.000  -0.002  0.000  -0.001** 
 (0.004)  (0.792)  (0.142)  (0.946)  (0.015) 
Turnover 0.007  0.026*  0.010  -0.051  -0.010 
 (0.370)  (0.087)  (0.442)  (0.152)  (0.321) 
FF-size 0.025***  0.022*  0.024*  -0.007  0.025*** 
 (0.001)  (0.076)  (0.086)  (0.848)  (0.002) 
FF-spec -0.130  -0.135  -0.399  -0.209  0.232 
 (0.205)  (0.591)  (0.118)  (0.736)  (0.304) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 75,005  6,260  9,843  891  14,101 
Clusters 45  34  35  24  42 
r2_p 0.0208  0.0311  0.0341  0.0261  0.0205 
ll -50157   -4196   -6575   -600.2   -9524 
 Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns -0.100***  -0.098*  -0.362***  -0.083  -0.081 
 (0.000)  (0.079)  (0.002)  (0.677)  (0.218) 
Flows -0.235***  -0.278***  -0.473***  -0.603***  -0.303*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size 0.005  0.010  0.010  -0.032***  0.006 
 (0.210)  (0.197)  (0.171)  (0.000)  (0.209) 
Age -0.003*  -0.003  -0.006*  0.001  -0.004* 
 (0.097)  (0.344)  (0.067)  (0.816)  (0.082) 
Turnover 0.011  0.013  -0.029*  0.060*  0.027* 
 (0.313)  (0.473)  (0.069)  (0.072)  (0.098) 
FF-size -0.020***  -0.069***  -0.045***  -0.039  0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.130)  (0.899) 
FF-spec -0.015  -0.361***  0.184  -0.040  0.091 
 (0.805)  (0.005)  (0.215)  (0.889)  (0.297) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 41,375  3,471  4,225  587  13,770 
Clusters 55  33  35  23  52 
r2_p 0.0286  0.104  0.108  0.115  0.0276 




Table 2-19. Marginal effects of logit regression clustered by investment objectives after matching for Age, Size, investment objectives and fund-family. The dependent variable is equal to one 
for every quarter for funds that were merged (Panel A) and liquidated (Panel B) within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for funds that 
have not exited the market for at least 6 months after the end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns. Quarterly data.  Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3-
month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till the end-month of current quarter. Size, family size and family size are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively 
over the three months in a quarter. P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Panel A. Within-family mergers 
Returns -0.076***  -0.132***  -0.257**  0.342*  -0.060** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.029)  (0.053)  (0.038) 
Flows -0.195***  -0.438***  -0.377***  -0.337***  -0.456*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Size -0.049***  -0.064***  -0.048***  -0.040***  -0.050*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.000) 
Age 0.020  0.001  -0.001  -0.005  0.001 
 (0.380)  (0.681)  (0.737)  (0.462)  (0.747) 
Turnover 0.018***  0.015  -0.009  0.048*  0.015 
 (0.003)  (0.532)  (0.720)  (0.074)  (0.395) 
FF-size 0.029***  0.029***  0.002  -0.017  0.031*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.825)  (0.268)  (0.000) 
FF-Spec 0.099  0.047  -0.166  -0.295  0.226** 
 (0.104)  (0.550)  (0.105)  (0.408)  (0.039) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 60,331  4,196  7,784  636  12,136 
Clusters 38  27  31  19  33 
Pseudo R2 0.0447  0.0620  0.0412  0.0417  0.0595 
LL -38693  -2,684  -5,098  -421.0  -7,748 
 Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns -0.049*  -0.155  -0.353*  0.717  -0.000 
 (0.057)  (0.134)  (0.078)  (0.164)  (0.995) 
Flows -0.279***  -0.285***  -0.577***  -0.702***  -0.345*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.071***  -0.084***  -0.076***  -0.124***  -0.072*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age -0.073***  -0.005  -0.017  0.006  -0.009*** 
 (0.002)  (0.620)  (0.202)  (0.621)  (0.002) 
Turnover 0.006  -0.002  -0.041  -0.000  -0.002 
 (0.591)  (0.926)  (0.166)  (0.997)  (0.924) 
FF-size 0.014***  -0.037*  -0.008  -0.013  0.015* 
 (0.010)  (0.055)  (0.592)  (0.514)  (0.093) 
FF-Spec 0.043  -0.248  -0.241  0.512  -0.015 
 (0.680)  (0.313)  (0.343)  (0.165)  (0.885) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 26,814  1,382  1,920  323  9,879 
Clusters 46  20  22  13  38 
Pseudo R2 0.125  0.128  0.154  0.221  0.151 




Table 2-20. Marginal effects of logit regression clustered by investment objectives after matching for Age, Size, investment objectives and fund-family. The dependent variable is equal to one for every quarter for 
funds that were merged (Panel A) and liquidated (Panel B) within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for funds that have not exited the market at the end of the 
periods as specified at the top of the columns. Quarterly data.  Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3-month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till the end-month of current 
quarter. Size, family size and family size are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical 
significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Panel A. Within-family mergers 
Returns -0.071***  -0.127***  -0.270**  0.364**  -0.053* 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.025)  (0.028)  (0.052) 
Flows -0.193***  -0.429***  -0.383***  -0.332***  -0.443*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Size -0.051***  -0.058***  -0.048***  -0.039**  -0.050*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.019)  (0.000) 
Age 0.003**  0.001  -0.001  -0.006  0.001 
 (0.032)  (0.778)  (0.569)  (0.462)  (0.583) 
Turnover 0.013***  0.011  -0.010  0.036  0.007 
 (0.007)  (0.635)  (0.694)  (0.251)  (0.644) 
FF-size 0.030***  0.028***  0.002  -0.019  0.033*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.778)  (0.209)  (0.000) 
FF-Spec 0.123**  0.050  -0.157*  -0.347  0.240** 
 (0.037)  (0.430)  (0.083)  (0.350)  (0.022) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 60,527  4,203  7,820  635  12,187 
Clusters 38  27  31  19  33 
Pseudo R2 0.0448  0.0549  0.0408  0.0413  0.0568 
LL -38861   -2709   -5128   -420.4   -7812 
 Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns -0.058**  -0.146  -0.411**  0.711  0.001 
 (0.042)  (0.167)  (0.037)  (0.167)  (0.989) 
Flows -0.276***  -0.284***  -0.554***  -0.650***  -0.335*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.067***  -0.085***  -0.075***  -0.123***  -0.070*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age -0.010***  -0.003  -0.015  0.007  -0.010*** 
 (0.001)  (0.719)  (0.176)  (0.592)  (0.000) 
Turnover 0.007  0.000  -0.036  0.001  0.000 
 (0.527)  (0.998)  (0.239)  (0.964)  (0.983) 
FF-size 0.012*  -0.030  -0.005  -0.014  0.013 
 (0.061)  (0.112)  (0.722)  (0.532)  (0.218) 
FF-Spec 0.018  -0.231  -0.051  0.480  -0.086 
 (0.839)  (0.360)  (0.842)  (0.252)  (0.377) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 27,006  1,404  1,995  323  9,993 
Clusters 46  20  22  13  38 
Pseudo R2 0.121  0.123  0.140  0.216  0.149 




Table 2-21. The alpha estimates from the six-factor model for the target funds and their acquirers for year one (-1), year two (-2) before the 
acquisitions and year one (1) and year two (2) after the acquisitions, as well as t-tests for the significance of their differences. The periods of mergers 
are indicated in bold headings. P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
  -2  -1  1  2  1-(-1)  2-(-1)  1- (-1)  2-(-1) 
2000-2014 
              
Target -0.106  -0.124             
Acquirer -0.015  -0.045  -0.088  -0.094         
Acquirer – Target  0.091***  0.078***          0.026  0.024 
 (0.000) 
 (0.000)          (0.246)  (-0.302) 
Acquirer - Acquirer         -0.049**  -0.052**     
         (0.033)  (0.028)     
Obs. 2,076  2,238  2,159  2,057  2,060  1,962  2,151  2,049 
1/2000-3/2003                
Target -0.633  -0.416             
Acquirer -0.453  -0.268  -0.348  -0.356         
Acquirer – Target  0.180***  0.148***          0.064  0.051 
 (0.001)  (0.000)          (0.452)  (0.555) 
Acquirer - Acquirer         -0.035  -0.042     
         (0.696)  (0.643)     
Obs. 314  357  381  372  353  344  379  370 
4/2003-8/2007                
Target -0.132  -0.105             
Acquirer -0.027  -0.064  -0.093  -0.083         
Acquirer – Target  0.104***  0.040**          0.017  0.026 
 (0.000)  (0.017)          (0.588)  (0.410) 
Acquirer - Acquirer         -0.019  -0.022     
         (0.558)  (0.500)     
Obs. 567  616  621  603  598  584  621  603 
9/2007-3/2009                
Target -0.123  -0.123             
Acquirer -0.075  -0.008  0.137  0.131         
Acquirer – Target  0.048  0.114**          0.273***  0.273*** 
 (0.177)  (0.017)          (0.004)  (0.006) 
Acquirer - Acquirer         0.161  0.183     
         (0.121)  (0.124)     
Obs. 160  166  170  162  162  154  170  162 
4/2009-12/2014                
Target 0.071  -0.048             
Acquirer 0.158  0.033  -0.046  -0.062         
Acquirer – Target  0.087***  0.080***          -0.034  -0.048* 
 (0.000)  (0.000)          (0.204)  (0.091) 
Acquirer - Acquirer         -0.128***  -0.138***     
         (0.000)  (0.000)     
Obs. 992  1,048  938  869  900  831  933  864 
4/2009-6/2011                
Target 0.209  0.152  0.032  0.022         
Acquirer 0.319  0.226             
Acquirer – Target  0.110***  0.074***          -0.136***  -0.147*** 
 (0.000)  (0.001)          (0.000)  (0.000) 
Acquirer - Acquirer         -0.208***  -0.216***     
         (0.000)  (0.000)     
Obs. 439  462  479  455  461  437  476  452 
7/2011-12/2014                
Target -0.039  -0.205  -0.128  -0.154         
Acquirer 0.031  -0.12             
Acquirer – Target  0.070***  0.085***          0.071*  0.06 
 (0.000)  (0.000)          (0.057)  (0.128) 
Acquirer - Acquirer         -0.045  -0.052     
         (0.201)  (0.159)     





This chapter aims to examine whether there is a negative performance-exit relationship in the 
U.S. mutual fund market, and whether such a relationship varies in different times. The main 
hypotheses are that worse performing funds exit the market in non-GFC periods (the dotcom 
correction period, the pre-GFC growth period, and the post-GFC recovery period), and that the 
market force is not strong enough to exit worse performing funds during the GFC. The GFC 
creates a unique crash market during the sample period between 2000 and 2014, where few 
alternative investment opportunities exist and a large number of active investors leave the 
market completely, only passive investors who are not sensitive to fund performance remained 
in a fund. This could motivate a fund-family to change its profit-maximizing strategy in such 
a crash market. In non-GFC periods, a fund-family has the motivation to close down or re-
organise poorly performing funds in order to retain and attract investors. In contrast, during the 
GFC, the reduced number of active investors in the market and passive investors’ insensitivity 
to performance make it more profitable for fund-families to take no actions on worse 
performing funds, rather than exit those funds.  
In addition, this chapter shows that only the acquisitions that were conducted during the GFC 
did not result in deteriorated post–merger performance of the acquiring funds. Yet, the 
acquisitions that occurred in the next few years following the GFC were more value destroying 
than they were in any other period. Following the GFC, the post–merger performance of both 
acquirers and of targets was worse than their pre–merger performance. 
This chapter provides new evidence of the changing performance-exit relationship in different 
times, as well as confirming the findings in the past literature about the determinants of fund 
exits. First, the main finding in this chapter is that there is a negative relationship between fund 
performance and the probability of fund exits in the sample period between January 2000 and 
December 2014 except the GFC period (August 2007-March 2009). There is no or positive 
performance-exit relationship during the GFC period. These results are preserved when 
liquidated and within-family merged funds are examined separately.  
Second, this chapter confirms the findings presented in the past literature that there is a negative 
relationship between the propensity towards a fund’s exit and its size, flow, and family size, 
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and a positive relationship between a fund’s turnover ratio and its exit. The effects of these 
fund characteristics hold on both mergers and liquidations and in every period. Yet, there are 
several differences in the determinants of mergers and liquidations with respect to fund and 
family characteristics. The worst performing funds tend to be liquidated rather than be merged. 
Older funds belonging to a larger fund-family are more likely to be merged within the family, 
as the intuition suggests that it is easier for a larger family to find a suitable acquirer to take 
over the assets of the target fund, and that only relatively good funds are acceptable as potential 
targets. 
This chapter makes several contributions. First, it contributes to the literature about the 
determinants of fund exits by pointing out that the well-documented crucial determinant of 
fund exits, poor performance, does not always force a fund out of the market. In contrast, the 
role of such basic characteristics as a fund’s size, flow, and family size in determining a fund’s 
fate preserves in different market conditions. 
Second, this chapter contributes to our understanding of the changing profit-maximisation 
practices of fund-families in different times. In non-GFC times, a fund-family is encouraged to 
improve fund performance and deal with poor performers in order to retain and attract investors, 
as there are numerous alternatives in the market for investors to choose from. However, during 
the GFC when few investment alternatives exist in the market, a fund-family prefers to take no 
actions on poorly performing funds in order to save the costs incurred in the process of 
liquidations and mergers, against the interests of investors. In this regard, this chapter reveals 
another side of the agency problem existing in the mutual fund industry and potentially in the 
broader asset management industry, particularly in hard times when all the parties in the market 
suffer a lot. Also, it confirms the past wisdom that business ethics weaken in the markets of 
worse financial performance (Harrison and Berman, 2016, Campbell, 2007).  
Third, this chapter contributes to the literature regarding investors’ role in governing fund-
family management as external monitors (Dangl et al., 2006; Meschke, 2007; Qian, 2011; Ding 
and Wermers, 2012). A fund-family is expected to be more disciplined under higher pressure 
from the redemptions from poorly performing funds by investors. During the GFC, some of 
active investors leave the market regardless of a fund’s performance, and the remaining 
69 
 
investors may be hard to find alternative investment opportunities. This reduces the pressure 
of fund-families from the remaining investors to deal with worse performing funds. This 
chapter documents that the strength of such external governance mechanisms is the weakest 
during the GFC. Thus, stronger monitoring and regulations should be imposed on fund-families 
and even on the broader asset management industry, in order to mitigate potential conflicts of 
interests between investors and management companies, in particular during extreme market 
conditions. 
Fourth, it reveals another impact of the GFC on the business environment and decision making 
(Campbell, 2007; Tsalikis, 2011; Carlson et al., 2013; DeYoung and Torna, 2013; Flannery et 
al., 2013; Dunham et al., 2016; Harrison and Berman, 2016; Anginer et al., 2017). The weaker 
ethics and severe information asymmetry in ordinary corporates during the GFC are well 
documented (Harrison and Berman, 2016, Campbell, 2007, Tsklikis, 2011, Flannery et al., 
2013). Moreover, mutual fund investors are exposed to more risks and a higher probability of 
being skimmed from more profits through security lending in the GFC than in other times 
(Dunhan et al., 2016). This chapter finds another way of a mutual fund-family taking advantage 
of its shareholders, and thus confirms the weaker ethics of the asset management industry 
during the GFC. Finally, it contributes to the M&A literature by providing the evidence that 
post-merger performance is sensitive to the quality of targets.  
There are some limitations of the analysis in this chapter. First, the premise of the hypotheses 
in this chapter is that there are two types of investors-active and passive investors in the market, 
and that they will act differently on their investment choices in face of different market 
conditions. However, due to the unavailability of the data on the cash flows of each investor, 
it is not possible to distinguish between the actions of different types of investors, or to examine 
their investment decisions in different times. Therefore, future work needs to be done to verify 
such premises of this chapter when the data of investors’ cash flows are available. Second, this 
chapter only proposes one potential explanation of why the negative performance-exit 
relationship disappeared during the GFC. Therefore, the explanation of the distortion of the 
market clearing mechanisms in crash markets is still open to arguments, if more information 
such as funds’ managerial histories and governance structure etc. can be retrieved. 
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CHAPTER 3: BOARD STRUCTURE AND MARKET CLEARING 
MECHANISMS IN THE U.S. MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY 
3.1 Background 
The GFC increased the unemployment rate (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Guichard and 
Rusticelli, 2010; Hurd and Rohwedder, 2010) and the number of business failures (DeYoung 
and Torna, 2013; Berger et al., 2016). The mutual fund industry was also affected by the GFC. 
The industry experienced heavy cash outflows, a large number of funds exiting the market33, 
high fund manager replacement ratios, and more career and remuneration concerns of managers 
and directors34. The difficult task for the industry lied not only in retaining investors during 
such bad times, but also in dealing with the potential conflicts of interest between fund-families, 
directors, managers and shareholders, which may have manifested more strongly during the 
GFC than during other times.  
Fund boards, especially independent directors, are expected to act as the internal monitor of 
fund management, reducing the agency costs between fund-families, managers and investors 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, there is extensive evidence showing that fund directors 
behave in a manner consistent with their own private interests at the expense of shareholders’ 
interests (Tufano and Sevick, 1997; Del Guercio et al., 2003; Ferris and Yan, 2007; Meschke, 
2007; Chen et al., 2008; Kong and Tang, 2008; Kryzanowski and Mohebshahedin, 2016). In 
addition, there is some evidence that corporate governance of the banking industry is weaker 
during the GFC than in other times (Kirkpatrick, 2009). Yet, whether the weaker governance 
during the GFC also exists in other financial institutions, e.g. the mutual fund industry, has not 
been researched on. This motivates an investigation of whether the conflict of interest between 
directors and investors in the mutual fund industry is more visible during the GFC than in other 
times.  
 
33 See Figure 2-2. 




Thus, this chapter investigates the link between board characteristics, fund exit decisions and 
expense ratios during non-GFC periods and during the GFC.  
Fund directors are legally empowered to negotiate and approve fees paid to sponsors and 
approve fund re-organisations, etc. This indicates that fund boards have direct influence on 
fund exit decisions and expense ratios. To protect shareholders’ interests, directors are expected 
to approve exits of poorly performing funds and negotiate with sponsors for lower fees. 
However, it is possible that directors put their own interests before shareholders’ when these 
are misaligned. This chapter investigates whether certain board characteristics stimulate or 
dampen directors’ incentives to act in the best of interest of shareholders, and whether in this 
regard the GFC is similar or different from other periods. 
Fund exit decisions are documented to be affected by directors’ own remuneration concerns 
and are shown not to be aligned with investors’ interests. Khorana et al. (2007) investigate the 
effects of board structure on fund (within-family and across-family) mergers and document 
that the more directors are paid, the less likely they are to approve across-family mergers that 
would cause a substantial reduction in their compensation. This chapter builds on Khorana et 
al.’s (2007) findings by investigating the effect of director remuneration on liquidation and 
within-family merger decisions. It is natural to conjecture that the argument for across-family 
mergers can be extended to liquidations and that directors’ compensation received from a fund-
family (or a fund) is negatively related to the probability of liquidations. 
Furthermore, this chapter also investigates the effects of excessive compensation and directors’ 
ownership on liquidation and within-family merger decisions. Two (Two) mutually non-
exclusive channels through which excessive compensation (directors’ ownership) may affect 
exit decisions are proposed. This chapter investigates whether there is any evidence for these 
channels to play a role, and whether there is any evidence that their influence changes with 
market regimes.  
The analysis of over 11,000 funds covering the period between 2000 and 2014 shows that 
director compensation is negatively associated with liquidations, and the relationship is 
statistically significant during the GFC. This gives support to the finding in Khorana et al. 
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(2007) that the more directors are paid, the less likely they are willing to approve the exits 
which reduce their compensation. Besides, this chapter shows that directors’ excessive 
compensation is positively related to liquidations during the non-GFC period and negatively 
related to liquidations during the GFC. The positive relationship indicates that fund-families 
prefer liquidating the funds with higher operational costs (i.e. the funds that pay higher 
excessive compensation to directors) and that the force of fund-families outweighs that of 
directors. In contrast, the negative relationship during the GFC suggests that directors’ private 
interests are put before the interests of fund-families. Finally, the chapter documents a 
statistically significantly negative relationship between director ownership and liquidations 
during the non-GFC period. The negative relationship becomes stronger during the GFC period. 
This could be driven by directors’ unwillingness to liquidate poorly performing funds which 
would require them to withdraw their investments at a low price, and/or be driven by fund-
families’ unwillingness to liquidate the funds heavily owned by directors which may attract 
investor inflows. 
How much fund-families charge investors is also an important indicator of whether directors 
fulfil their fiduciary duties. This is because fund fees are ultimately related to long-term fund 
returns deliverable to investors (Gruber, 1996). To shed more light on how board characteristics 
are related to investors’ benefits, as an additional analysis, the relationship between board 
characteristics and fund fess is also investigated in this chapter. Various board characteristics 
such as board size, independence ratio, experience, compensation, ownership, and tenure etc. 
are documented to be related to fund fees. In this chapter, two additional variables representing 
board diversity as control variables are considered. They are introduced to assess whether they 
are associated with fund fees. In addition, whether the relationship between board 
characteristics and fund fees was changed during the GFC is also investigated. 
This chapter contributes to several strands of literature. First, it expands the evidence on the 
effect of board characteristics on fund exits (Khorana et al. 2007, Namvar and Phillips 2013) 
by showing that the effects of excessive compensation and directors’ ownership change with 
market conditions and that directors tend not to fully fulfil their monitoring duties when their 
own private interests contradict with the interests of investors in particular under tough market 
conditions such as the GFC. Second, the chapter deepens our understanding of the agency 
problems in the asset management industry by showing that conflicts of interest between 
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directors and shareholders not only exist in the process of fee negotiations and performance 
improvement (Tufano and Sevick 1997, Del Guercio, Dann et al. 2003, Ferris and Yan 2007, 
Meschke 2007, Chen, Goldstein et al. 2008, Kong and Tang 2008, Kryzanowski and 
Mohebshahedin 2016), but are also present in the decision-making of fund exits. Third, it 
contributes to the literature on the role of directors’ ownership in protecting the interests of 
shareholders. Numerous papers document the effectiveness of directors’ ownership in aligning 
the interests of directors and of shareholders (Meschke 2007, Chen et al. 2008, Cremers et al. 
2009, Qian 2011, Kryzanowski and Mohebshahedin 2016, Bhagat and Bolton 2019). Yet, this 
chapter casts doubt on its effectiveness on exiting poorly performing funds especially during 
the GFC. 
3.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
3.2.1 Relationship between director ownership and fund exit decisions 
Fund exits may affect the compensation and career continuation of directors. Khorana et al. 
(2007) find evidence that directors’ total compensation is negatively associated with across-
family mergers but not with within-family mergers. They show that over half of the directors 
of the target funds involved in across-family mergers discontinued services after the mergers, 
whilst only 10% of the directors of the target funds involved in within-family mergers lost their 
board seats after the mergers. In addition, Khorana et al. (2007) document that the decrease in 
directors’ total compensation in across-family mergers than in within-family mergers. Their 
analysis suggests that the extent of the adverse impact of exits on directors’ remuneration may 
vary with the form of mergers. Analogously, it can be expected that liquidations may cause 
more career discontinuation for directors than within-family mergers35. Moreover, it is assumed 
that the adverse impact of liquidations is stronger than that of within-family mergers on 
directors’ compensation36 . In other words, directors may prefer within-family mergers to 
liquidations to deal with the poorly performing funds, in order to keep their board seats within 
the fund-family and the associated compensation. 
 
35 For this chapter, I did not manage to collect the data of which directors discontinue their posts after mergers as 
the collection would be rather time-consuming.  
36 As the data of the compensation after mergers for each director are not complete, the comparison of the change 
in directors’ compensation after mergers would be biased. Thus, I only consider the possibility of career 
discontinuation of fund exits as the adverse impact on director benefits.  
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Khorana et al. (2007) results are based on the analysis of levels of remuneration. Although it 
is not questioned in this chapter that levels of remuneration play an important role in 
determining directors’ decisions, understanding the link between excessive remunerations and 
director’s decisions requires more attention. Excessive compensation is defined as the 
unexplained compensation after taking into account directors’ workloads and experience 
(Tufano and Servick, 1997; Ferris and Yan, 2007; Meschke, 2007). It can be expected that 
directors appreciate and value high excessive compensation. In other words, this measure 
indicates the relative ‘attractiveness’ of a board seat to directors (Tufano and Servick, 1997), 
and thus the extent of directors’ reluctance to lose their posts in the decision-making process 
of fund exits. This channel through which excessive compensation may affect exit decisions is 
called the ‘job attractiveness’ channel. Excessive compensation is preferable to total 
compensation also because it measures part of the operational cost of the fund-family for 
paying directors extra. Therefore, when one considers potential candidates for exits, it may be 
favourable for fund-families to exit those that pay higher excessive compensation to directors. 
This is called the ‘operational cost’ channel. 
The two channels may affect liquidation and within-family merger decisions in different ways. 
As liquidations will certainly reduce the number of funds overseen by directors, the job 
attractiveness channel would suggest a negative relationship between excessive compensation 
and the probability of liquidations. In contrast, fund-families would prefer liquidating the funds 
with excessive pay to reduce internal costs. This indicates a positive relationship between 
excessive compensation and liquidations. The relative strength of the two competing forces 
determines the relationship between excessive compensation and liquidations in practice. 
Similarly, the relationship between excessive compensation and within-family mergers is also 
determined by the two competing forces. The difference from the case of liquidations is that 
the adverse impact of mergers on directors’ remuneration and the cost-saving effect of mergers 
for fund-families are both weaker.  
The relative strength of the two competing forces may vary with market regimes. Given that 
the mutual fund market shrank during the GFC, and that the probability of getting jobs declined 
during the GFC, directors’ concern of keeping their posts may be stronger during the GFC than 
in the other times.  Chapter 2 argues that fund-families have less motivation to exit poorly 
performing funds during the GFC than in other times. The ‘nonfeasance’ of fund-families may 
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create an environment more prone for directors to resist exiting the funds with excessive pay. 
When the pressure to deal with poor performers grows,  directors may be more likely to approve 
within-family mergers that will allow them to keep their posts, rather than liquidations. Thus, 
there should be a stronger negative relationship between excessive compensation and 
liquidations and a stronger positive relationship between excessive compensation and within-
family mergers during the GFC than in other times. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are proposed for the relationship between excessive 
compensation and exits during the GFC. It is an empirical question of which force prevails 
during the non-GFC periods. 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between excessive compensation and 
liquidations during the GFC. 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between excessive compensation and within-
family mergers during the GFC. 
3.2.2 Relationship between director ownership and fund exit decisions 
It is documented in the literature that a significant portion of directors hold shares in the funds 
they oversee (Chen et al., 2008). Directors may hold shares due to their personal portfolio 
choices, and/or due to family-wide requirement/encouragement driven by the expectation that 
high director ownership better aligns the interests of directors and investors. This requirement, 
to some extent, restricts the freedom of directors to withdraw money from the funds they 
oversee even if they are not satisfied with the funds’ performance. Faced with this situation, 
directors should exert an effort to improve fund performance by communicating with fund 
managers, or to find a better performing fund to merge the poorly performing funds with37. It 
seems that liquidation would be the least favourable choice as it would require the directors to 
withdraw all of their investments at a low price. This predicts that director ownership is 
negatively related to liquidations. 
 
37 This assumption is plausible as numerous papers have documented that acquisitions benefit the shareholders of 




The shares held by directors can create values not only for directors but also for fund-families. 
Investors value director holdings (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997) and the ownership of the funds 
directors oversee is documented to successfully attract investor inflows (Zhao, 2007). Thus, it 
can be argued that fund-families do not liquidate poorly performing funds with high director 
ownership in the expectation that investors will keep investing in these funds. This predicts a 
negative relationship between director ownership and liquidations.  
Given that the motivation of fund-families to exit poorly performing funds during the GFC was 
lower than that in other times, fund-families may be more willing to rely on director ownership 
to attract investor inflows during the GFC than in other times. If this is true, the negative 
relationship between director ownership and liquidations should strengthen during the GFC. 
Therefore, the hypothesis regarding the relationship between director ownership and 
liquidations is proposed as follows. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relationship between director ownership and liquidations, 
and this relationship becomes stronger during the GFC. 
 
3.3 Data and methodology 
3.3.1 Data collection 
In Chapter 2 which examined the effect of fund performance on fund exits, a sample of 17,487 
funds from 1,014 fund-families, consisting of 6,600 exit funds (liquidations and within-family 
mergers) and 10,887 surviving funds during the period between Jan 2000 and June 2015 was 
constructed. These 17,487 funds covered all investment objectives such as equity funds, bond 
funds, mixed funds etc.  
To construct the sample in this chapter, the 17,487 funds were treated as the population and 
searched for their board information between 2000-2014 from U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) website via the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval 
(EDGAR) system38. Each fund belongs to an investment company and multiple investment 





containing board demographic information are reported by each investment company to the 
SEC, and each investment company is identified by EDGAR by its Central Index Key (CIK).  
Therefore, in order to search the EDGAR for company governance data, the investment 
company a fund belongs to was identified using the fund’s name as given by CRSP39. Out of 
the 17,487 funds, it was possible to identify the investment companies of 15,122 funds. The 
corresponding CIK numbers of the identified investment companies were then collected from 
EDGAR, by searching each company’s name. The 17,487 funds come from 1,014 fund-
families, according to the family names provided by CRSP. Searching the EDGAR for 
investment companies revealed that there were some inconsistencies in the expressions of 
family names between EDGAR and CRSP. In other words, it was possible that several different 
family names in CRSP actually represent one family in EDGAR, although such occasions were 
not common. In this chapter, the family names provided by EDGAR were used, so the number 
of fund-families for the 17,487 funds was reduced to 73640. Table 3-1 reports the number of 
funds, CIKs, and families in the population, and lists the number of funds whose investment 
companies were (not) identified. 
Table 3-1. Number of funds, investment companies (CIKs), and fund-families in the population 
 Exit funds Surviving funds Population 
Panel A. Number of funds, CIKs, and families in the population 
Number of families 515 736 736 
Number of CIKs 1,313 1,373 2,039 
Number of funds 6,600 10,887 17,487 
Panel B. Number of funds with identified/unidentified CIK 
Funds with CIKs 5,707 9,415 15,122 
Funds without CIKs 893 1,472 2,365 
Total number of funds 6,600 10,887 17,487 
The collected CIK numbers were used in Java programming to automatically extract board 
structure information from each investment company’s 485 files for the period between 2000 
and 2014. As investment companies may report their 485 files in different months in a calendar 
year, the files closest to December in each year were selected. However, not all files were 
readable by programming (i.e. the files of some investment companies and/or the files of 
certain years of some investment companies could not be extracted). This results in a large 
 
39 A fund name provided by CRSP generally consists of two parts-the name of the investment company, following 
by the name of the specific fund. 




sample loss. Manual search was the only way to complete the dataset, but this was extremely 
time-consuming.  
In order to ensure the representativeness of the dataset, the data for the largest 30 fund-families 
in the US as of December 2014 were manually searched and completed. Using fund size data 
as of December 2014, each family’s market share was calculated and it was found that the top 
30 families managed 79.96% of the total assets in the market41. Therefore, the biggest 30 
families, as long as funds’ investment companies and the 485 files during the sample period in 
the EDGAR system42 could be identified, were manually collected and cleared. Thus, the final 
sample consists of a complete sub-sample of the top 30 families, and a randomly programme-
collected sub-sample for the other families. Table 3-2 describes the number of funds, CIKs and 
families for the whole sample, and for the 30-family sample.  
Table 3-2. Number of funds, investment companies (CIKs), and fund-families in the sample 
 Exit funds Surviving funds              Sample Population 
Panel A. Number of funds, CIKs, and families in the whole sample  
Number of families 248 300 356 736 
Number of CIKs 872 1,015 1,387 2,039 
Number of funds 4,020 7,411 11,431 17,487 
Panel B. Number of funds, CIKs, and families in the 30-family sample  
Number of families 29 30 30 30 
Number of CIKs 408 506 695 731 
Number of funds 1,732 3,403 5,135 6,524 
For the top 30 families, the board information for each investment company in each year 
between 2000 and 2014 was collected43. For the other families, the data for some of their 
investment companies and some of years during the 15 years’ window may be missing. Table 
3-2 Panel A shows that the board information for 11,431 funds, belonging to 1,387 investment 
companies and 356 fund-families was collected, but the data for some years are missing. Table 
3-2 Panel B shows that out of the 6,524 funds from the largest 30 families, the board 
information for 5,135 funds in each year between 2000 and 2014 was collected as long as their 
investment companies reported governance information to the SEC.  
For an investment company (represented by a CIK), the yearly information of each director’s 
age, tenure, if he/she was an independent director/chairman, total compensation paid from the 
 
41 The names and respective market shares of the 30 fund-families are presented in the Appendix Table A3-1. 
42 There are some cases where no 485 files during the period between 2000 and 2014 can be found, even if the 
underlying funds were still in operation. 
43 As there are some funds of which I cannot identify the investment companies, it is possible that even if a fund’s 
family is known, I cannot collect its board information. 
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fund-family, the number of funds he/she oversaw in the family, the dollar range of ownership 
in the funds he/she oversaw across the family, and if the director held outside directorship 
besides the current board was collected.  Monthly fund and family characteristics data were 
collected from the CRSP Mutual Fund Database.  
3.3.2 Variable construction 
For each fund, I calculated funds’ annual net return (Return) in the past 12 months before its 
investment company reports the board information to the SEC. A fund’s size (Fsize) is the total 
value of net assets in the month one-year before a board information report month (referred to 
as report month from this point onwards), a fund’s age (Fage) is the number of years a fund 
has operated till a report month, a fund’s flow (Flow) is the cumulative monthly flow calculated 
over the 12 months before a report month, a fund’s expense ratio (Expense) is the latest reported 
expense ratio as at a report month, a fund’s turnover ratio (Turnover) is the latest reported 
turnover ratio as at a report month44, a fund-family’s size (FF-size) is the sum of the total net 
assets’ value across all the funds in a family in a report month. The specialisation of a fund-
family (FF-spec) is the ratio of the number of funds belonging to a certain style over the total 
number of funds a family provides in a report month.  
For each board (overseeing one investment company), the following statistics were calculated. 
A board’s size (Bsize) is the number of all directors including independent and inside directors 
sitting on a board. A board’s independence (Inderatio) is measured by the ratio of the number 
of independent directors over the board size. Director ownership (Ownership) is the average 
dollar amount of ownership in the funds a director oversees in the family across all independent 
directors sitting on a board. Investment companies only report the dollar range owned by each 
director in the funds they oversee in the family such as ‘None, $1-$10,000, $10,000-50,000, 
$50,000-100,000, over $100,000’ etc. The midpoint of each range was selected as the amount 
of dollars value owned by a director. Director compensation (Comp_fam) is defined as the 
average total compensation a director receives from a fund-family across all independent 
directors in a board. It is possible that some directors put a part or all of their compensation in 
the shares of the funds they oversee, but it is not possible to know whether and how much of 
 
44 Expense (Turnover) ratio is measured as the average expense (turnover) ratio over the 12 months prior to its 
report month, as defined by CRSP. 
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the total compensation is in the form of fund ownership45. Compensation per fund (Comp_fund) 
is the average compensation a director receives from each fund he/she oversees across all 
independent directors sitting on a board, where the compensation per fund for each director is 
proxied by the ratio of total compensation over the number of funds he/she oversees in the 
fund-family. Director excessive compensation (ExcComp) is defined as the average excessive 
director compensation across all independent directors sitting on a board, where the excessive 
compensation of each director is the residual after regressing the natural logarithm of a 
director’s total compensation from a fund-family on the natural logarithm of a family’s size, 
the natural logarithm of the number of funds a director oversees, the business complexity of 
the family (measured by the ratio of the number of investment styles over the number of 
funds)46, 47, the director’s age and the director’s tenure.  
Table 3-3 reports the results of the regressions to obtain excessive compensation. The 
regressions were run in each year over the period 2000-2014 to rule out any time trends in 
director compensation. It can be seen that the five variables can explain over 50% of the 
variation in directors’ compensation. Directors’ compensation is significantly and positively 
related to the family sizes and the number of funds directors oversee in every year. In addition, 
in 8 (12) out of the 15 years, directors’ ages (tenures) are statistically significantly and 
positively related to director compensation. This suggests that directors’ experience matters in 
how much they are paid by fund-families. Finally, business complexity has some explanatory 
power in half of the regressions. In general, it is positively related to compensation before the 
GFC, but the relationship becomes negative after the GFC.  
A board’s tenure (Btenure) is defined as the average number of years independent directors 
have been on a board till the report month. A board’s age (Bage) is the average age of 
independent directors sitting on a board as of the report month. The number of funds overseen 
by directors (Nfunds) is the average number of funds independent directors oversee in the 
 
45 There are some investment companies that disclose this information, but many of the sample companies do not 
distinguish ownership from total compensation paid to a director. 
46 As the dependent variable is in logarithm, the dollar amount of the excessive compensation of each director in 
the descriptive statistics presented in Tables 3-4 – 3-7 was obtained from taking the exponential of the residual. 
47 This method of obtaining directors’ excessive compensation was commonly used, for example, in Tufano and 
Sevick (1997), Ferris and Yan (2007), and Meschke (2007). This study added three new independent variables 
(business complexity, directors’ ages, and directors’ tenure) into the regressions, in order to take into account the 
difficulty of managing the funds in a family and directors’ experience besides the total number of funds and assets 
managed in a family.  
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family. The dispersion of directors’ age/tenure (Disp.Bage/Btenure) is the normalized standard 
deviation of independent directors’ age/tenure in a board.
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Table 3-3. Regressions of director total compensation in each year over the period 2000-2014. Nfunds and FF-size are in logarithm. Complexity is the ratio of the number of investment styles over the 
number of funds provided by a fund-family. Age is directors’ age till the year questioned. Tenure is the number of years a director has been on a board till the year questioned. P-values in brackets. *** - 1% 
statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
Director comp 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
                                
Nfunds 0.699*** 0.864*** 0.440*** 0.440*** 0.327*** 0.434*** 0.369*** 0.379*** 0.363*** 0.343*** 0.343*** 0.414*** 0.357*** 0.341*** 0.407*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FF-size 0.702** 0.591** 0.289*** 0.297*** 0.144*** 0.275*** 0.225*** 0.202*** 0.180*** 0.180*** 0.206*** 0.213*** 0.205*** 0.162*** 0.165*** 
 (0.013) (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Complexity 4.885 2.229 0.603** 0.585*** -0.891*** 0.452*** -0.127 -0.065 -0.194* -0.668*** -0.330*** -0.195 -0.319*** -0.752*** -0.311** 
 (0.147) (0.118) (0.032) (0.008) (0.000) (0.005) (0.312) (0.611) (0.074) (0.000) (0.009) (0.106) (0.009) (0.000) (0.018) 
Age -0.596 0.360 0.392** 0.118 0.075 0.060 0.101 0.443*** 0.315** 0.223 0.366** 0.477*** 0.437*** 0.482*** 0.510*** 
 (0.312) (0.498) (0.025) (0.403) (0.616) (0.703) (0.490) (0.003) (0.014) (0.138) (0.018) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tenure 0.037 0.029 0.170*** 0.096*** 0.019 0.196*** 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.106*** 0.126*** 0.098*** 0.141*** 0.139*** 0.178*** 0.088*** 
 (0.675) (0.677) (0.000) (0.000) (0.457) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 2.706 -0.316 4.533*** 5.822*** 8.520*** 6.189*** 7.235*** 6.096*** 7.020*** 7.661*** 6.719*** 5.847*** 6.393*** 6.791*** 6.479*** 
 (0.508) (0.938) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
                
Observations 27 50 848 1,026 968 1,020 1,132 1,257 1,424 1,067 1,212 1,222 1,269 1,302 1,279 




3.3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3-4 reports the means, medians, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values of 
fund, fund-family, and board characteristics for the non-GFC and the GFC periods. This 
chapter follows Chapter 2 and treats the period September 2007-March 2009 as the GFC period, 
and January 2000-August 2007 and April 2009-December 2014 as the non-GFC period.  
During the whole sample period between 2000 and 2014, a board has on average 8.7 directors 
at the average age of 64.8 years. The variation in Bsize is very large; the smallest boards consist 
of 3 directors whilst the largest ones consist of 28 members. The mean director tenure across a 
board is 8.57 years. On average, a director oversees 86.7 funds and receives $185,518 ($3,443) 
from the fund-family (a fund) per annum. After taking into account directors’ effort put into 
the family, the excessive compensation for each director is -$9,077. This indicates that an 
average director is not compensated sufficiently for his/her service for the family48. However, 
it is possible that part of a director’s compensation is in the form of shares of the funds (through 
deferred compensation plans) the director oversees, so the amount of excessive compensation 
may be biased downwards. In addition, a director’s total compensation and excessive 
compensation are highly skewed to the right. The average director owns $77,916 of the fund 
shares he/she oversees, and the deviation of this amount is also large across boards. The 
statistics for the non-GFC and the GFC periods confirm the direction of the skewness of each 
variable in the whole sample period. 
The statistics of the non-GFC and of the GFC periods are shown in Table 3-5. It can be seen 
that, on average, the annual net return for the non-GFC period was higher than that for the GFC 
by 17.647% per annum. During the GFC, funds charged higher expenses (1.08% during the 
GFC versus 1.059% during the non-GFC period) and made more portfolio rebalancing (the 
turnover ratio for the GFC was 0.884 versus 0.81 for the non-GFC times). The size of a fund-
family shrank significantly during the GFC, and an average fund-family was more specialised 
in certain investment styles during the GFC.  
 
48 Negative excessive compensation of fund directors is also documented in Tufano and Servick (1997).  
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Although fund characteristics differ across market regimes, most of the board characteristics 
such as board size, director ownership, dispersion in director age (tenure) remain relatively 
similar, except for the lower total compensation ($163,641 for the GFC versus $189,268 for 
the non-GFC times), and the higher excessive compensation (-$4,572 for the GFC versus -
$9,850 for the non-GFC times) during the GFC. The lower total compensation paid to directors 
during the GFC is consistent with the smaller number of funds (85 in the GFC versus 87 in the 
non-GFC times) a director oversaw, the reduced family size, and the higher investment 
specialisation in that period. The higher excessive compensation during the GFC suggests that 
directors were extracting more compensation from the family but exerting less effort on 
fulfilling their fiduciary duties. The differences in the means of board age, tenure, 
independence ratio, age dispersion, and tenure dispersion are statistically significant at 10 
percent, but the magnitudes are rather small. 
Table 3-6 Panels A and B show the equivalent statistics for the surviving funds and the exit 
funds respectively for each period, and Table 3-7 reports the t-test for the differences in the 
means of each variable between the surviving and the exit funds in each period.  
The statistics in the left panel of Table 3-6 confirm the past literature that exit funds tend to 
perform worse, have larger cash outflows, shorter history, fewer assets under management, 
higher portfolio turnover ratio and expense ratios.  Exit funds are more likely to belong to 
smaller families than surviving funds. The size of a board monitoring the average exit fund 
(8.569) is a little smaller than that of a surviving fund (8.8), but considering the small size of 
the average exit fund (around one seventh of the average surviving fund) and its family (around 
half size of a surviving fund’s family), the exit funds seem to have relatively large boards 
compared to the surviving funds.  
Another apparent difference between the exit and the surviving funds is in directors’ total 
compensation and excessive compensation. Although directors of the exit funds are paid 
slightly less ($167,528) than those of the surviving funds ($191,501), they have much higher 
excessive compensation ($14,218) than directors of surviving funds (-$16,825). This implies 
that high excessive compensation is associated with poor performance thus the consequent 
exiting of these bad performers, or/and that fund-families tend to exit the funds which pay 
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higher excessive compensation to reduce operational costs. Yet, the circumstance in which 
directors of surviving funds have more compensation in the form of fund ownership cannot be 
ruled out. The board for the average exit fund has slightly lower ownership in fund shares, and 
higher dispersion in age and tenure than the board for the average surviving fund. This also 
suggests that there may be more governance problems such as lower alignment of the interests 
of shareholders and directors for the exit funds than for the surviving funds. 
The middle and the right panels in Table 3-6 show the equivalent statistics in the left panel, in 
the non-GFC and the GFC periods separately. The differences in fund, family, and board 
characteristics between the surviving and the exit funds during non-GFC period exhibit the 
same pattern as the whole period. In contrast, the differences reduce in the GFC period in terms 
of both statistical significances and magnitudes. For example, the performance of the surviving 
funds and of the exit funds does not differ statistically significantly during the GFC. In addition, 
the boards of the surviving funds and of the exit funds do not statistically significantly differ 
from each other with respect to the board size, average number of funds overseen by a director, 
and director compensation. Moreover, the difference in directors’ excessive compensation 
during the GFC is just the half of that during non-GFC times. These suggest that the differences 
in governance quality between the  surviving funds and the exit funds in the GFC period are 
smaller than that in non-GFC period. 
3.3.4 Sample of comparable surviving funds 
To assess the relationship between the board characteristics and fund exits, the board 
characteristics of the exit funds should be compared with those of the comparable surviving 
funds. Tables 3-6 and 3-7 show that the exit and the surviving funds differ much in fund, family 
and board characteristics. Thus, accounting for all the surviving funds may create a bias, i.e. 
the results may be driven by distributional differences across the populations. In addition, the 
funds that exited during sub-periods (e.g. between September 2007 and March 2009) should 
not be compared with the surviving funds that have not exited the market till June 2015, 
because the funds that survived for a longer time may be inherently better governed than the 
funds that had exited the market. Following Chapter 2, the board characteristics of the exit 
funds are compared against those of the surviving funds that remained operational for at least 
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six months beyond the end of the periods of investigation49. For example, the surviving funds 
for the funds that exited the market between September 2007 and March 2009 are defined as 
those that were in operation over the period September 2007 and September 2009.  
To reduce any potential bias, the nearest-neighbour-matching (NNM) with replacement was 
adopted. As the non-GFC period consists of two separate periods, the pre-crisis period of 
January 2000-August 2007, and the post-crisis period of April 2009 - December 2014, the 
NNM was conducted on three periods, the pre-crisis period, the crisis-period, and the post-
crisis period separately. The matching was done on the basis of funds’ size and age that are 
associated with board characteristics (Kryzanowski and Mohebshahedin, 2016) and fund exits 
(Jayaraman et al., 2002; Zhao, 2003). It can also be expected that investment objectives may 
be related to board characteristics, as the supervision of, for example, domestic equity funds 
and foreign fixed-income funds may require different specialised knowledge and industry 
experience of directors. In addition, as fund performance may also be related to board structure 
(e.g. better funds may pay higher compensation to directors etc.), Return was also considered 
as an additional matching covariate.  
Thus, two sets of matching were adopted. The first one was done on Fsize, Fage and investment 
objectives, and the second was done on Fsize, Fage, Return and investment objectives.  Figure 
3-1 shows the standardized differences in the means (SDMs, Panel A) and the variance ratios 
(VRs, Panel B) for each period, and for Fsize and Fage for the matching. Figure 3-2 shows the 
SDMs and the VRs for each period and for Fsize, Fage, and Return for the matching. The 
SDMs and the VRs for the liquidated funds are presented first, then for the merged funds. 
Figure 3-1 shows that the matching reduces the SDMs between the surviving and the exit funds 
close to zero for both Fsize (for both liquidated and merged funds) and Fage (for the liquidated 
funds) for all three periods. Yet, the VRs are not improved although they are still within the 
expected range of 0.5-2 (Rubin, 2001). The SDMs for Fage become slightly larger after the 
matching for the crisis and the post-crisis periods, but the VRs for Fage for the two periods are 
improved.  Figure 3-2 shows that the second set of matching further reduces the SDMs between 
 
49 The regression results that compare the board characteristics of the exit and the surviving funds that remained 
operational at the end of the period questioned are reported in the Appendix Tables A3-6-A3-13, pretty similar to 
the main results reported in the next section. 
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the surviving and the exit funds for Return for all the three periods for the mergers, and for the 
pre- and post-crisis periods for the liquidations. In addition, the VRs are also improved for all 
periods for liquidations, and for the pre- and post-crisis periods for the mergers.
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Table 3-4. Descriptive statistics of fund, fund-family, and board characteristics for the whole period and the two sub-periods. The statistics are based on all years within the period specified in the top row.  
 Whole period (2000-2014) 
 
Non-GFC period (before 9/2007 or after 3/2009) 
 
Crisis period (9/2007-3/2009) 
  Mean Median St dev Min Max Mean Median St dev Min Max Mean Median St dev Min Max 
Fund characteristics 
Return (%) 7.308 6.212 17.978 -74.087 160.288  9.891 7.757 16.133 -61.507 160.288  -7.756 -1.951 20.607 -74.087 72.522 
Fsize ($mil) 1,126 111 4,537 0.100 137,381  1,135 112 4,502 0.100 137,381  1,074 105 4,737 0.100 96,715 
Flow (%) 2.281 -4.615 38.536 -99.883 199.544  2.109 -4.667 38.223 -99.883 199.544  3.284 -4.222 40.303 -97.828 199.444 
Fage (yrs) 12.459 10.025 9.869 0.997 90.055  12.630 10.036 9.995 0.997 90.055  11.457 10.005 9.036 1.000 84.049 
Turnover 0.823 0.490 1.158 0.000 9.930  0.813 0.480 1.146 0.000 9.930  0.886 0.530 1.224 0.000 9.710 
Expense (%) 1.062 0.970 0.618 -0.510 6.660  1.059 0.970 0.620 -0.510 5.260  1.078 1.000 0.605 -0.440 6.660 
Family characteristics 
FF-size ($mil) 198,588 70,617 329,750 0.400 1,656,588  207,271 72,281 339,609 0.400 1,656,588  147,936 52,070 259,326 2.467 1,176,182 
FF-spec 0.116 0.086 0.122 0.002 1.000  0.115 0.085 0.121 0.002 1.000  0.122 0.091 0.128 0.005 1.000 
Board characteristics 
Bsize 8.743 9.000 2.761 3.000 28.000  8.749 9.000 2.792 3.000 28.000  8.705 9.000 2.574 3.000 26.000 
Bage (yrs) 64.803 64.900 4.020 28.250 78.143  64.942 65.000 4.049 28.250 78.143  63.988 64.000 3.744 44.000 76.400 
Btenure (yrs) 8.567 8.125 4.130 0.111 37.857  8.663 8.125 4.162 0.111 37.857  8.009 8.143 3.893 0.667 24.800 
Nfunds 86.688 67.714 65.691 1.000 377.000  86.978 66.800 66.194 1.000 377.000  84.996 69.000 62.657 1.000 377.000 
Comp_fam ($) 185,518 182,095 103,475 500 1,251,519  189,268 184,893 107,049 500 1,251,519  163,641 163,611 75,887 1,000 436,742 
ExcComp ($) -9,077 -5,569 87,832 -340,692 1,134,109  -9,850 -5,208 90,383 -340,692 1,134,109  -4,572 -7,304 70,999 -263,193 226,368 
Comp_fund ($) 3,443 2,321 5,104 60.460 81,568  3,496 2,423 5,044 63.104 81,568  3,136 2,034 5,430 60.460 61,129 
Ownership ($) 77,916 87,500 27,870 0.000 1,000,000  77,929 87,500 27,816 0.000 1,000,000  77,842 83,333 28,187 0.000 250,000 
Inderatio 0.818 0.818 0.094 0.500 1.000  0.816 0.813 0.094 0.500 1.000  0.827 0.833 0.096 0.500 1.000 
Disp. Bage 0.099 0.093 0.039 0.000 0.354  0.099 0.093 0.039 0.000 0.354  0.097 0.094 0.041 0.000 0.347 
Disp. Btenure 
No. of funds 
No. of observations 
0.646 0.650 0.335 0.000 3.000 
 
  
0.640 0.641 0.334 0.000 3.000 
 
0.684 0.713 0.339 0.000 2.830 
7,163 7,163 7,163 7,163 7,163 6,810 6,810 6,810 6,810 6,810 3,398 3,398 3,398 3,398 3,398 






Table 3-5. T-test on the differences of the means of fund, family, and board characteristics between non-GFC periods and the GFC period for all funds. 
*** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 Non-GFC period (before 9/2007 or after 3/2009) Crisis period (9/2007-3/2009) Diff. P-value 
Fund characteristics 
Return (%) 9.891 -7.756 17.647*** 0.000 
Fsize ($mil) 1,135.379 1,074.074 61.305 0.389 
Flow (%) 2.119 3.284 -1.175* 0.052 
Fage (yrs) 12.630 11.457 1.173*** 0.000 
Turnover 0.813 0.886 -0.074*** 0.000 
Expense (%) 1.059 1.078 -0.019** 0.048 
Family characteristics 
FF-size ($mil) 207,271 147,936 59,334*** 0.000 
FF-spec 0.115 0.122 -0.008*** 0.000 
Board characteristics 
Bsize 8.749 8.705 0.044 0.310 
Bage (yrs) 64.942 63.988 0.954*** 0.000 
Btenure (yrs) 8.663 8.009 0.654*** 0.000 
Nfunds 86.978 84.996 1.982* 0.054 
Comp_fam ($) 189,268 163,641 25,627*** 0.000 
ExcComp ($) -9,850 -4,572 -5,278*** 0.000 
Comp_fund ($) 3,496 3,136 360*** 0.000 
Ownership ($) 77,929 77,842 86.675 0.843 
Inderatio 0.816 0.827 -0.010*** 0.000 
Disp. Bage 0.099 0.097 0.002*** 0.000 






Table 3-6. Descriptive statistics of fund, fund-family, and board characteristics of surviving (Panel A) and exit funds (Panel B) for the whole period and the two sub-periods. The statistics are based on all years within 
the period specified in the top row. Surviving funds are the funds that have not exited the market between January 2000 and June 2015, and exit funds are the funds that were liquidated or merged within a fund-family 
between January 2000 and December 2014. 
 Whole period (2000-2014) 
 
Non-GFC period (before 9/2007 or after 3/2009) 
 
Crisis period (9/2007-3/2009) 
  Mean Median St dev Min Max Mean Median St dev Min Max Mean Median St dev Min Max 
Panel A. Surviving funds 
Fund characteristics 
Return (%) 8.146 6.829 17.769 -65.121 160.288  10.521 8.307 15.978 -61.507 160.288  -7.388 -1.269 20.806 -65.121 72.522 
Fsize ($mil) 1,420 171 5,159 0.100 137,381  1414 170 5083 0.100 137381  1459 176 5634 0.100 96715 
Flow (%) 6.134 -2.252 38.466 -99.725 199.544  5.643 -2.507 38.087 -99.725 199.544  9.345 -0.659 40.716 -90.046 199.444 
Fage (yrs) 13.239 11.016 10.337 0.997 90.055  13.417 11.025 10.448 0.997 90.055  12.077 10.025 9.500 1.000 84.049 
Turnover 0.800 0.460 1.164 0.000 9.930  0.795 0.460 1.162 0.000 9.930  0.831 0.500 1.178 0.000 9.710 
Expense (%) 0.983 0.910 0.585 -0.510 5.260  0.984 0.910 0.587 -0.510 5.260  0.980 0.900 0.565 -0.440 3.170 
Family characteristics 
FF-size ($mil) 229,647 72,640 359,321 2.342 1,656,588  238,466 74,533 368,169 2.342 1,656,588  171,984 60,098 288,479 11.575 1,176,182 
FF-spec 0.116 0.086 0.123 0.002 1.000  0.115 0.086 0.123 0.002 1.000  0.119 0.091 0.122 0.005 1.000 
Board characteristics 
Bsize 8.800 9.000 2.807 3.000 28.000  8.813 9.000 2.838 3.000 28.000  8.714 9.000 2.598 3.000 26.000 
Bage (yrs) 64.916 65.091 4.051 28.250 78.143  65.041 65.250 4.069 28.250 78.143  64.103 64.332 3.831 44.000 73.800 
Btenure (yrs) 8.642 8.167 4.108 0.364 37.857  8.725 8.167 4.133 0.364 37.857  8.094 8.571 3.895 1.000 24.800 
Nfunds 89.178 69.000 68.756 1.000 377.000  89.758 69.000 69.005 1.000 377.000  85.385 68.000 66.993 1.000 377.000 
Comp_fam ($) 191,501 187,970 106,956 500 1,251,519  195,869 194,031 110,180 500 1,251,519  162,936 162,661 76,968 1000 436,742 
ExcComp ($) -16,825 -10,664 91,763 -340,692 1,134,109  -17,806 -10,042 94,094 -340,692 1,134,109  -10,408 -13,695 74,447 -263,193 224,176 
Comp_fund ($) 3,637 2,320 5,676 60.460 81,568  3,676 2,429 5,570 125 81,568  3,375 1,997 319 60.460 61,129 
Ownership ($) 78,836 88,889 28,485 0.000 1,000,000  78,796 89,286 28,358 0.000 1,000,000  79,094 84,375 29,301 0.000 250,000 
Inderatio 0.813 0.800 0.092 0.500 1.000  0.813 0.800 0.091 0.538 1.000  0.818 0.800 0.098 0.500 1.000 
Disp. Bage 0.098 0.091 0.039 0.000 0.354  0.098 0.091 0.039 0.000 0.354  0.095 0.093 0.042 0.000 0.347 
Disp. Btenure 
No. of funds 
No. of 
observations 
0.641 0.642 0.324 0.000 3.000 
 
  
0.636 0.637 0.322 0.000 3.000 
 
  
0.671 0.697 0.339 0.000 2.830 
4,738 4,738 4,738 4738 4,738 4,622 4,622 4,622 4,622 4,622 2,288 2,288 2,288 2,288 2,288 








Table 3-6 (Continued). Descriptive statistics of fund, fund-family, and board characteristics of surviving (Panel A) and exit funds (Panel B) for the whole period and the two sub-periods. The statistics are based on all years 
within the period specified in the top row. Surviving funds are the funds that have not exited the market between January 2000 and June 2015, and exit funds are the funds that were liquidated or merged within a fund-family 
between January 2000 and December 2014. 
 Whole period (2000-2014)  Normal period (before 9/2007 or after 3/2009)  Crisis period (9/2007-3/2009) 
  Mean Median St dev Min Max  Mean Median St dev Min Max  Mean Median St dev Min Max 
Panel B. Exit funds 
Fund characteristics 
Return (%) 4.790 4.782 18.366 -74.087 124.006  7.867 6.252 16.459 -56.349 124.006  -8.539 -2.906 20.162 -74.087 65.123 
Fsize ($mil) 242.542 31.600 1184.754 0.100 31695.190  239.691 31.300 1158.452 0.100 31695.190  254.893 32.100 1292.888 0.100 29367.400 
Flow (%) -9.304 -12.421 36.367 -99.883 199.151  -9.234 -12.170 36.411 -99.883 199.151  -9.607 -13.532 36.190 -97.828 193.535 
Fage (yrs) 10.113 8.992 7.850 0.997 85.052  10.107 8.978 7.862 0.997 85.052  10.138 9.011 7.799 1.000 79.030 
Turnover 0.894 0.570 1.137 0.000 9.830  0.869 0.550 1.091 0.000 9.830  1.004 0.635 1.310 0.000 9.210 
Expense (%) 1.297 1.250 0.655 0.000 6.660  1.300 1.250 0.660 0.000 4.160  1.285 1.250 0.633 0.000 6.660 
Family characteristics 
FF-size ($mil) 105,196 65,903 189,338 0.400 1,656,588  107,138 68,177 193,151 0.400 1,656,588  96,782 38,095 171,647 2.467 1,176,182 
FF-spec 0.116 0.084 0.117 0.004 1.000  0.113 0.083 0.111 0.004 1.000  0.130 0.094 0.139 0.005 1.000 
Board characteristics 
Bsize 8.569 9.000 2.611 3.000 26.000  8.543 9.000 2.630 3.000 26.000  8.685 9.000 2.524 3.000 18.000 
Bage (yrs) 64.460 64.429 3.907 46.000 77.667  64.625 64.500 3.969 46.000 77.667  63.745 63.500 3.542 46.667 76.400 
Btenure (yrs) 8.343 8.000 4.187 0.111 37.857  8.462 8.000 4.244 0.111 37.857  7.828 7.833 3.886 0.667 24.800 
Nfunds 79.200 64.333 54.791 1.000 377.000  78.053 63.000 55.299 1.000 377.000  84.167 69.000 52.261 1.000 373.000 
Comp_fam ($) 167,528 164,289 89,854 600 621,925  168,079 163,667 93,212 600 621,925  165,143 170,714 73,536 1,160 436,742 
ExcComp ($) 14,218 5,485 69,780 -335,703 332,912  15,690 6,904 71,530 -335,703 332,912  7,841 4,960 61,241 -233,766 226,368 
Comp_fund ($) 2,862 2,321 2,656 63.104 41,139  2,917 2,384 2,660 63.104 33,665  2,627 2,189 2,629 230.994 41,139 
Ownership ($) 75,151 80,000 25,739 0.000 250,000  75,144 81,818 25,805 0.000 100,000  75,179 78,571 25,461 0.000 250,000 
Inderatio 0.831 0.833 0.099 0.500 1.000  0.828 0.824 0.101 0.500 1.000  0.845 0.846 0.092 0.556 1.000 
Disp. Bage 0.104 0.101 0.038 0.000 0.345  0.104 0.101 0.038 0.000 0.345  0.101 0.097 0.040 0.000 0.330 
Disp. Btenure 
No. of funds 
No. of observations 
0.661 0.666 0.366 0.000 3.000  0.649 0.655 0.372 0.000 3.000  0.711 0.750 0.337 0.000 2.188 
2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425  2,188 2,188 2,188 2,188 2,188  1,110 1,110 1,110 1,110 1,110 









Table 3-7. T-test on the differences in the means of fund, family, and board characteristics for surviving and exit funds, in different periods. The statistics are based on all years within the period specified in the top row. 
*** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 Whole period (2000-2014) 
 
Non-GFC period (before 9/2007 or after 3/2009)  Crisis period (9/2007-3/2009) 
 Surviving funds Exit funds Diff. P-value Surviving funds Exit funds Diff. P-value  Surviving funds Exit funds Diff. P-value 
Fund characteristics 
Return (%) 8.145 4.790 3.355*** 0.000  10.521 7.867 2.655*** 0.000  -7.388 -8.539 1.151* 0.072 
Fsize ($mil) 1,420.355 242.542 1,177.814*** 0.000  1,414.417 239.691 1,174.726*** 0.000  1,459.185 254.893 1,204.292*** 0.000 
Flow (%) 6.134 -9.304 15.438*** 0.000  5.643 -9.234 14.877*** 0.000  9.345 -9.607 18.952*** 0.000 
Fage (yrs) 13.239 10.113 3.126*** 0.000  13.417 10.107 3.310*** 0.000  12.077 10.138 1.939*** 0.000 
Turnover 0.800 0.894 -0.094*** 0.000  0.795 0.869 -0.074*** 0.000  0.831 1.004 -0.173*** 0.000 
Expense (%) 0.983 1.297 -0.314*** 0.000  0.984 1.300 -0.316*** 0.000  0.980 1.285 -0.305*** 0.000 
Family characteristics 
FF-size ($mil) 229,647 105,196 124,451*** 0.000  238,466 107,138 131,328*** 0.000  171,984 96,782 75,202*** 0.000 
FF-spec 0.116 0.116 0.000 0.881  0.115 0.113 0.002 0.151  0.119 0.130 -0.011*** 0.006 
Board characteristics 
Bsize 8.800 8.569 0.231*** 0.000  8.813 8.543 0.271*** 0.000  8.714 8.685 0.029 0.717 
Bage (yrs) 64.916 64.460 0.456*** 0.000  65.041 64.625 0.416*** 0.000  64.103 63.745 0.358*** 0.002 
Btenure (yrs) 8.642 8.343 0.298*** 0.000  8.725 8.462 0.263*** 0.000  8.094 7.828 0.266** 0.028 
Nfunds 89.178 79.200 9.979*** 0.000  89.758 78.053 11.705*** 0.000  85.385 84.167 1.218 0.531 
Comp_fam ($) 191,501 167,528 23,972*** 0.000  195,869 168,079 27,790*** 0.000  162,935 165,143 -2,208 0.349 
ExcComp ($) -16,825 14,218 -31,043*** 0.000  -17,806 15,690 -33,496*** 0.000  -10,408 7,841 -18,250*** 0.000 
Comp_fund ($) 3,636.537 2,862.482 774.056*** 0.000  3,676.469 2,916.910 759.559*** 0.000  3,375.440 2,626.649 748.791*** 0.000 
Ownership ($) 78,836 75,151 3,686*** 0.000  78,796 75,144 3,653*** 0.000  79,094 75,179 3,915*** 0.000 
Inderatio 0.813 0.831 -0.018*** 0.000  0.813 0.828 -0.016*** 0.000  0.818 0.845 -0.027*** 0.000 
Disp. Bage 0.098 0.104 -0.006*** 0.000  0.098 0.104 -0.006*** 0.000  0.095 0.101 -0.006*** 0.000 
Disp. Btenure 0.641 0.661 -0.020*** 0.000  0.636 0.549 -0.013*** 0.007  0.672 0.711 -0.039*** 0.000 
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Figure 3-1. Standardized differences in means (Panel A) and the variance ratios (Panel B) for the Nearest-
Neighbor matching, matched by investment objectives, age, and size. 
 













Figure 3-2. Standardized differences in means (Panel A) and the variance ratios (Panel B) for the Nearest-
Neighbor matching, matched by investment objectives, Fage, Fsize, and Return. 
Panel A. Standardized differences in means (SDMs)     
Liquidations 
   
Mergers 
 








3.4 Empirical evidence 
3.4.1 Board characteristics and fund exit decisions 
To test whether the role of board characteristics, in particular director (excessive) compensation 
and ownership in explaining fund liquidations and mergers changed during the GFC, logit 
regressions where the dependent variable take value of one for the exit funds and zero for the 
comparable surviving funds selected by the NNM, were adopted. Given that some fund, fund-
family, and board characteristics may highly correlate with each other, their correlations were 
checked before they entered the regressions. Table 3-8 presents the Pearson’s correlations 
among fund, fund-family, and board characteristics. The relatively large values, i.e. those larger 
than 0.2 or smaller than -0.2 are presented in bold. It can be seen that FF-size, FF-spec, Bsize, 
and Bage are highly correlated with other variables. As the interest lies in the effects of the 
board characteristics rather than the fund-family characteristics, FF-size and FF-spec were 
dropped out of the regressions analysis to minimise the multicollinearity issue. Fsize is highly 
correlated with Fage (0.526), but following the past literature that commonly include both of 
these variables in regression specification, both of them have been used.  
Thus, the independent variables are Comp_fam, ExcComp, Comp_fund, and Ownership, with 
control variables for the fund characteristics (Return, Fsize, Fage, Flow, and Turnover) and for 
the board characteristics (Inderatio, Bsize, Bage, Btenure, Nfunds, Disp.Bage, and 
Disp.Btenure), plus the investment objective and time dummies50. The regressions were run on 
the non-GFC period and on the GFC period separately. All the regressions are clustered by 
investment objectives and investment companies. Moreover, to reduce the possible bias arising 
from the correlations between compensation and ownership, each of the independent variables 
entered the regressions alone in turn, before the compensation and ownership variables were 
included together in the regressions. 
Table 3-9 shows the results for the regressions based on the liquidated funds and the matched 
surviving funds for the non-GFC period. The coefficients of fund characteristics obtained from 
 
50 The interaction terms of Returns and ExcComp were also examined in the regressions, but they were not 
statistically significant in any of the specifications. These results are reported in the Appendix Table A3-5.   
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all the seven specifications confirm the past literature that exit funds tend to perform worse, 
are smaller in size, have a shorter history and smaller cash inflows than the surviving funds.  
Moreover, Table 3-9 Model 2 shows that during the non-GFC period, the larger the excessive 
pay is, the more likely liquidations of the funds overseen by these overpaid directors are. This 
statistically significant and positive relationship between ExcComp and liquidations is 
preserved when Ownership is used in the regression specification. This result suggests that the 
force of the operational cost channel prevails the job attractiveness channel during the non-
GFC period. Models 1 and 3 show that there is a negative relationship between Comp_fam 
(Comp_fund) and liquidations in line with Khorana et al. (2007), but the result is not 
statistically significant. Models 4-7 shows that there is some evidence of a negative relationship 
between director ownership and liquidations. The coefficient of Ownership in Model 6 is 
statistically significantly negative at 10 percent. This result supports Hypothesis 3, but it cannot 
distinguish whether it is directors’ concern of their shares in the funds overseen or/and fund-
families’ reliance on director ownership to attract investor inflows that leads to the negative 
relationship. 
Table 3-9 also shows that boards’ independence, sizes, ages, and tenures do not have 
statistically significant explanatory power in fund liquidation decisions. There is, however, 
some evidence of a positive relationship between the number of funds overseen by directors 
and liquidations as two of the seven estimated coefficients are statistically positively significant 
(at 10 percent). Yet, the coefficients estimated for the boards’ diversities, i.e. Disp. Bage and 
Disp. Btenure, are statistically significantly positive. This suggests that more diverse boards 
contribute to the decision-making of liquidating poorly performing funds, possibly by bringing 
different experience and insights to the decision-making process or/and by achieving more 
elaborate division of work (Hoffman and Maier, 1961; Barnhart et al., 1994; Siciliano, 1996; 
Carter et al., 2002; Van Knippenberg et al., 2004; Hassan and Marimuthu, 2016). 
Table 3-10 reports the results for the regressions for the liquidated and the matched surviving 
funds for the GFC period. Consistent with Chapter 2, the negative relationship between fund 
performance and liquidations becomes insignificant during the GFC, in 4 out of the 7 
specifications. The statistical significance of the other three coefficients is 10 percent only. 
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Similar to the results for the non-GFC period, smaller funds with lower cash inflows tend to be 
liquidated during the GFC. Yet, the negative relationship between funds’ age and liquidation 
decisions becomes insignificant, and there is a positive relationship between turnover ratio and 
liquidations during the GFC.  
Interestingly, the positive relationship between ExcComp and liquidations during the non-GFC 
period disappears and even becomes negative (statistically significant at 5 percent in Model 2 
and at 10 percent in Model 6) during the GFC period. This negative relationship cannot be 
explained by fund-families’ propensity to liquidate low-cost funds. Instead, this supports the 
job attractiveness channel. This suggests that the effect of directors’ remuneration concerns 
outweighs the effect of fund-families’ cost-reduction strategies, if any, during the GFC.  
The results regarding the role of excessive compensation shown in Tables 3-9 and 3-10 suggest 
that fund exit decisions are affected by directors’ decisions (due to remuneration concerns), 
and this is more pronounced during the GFC. Models 1 and 5 (3 and 7) show that the negative 
relationship between the total compensation from fund-families (funds) and liquidations 
becomes statistically significant during the GFC. This provides support for the argument in 
Khorana et el. (2007) that the more directors are paid, the less willing they are to approve 
liquidations.  
Models 4-7 show that the negative relationship between director ownership and liquidations 
becomes stronger during the GFC, in terms of both magnitude and statistical significance, in 
comparison with the non-GFC period. This evidence provides support for Hypothesis 3 that 
fund-families’ reluctance to exit funds makes fund-families more likely to rely on director 
ownership to attract investor inflows during the GFC than during the other times. 
Similar to the results for the non-GFC period, boards’ independence, sizes, ages, and tenures 
do not have any statistically significant explanatory power in explaining the liquidations that 
occurred during the GFC. The dispersion of director ages, but not the dispersion of director 
tenures, still statistically significantly explains fund liquidations.  
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Tables 3-11 and 3-12 show the results for the equivalent regressions for the mergers that 
occurred during the non-GFC and the GFC periods, respectively. Table 3-11 confirms the 
findings of the past literature that small, poorly performing funds as well as those with shorter 
operational history and smaller fund inflows are more likely to be merged during the non-GFC 
times. 
Table 3-11 Models 2 and 6 show that there is no statistically significant relationship between 
directors’ excessive compensation and within-family mergers during the non-GFC times. 
Models 1 and 5 (3 and 7) show that directors’ total compensation from fund-families (funds) 
do not have statistically significant relationship with mergers. This confirms the argument 
proposed in Khorana et al. (2007) that the probability of within-family mergers is not affected 
by directors’ total compensation because such mergers do not impair directors’ compensation 
received from fund-families. 
In addition, boards’ independence and sizes are shown to be positively associated with mergers. 
Boards with younger directors tend to be less tolerant with poor performance and approve 
mergers. This is reasonable in the sense that younger directors may be more concerned with 
the longer-term reputation of the fund-family compared with older directors who may retire in 
the near future. The number of funds overseen by directors has a statistically significantly 
positive impact on the mergers of poorly performing funds. This is possibly because the more 
funds are overseen by a board, the more easily a poorly performing fund finds an acquirer that 
is also overseen by the same board, thus increasing the rate of merger success. In contrast to 
the case of liquidations, a higher dispersion of director ages is associated with a lower 
propensity of merging poorly performing funds. Given that liquidations and mergers are sort 
of substitutes to each other, it can be conjectured that in a board with wider age dispersion, 
poorly performing funds tend to be liquidated rather than be merged. This points out the value 
of different insights and elaborate division of work brought by age diversity in making 
relatively complex decisions, on the condition that the decision-making and implement of 
liquidations are assumed to be harder than mergers given that liquidations are expected to 
impair the reputation of fund-families more heavily and result in more investor outflows in 
comparison with mergers.  
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Table 3-12 confirms the results in Chapter 2 that the merged funds do not perform worse than 
the comparable surviving funds during the GFC. Models 2 and 6 show that there is a 
statistically significantly positive relationship between director excessive compensation and 
mergers during the GFC. This result supports the prediction of the job attractiveness channel 
and the argument that directors do not want to lose the board seats and the associated high 
excessive compensation, thus would rather merge the poorly performing funds within the fund-
family than liquidate them. Similar to the results for the non-GFC period, directors’ total 
compensation is not statistically significantly related to within-family mergers. The positive 
effect of boards’ independence on mergers is preserved during the GFC. Similar to the case 
during the non-GFC times, higher dispersion of director ages in a board is associated with a 
lower propensity of mergers.  
The analogous logit regressions were then run on the sample after the NNM on Return, Fsize, 
Fage, and investment objectives. The corresponding results to those for Tables 3-9 – 3-12 are 
presented in Tables 3-13- 3-16 respectively. Tables 3-13 and 3-15 show that the liquidated and 
the merged funds perform worse than the comparable surviving funds even after the matching 
with Returns for the non-GFC period. Tables 3-14 and 3-16 show that there is no statistically 
significant difference in the performance of the liquidated (merged) funds and the matched 
surviving funds. In addition, the results with respect to the relationships between board 
characteristics and exits for different periods are still preserved for the matching with Returns. 
As a robustness check, the analogous logit regressions were run on the sample before NNM. 
The corresponding results to those for Tables 3-9 - 3-12 (3-13 – 3-16) are presented in Tables 
3-17 - 3-20 respectively.  The results obtained from the whole sample are similar to those 
obtained from the matched sample. They confirm that the poorly performing funds that pay 
higher excessive compensation to directors tend to be liquidated during the non-GFC times, 
but not during the GFC. Instead, the funds that pay higher compensation to directors tend to be 
merged during the GFC. Moreover, the poorly performing funds with higher director 




Table 3-8. Pearson’s correlations among fund, fund-family, and board characteristics. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 Return Fsize Flow Fage Turnover Expense FF-size FF-spec Bsize Bage Btenure Nfunds Comp_fam ExcComp Comp_fund Ownership Inderatio Disp.Bage Disp.Btenure 
Return 1                                     
Fsize -0.024*** 1                  
Flow 0.075*** -0.062*** 1                 
Fage 0.049*** 0.522*** -0.293*** 1                
Turnover -0.017*** -0.111*** -0.024*** -0.059*** 1               
Expense 0.020*** -0.343*** -0.099*** -0.073*** 0.183*** 1              
FF-size 0.015*** 0.256*** 0.046*** 0.085*** -0.053*** -0.223*** 1             
FF-spec -0.028*** -0.098*** -0.009* -0.054*** -0.057*** 0.056*** -0.455*** 1            
Bsize 0.019*** 0.087*** -0.009* 0.151*** -0.065*** -0.017*** 0.390*** -0.216*** 1           
Bage 0.057*** 0.007 -0.067*** 0.166*** -0.004 -0.001 0.170*** -0.128*** 0.225*** 1          
Btenure 0.060*** 0.083*** -0.057*** 0.256*** 0.013** -0.007 -0.007 -0.010* -0.050*** 0.258*** 1         
Nfunds -0.021*** 0.048*** -0.024*** 0.036*** 0.024*** -0.141*** 0.552*** -0.355*** 0.343*** 0.071*** -0.099*** 1        
Comp_fam 0.028*** 0.118*** -0.052*** 0.170*** -0.022*** -0.083*** 0.651*** -0.327*** 0.414*** 0.302*** 0.036*** 0.681*** 1       
ExcComp -0.012* -0.154*** -0.077*** 0.016*** -0.030*** 0.228*** -0.368*** 0.112*** -0.065*** 0.086*** -0.014** -0.341*** 0.095*** 1      
Comp_fund 0.030*** 0.128*** 0.003 0.072*** -0.069*** 0.035*** 0.061*** 0.091*** 0.040*** 0.076*** 0.102*** -0.475*** 0.062*** 0.329*** 1     
Ownership 0.020*** 0.088*** -0.042*** 0.201*** -0.034*** -0.024*** 0.257*** -0.135*** 0.313*** 0.283*** 0.134*** 0.195*** 0.394*** 0.058*** 0.049*** 1    
Inderatio 0.014*** -0.018*** -0.080*** 0.137*** -0.068*** -0.018*** 0.070*** -0.055*** 0.158*** 0.158*** -0.007 0.104*** 0.254*** 0.152*** 0.020*** 0.163*** 1   
Disp.Bage 0.012** -0.009* 0.011** -0.005 -0.061*** 0.035*** -0.138*** 0.079*** -0.036*** -0.149*** 0.036*** -0.236*** -0.168*** 0.178*** 0.076*** -0.019*** 0.034*** 1  
Disp.Btenure 0.010* 0.111*** -0.029*** 0.148*** -0.043*** -0.035*** 0.141*** -0.064*** 0.223*** 0.019*** -0.041*** 0.124*** 0.129*** -0.036*** -0.014** 0.144*** 0.117*** 0.124*** 1 
                                        




Table 3-9. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment objectives and investment companies after matching 
for Fsize, Fage, and investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every observation for funds that were 
liquidated during the non-GFC periods (before Sep 2007, or after Mar 2009) and it is equal to zero for every observation 
for the funds that have not exited the market for at least 6 months after the end of the periods of investigation. The 
observations cover the non-GFC period.  P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical 
significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
                
Return -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.017) (0.018) (0.023) (0.018) 
Comp_fam -0.008    0.001   
 (0.732)    (0.978)   
ExcComp  0.004***    0.004***  
  (0.007)    (0.002)  
Comp_fund   -0.003    0.006 
   (0.901)    (0.806) 
Ownership    -0.009 -0.012 -0.015* -0.012 
    (0.183) (0.124) (0.052) (0.113) 
Inderatio 0.077 -0.016 0.070 0.087 0.085 -0.003 0.081 
 (0.643) (0.926) (0.671) (0.590) (0.612) (0.987) (0.631) 
Bsize -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 
 (0.144) (0.158) (0.140) (0.283) (0.241) (0.312) (0.234) 
Bage 0.123 0.052 0.115 0.083 0.119 0.058 0.112 
 (0.587) (0.819) (0.611) (0.712) (0.604) (0.800) (0.623) 
Btenure 0.045 0.050 0.044 0.047 0.053 0.062 0.053 
 (0.324) (0.273) (0.331) (0.279) (0.244) (0.178) (0.246) 
Nfunds 0.029 0.031* 0.022 0.020 0.021 0.032* 0.024 
 (0.252) (0.096) (0.292) (0.281) (0.378) (0.087) (0.255) 
Disp.Bage 0.779** 0.660** 0.774** 0.780** 0.827** 0.704** 0.821** 
 (0.022) (0.046) (0.022) (0.024) (0.019) (0.040) (0.019) 
Disp.Btenure 0.069* 0.062* 0.069* 0.083** 0.074* 0.068* 0.074* 
 (0.071) (0.098) (0.070) (0.031) (0.055) (0.076) (0.055) 
Fsize -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.057*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fage -0.108*** -0.108*** -0.108*** -0.105*** -0.101*** -0.100*** -0.101*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Flow -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Turnover -0.018* -0.015 -0.018* -0.016 -0.017 -0.013 -0.017 
 (0.096) (0.165) (0.098) (0.158) (0.118) (0.213) (0.121) 
        
IS&Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,832 3,832 3,832 3,901 3,742 3,742 3,742 
r2_p 0.197 0.202 0.197 0.196 0.200 0.206 0.200 






Table 3-10. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment objectives and investment companies after 
matching for Fsize, Fage, and investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every observation for funds 
that were liquidated during the GFC period (between Sep 2007 and Mar 2009) and it is equal to zero for every observation 
for the funds that have not exited the market for at least 6 months after the end of the periods of investigation. The 
observations cover the GFC period.  P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, 
* - 10% statistical significance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
                
Return -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* 
 (0.118) (0.144) (0.109) (0.111) (0.072) (0.073) (0.065) 
Comp_fam -0.258***    -0.231**   
 (0.004)    (0.012)   
ExcComp  -0.008**    -0.008*  
  (0.045)    (0.057)  
Comp_fund   -0.262***    -0.233** 
   (0.004)    (0.012) 
Ownership    -0.049* -0.037 -0.048* -0.037 
    (0.059) (0.115) (0.070) (0.116) 
Inderatio 1.005** 0.861* 0.971** 0.546 0.956** 0.853* 0.923** 
 (0.035) (0.066) (0.041) (0.250) (0.042) (0.064) (0.048) 
Bsize 0.008 -0.008 0.009 -0.008 0.013 0.002 0.014 
 (0.704) (0.686) (0.674) (0.705) (0.548) (0.940) (0.530) 
Bage 0.811 0.530 0.803 0.613 0.860 0.637 0.847 
 (0.361) (0.490) (0.366) (0.411) (0.356) (0.443) (0.362) 
Btenure 0.018 -0.033 0.017 0.069 0.054 0.015 0.054 
 (0.855) (0.717) (0.864) (0.504) (0.610) (0.874) (0.614) 
Nfunds 0.077 -0.078 -0.195** -0.051 0.049 -0.095* -0.193** 
 (0.189) (0.137) (0.019) (0.315) (0.419) (0.082) (0.027) 
Disp.Bage 2.691** 2.127* 2.752** 2.193** 2.689** 2.185* 2.740** 
 (0.018) (0.064) (0.017) (0.050) (0.022) (0.058) (0.021) 
Disp.Btenure -0.109 -0.057 -0.112 -0.011 -0.069 -0.014 -0.072 
 (0.440) (0.695) (0.425) (0.932) (0.613) (0.916) (0.599) 
Fsize -0.125*** -0.115*** -0.125*** -0.107*** -0.127*** -0.119*** -0.126*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fage 0.028 0.008 0.029 -0.004 0.030 0.014 0.030 
 (0.747) (0.920) (0.741) (0.959) (0.735) (0.861) (0.730) 
Flow -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Turnover 0.045* 0.062*** 0.045* 0.057** 0.048** 0.064*** 0.048** 
 (0.062) (0.007) (0.059) (0.012) (0.047) (0.007) (0.045) 
        
IS&Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 196 196 196 198 195 195 195 
r2_p 0.267 0.244 0.266 0.251 0.275 0.261 0.275 











Table 3-11. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment objectives and investment companies after 
matching for Fsize, Fage, and investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every observation for funds 
that were merged during the non-GFC periods (before Sep 2007, or after Mar 2009) and it is equal to zero for every 
observation for the funds that have not exited the market for at least 6 months after the end of the periods of investigation. 
The observations cover the non-GFC period.  P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical 
significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
                
Return -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) 
Comp_fam 0.031    0.028   
 (0.260)    (0.316)   
ExcComp  -0.001    -0.001  
  (0.592)    (0.311)  
Comp_fund   0.028    0.026 
   (0.293)    (0.343) 
Ownership    -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 
    (0.905) (0.882) (0.846) (0.895) 
Inderatio 1.230*** 1.278*** 1.235*** 1.233*** 1.219*** 1.270*** 1.223*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bsize 0.009* 0.010** 0.009* 0.009* 0.009* 0.009* 0.009* 
 (0.069) (0.048) (0.070) (0.085) (0.077) (0.060) (0.078) 
Bage -0.637** -0.556** -0.627** -0.551** -0.635** -0.548** -0.626** 
 (0.018) (0.032) (0.019) (0.033) (0.020) (0.036) (0.021) 
Btenure -0.044 -0.043 -0.043 -0.047 -0.040 -0.040 -0.040 
 (0.157) (0.162) (0.162) (0.129) (0.202) (0.197) (0.208) 
Nfunds 0.026 0.041** 0.057** 0.047*** 0.033 0.044** 0.061** 
 (0.229) (0.020) (0.015) (0.008) (0.130) (0.014) (0.013) 
Disp.Bage -0.464 -0.469 -0.465 -0.691** -0.619* -0.629* -0.621* 
 (0.163) (0.164) (0.162) (0.038) (0.066) (0.063) (0.066) 
Disp.Btenure -0.040 -0.042 -0.040 -0.055 -0.054 -0.055 -0.054 
 (0.274) (0.248) (0.269) (0.100) (0.112) (0.110) (0.110) 
Fsize -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fage -0.058** -0.057** -0.057** -0.060** -0.061** -0.060** -0.060** 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
Flow -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Turnover -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 
 (0.235) (0.275) (0.237) (0.219) (0.193) (0.223) (0.194) 
        
IS&Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,739 4,739 4,739 4,774 4,612 4,612 4,612 
r2_p 0.201 0.200 0.201 0.200 0.202 0.202 0.202 












Table 3-12. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment objectives and investment companies after 
matching for Fsize, Fage, and investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every observation for funds 
that were merged during the GFC period (between Sep 2007 and Mar 2009) and it is equal to zero for every observation 
for the funds that have not exited the market for at least 6 months after the end of the periods of investigation. The 
observations cover the GFC period.  P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, 
* - 10% statistical significance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
                
Return -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.742) (0.217) (0.747) (0.778) (0.797) (0.210) (0.800) 
Comp_fam 0.061    0.049   
 (0.600)    (0.670)   
ExcComp  0.017***    0.017***  
  (0.000)    (0.000)  
Comp_fund   0.061    0.049 
   (0.602)    (0.672) 
Ownership    0.022 0.019 -0.002 0.019 
    (0.681) (0.718) (0.954) (0.716) 
Inderatio 1.403*** 0.903*** 1.411*** 1.429*** 1.381*** 0.908*** 1.387*** 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) 
Bsize 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.022 
 (0.200) (0.177) (0.202) (0.168) (0.202) (0.176) (0.204) 
Bage 1.062 0.714 1.081 1.140 1.080 0.714 1.096 
 (0.150) (0.242) (0.142) (0.124) (0.147) (0.241) (0.138) 
Btenure -0.049 0.006 -0.050 -0.049 -0.049 0.006 -0.050 
 (0.581) (0.939) (0.573) (0.572) (0.572) (0.939) (0.565) 
Nfunds -0.050 0.002 0.014 -0.024 -0.054 0.003 -0.002 
 (0.588) (0.981) (0.851) (0.684) (0.551) (0.967) (0.980) 
Disp.Bage -0.944 -1.698* -0.947 -1.146 -1.065 -1.696* -1.069 
 (0.375) (0.069) (0.372) (0.303) (0.332) (0.066) (0.330) 
Disp.Btenure -0.172 -0.046 -0.173 -0.162 -0.167 -0.046 -0.168 
 (0.170) (0.671) (0.165) (0.206) (0.191) (0.677) (0.187) 
Fsize -0.032 -0.043 -0.032 -0.031 -0.033 -0.042 -0.033 
 (0.209) (0.165) (0.208) (0.214) (0.200) (0.167) (0.199) 
Fage -0.078 -0.053 -0.078 -0.082 -0.072 -0.054 -0.072 
 (0.358) (0.562) (0.350) (0.321) (0.401) (0.558) (0.396) 
Flow -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Turnover 0.009 0.021 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.021 0.009 
 (0.781) (0.517) (0.779) (0.748) (0.785) (0.511) (0.784) 
        
IS&Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 233 233 233 236 233 233 233 
r2_p 0.220 0.324 0.220 0.223 0.221 0.324 0.221 











Table 3-13. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment objectives and investment companies after 
matching for Return, Fsize, Fage, and investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every observation 
for funds that were liquidated during the non-GFC periods (before Sep 2007, or after Mar 2009) and it is equal to zero for 
every observation for the funds that have not exited the market for at least 6 months after the end of the periods of 
investigation. The observations cover the non-GFC period.  P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% 
statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
                
Return -0.001** -0.001* -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.049) (0.055) (0.048) (0.119) (0.109) (0.122) (0.107) 
Comp_fam -0.013    -0.003   
 (0.573)    (0.904)   
ExcComp  0.004***    0.004***  
  (0.008)    (0.003)  
Comp_fund   -0.008    0.002 
   (0.735)    (0.921) 
Ownership    -0.009 -0.011 -0.015* -0.012 
    (0.219) (0.135) (0.053) (0.123) 
Inderatio 0.039 -0.060 0.032 0.035 0.045 -0.051 0.040 
 (0.806) (0.714) (0.844) (0.823) (0.781) (0.759) (0.806) 
Bsize -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.124) (0.126) (0.121) (0.259) (0.216) (0.271) (0.211) 
Bage 0.142 0.073 0.134 0.091 0.135 0.080 0.129 
 (0.526) (0.743) (0.550) (0.684) (0.551) (0.723) (0.570) 
Btenure 0.053 0.057 0.052 0.054 0.059 0.066 0.059 
 (0.246) (0.221) (0.254) (0.227) (0.203) (0.158) (0.206) 
Nfunds 0.038 0.036* 0.026 0.023 0.028 0.035* 0.027 
 (0.127) (0.052) (0.210) (0.208) (0.251) (0.057) (0.203) 
Disp.Bage 0.895*** 0.767** 0.889*** 0.915*** 0.956*** 0.823** 0.950*** 
 (0.009) (0.020) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.017) (0.007) 
Disp.Btenure 0.046 0.041 0.046 0.061 0.053 0.047 0.053 
 (0.227) (0.276) (0.224) (0.111) (0.171) (0.213) (0.169) 
Fsize -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.056*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fage -0.101*** -0.102*** -0.101*** -0.100*** -0.097*** -0.096*** -0.096*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Flow -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Turnover -0.017 -0.015 -0.017 -0.015 -0.016 -0.013 -0.016 
 (0.133) (0.191) (0.133) (0.194) (0.151) (0.229) (0.153)         
IS&Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,824 3,824 3,824 3,897 3,729 3,729 3,729 
r2_p 0.193 0.198 0.193 0.193 0.197 0.203 0.197 








Table 3-14. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment objectives and investment companies after 
matching for Return, Fsize, Fage, and investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every observation 
for funds that were liquidated during the GFC period (between Sep 2007 and Mar 2009) and it is equal to zero for every 
observation for the funds that have not exited the market for at least 6 months after the end of the periods of investigation. 
The observations cover the GFC period.  P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical 
significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
                
Return -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.247) (0.257) (0.228) (0.319) (0.188) (0.163) (0.172) 
Comp_fam -0.272***    -0.248***   
 (0.002)    (0.006)   
ExcComp  -0.010**    -0.010**  
  (0.030)    (0.036)  
Comp_fund   -0.281***    -0.256*** 
   (0.002)    (0.005) 
Ownership    -0.042 -0.029 -0.043 -0.029 
    (0.116) (0.240) (0.124) (0.245) 
Inderatio 1.071** 1.025** 1.047** 0.587 1.008** 0.994** 0.985** 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) (0.163) (0.027) (0.025) (0.029) 
Bsize 0.006 -0.007 0.007 -0.015 0.009 0.002 0.011 
 (0.792) (0.774) (0.739) (0.461) (0.675) (0.923) (0.634) 
Bage 0.921 0.637 0.918 0.698 0.972 0.768 0.965 
 (0.274) (0.391) (0.278) (0.329) (0.272) (0.345) (0.276) 
Btenure -0.030 -0.108 -0.031 0.009 -0.004 -0.071 -0.005 
 (0.759) (0.224) (0.751) (0.931) (0.968) (0.464) (0.962) 
Nfunds 0.093 -0.084 -0.196** -0.037 0.069 -0.102* -0.195** 
 (0.115) (0.149) (0.019) (0.489) (0.269) (0.094) (0.025) 
Disp.Bage 2.432** 1.769 2.504** 1.928* 2.397** 1.783 2.461** 
 (0.037) (0.138) (0.032) (0.092) (0.043) (0.133) (0.039) 
Disp.Btenure -0.105 -0.023 -0.110 0.016 -0.063 0.022 -0.067 
 (0.490) (0.879) (0.470) (0.915) (0.684) (0.881) (0.664) 
Fsize -0.130*** -0.121*** -0.130*** -0.113*** -0.132*** -0.126*** -0.132*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fage 0.009 -0.002 0.011 -0.025 0.010 0.003 0.012 
 (0.914) (0.983) (0.901) (0.751) (0.905) (0.968) (0.893) 
Flow -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Turnover 0.032 0.052** 0.032 0.042* 0.034 0.053** 0.034 
 (0.168) (0.020) (0.164) (0.051) (0.150) (0.022) (0.146) 
        
IS&Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 194 194 194 195 193 193 193 
r2_p 0.262 0.241 0.263 0.238 0.267 0.253 0.268 











Table 3-15. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment objectives and investment companies after 
matching for Return, Fsize, Fage, and investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every observation 
for funds that were merged during the non-GFC periods (before Sep 2007, or after Mar 2009) and it is equal to zero for 
every observation for the funds that have not exited the market for at least 6 months after the end of the periods of 
investigation. The observations cover the non-GFC period.  P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% 
statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
                
Return -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Comp_fam 0.028    0.024   
 (0.276)    (0.367)   
ExcComp  0.000    -0.000  
  (0.800)    (0.811)  
Comp_fund   0.026    0.023 
   (0.298)    (0.381) 
Ownership    0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 
    (0.791) (0.834) (0.685) (0.828) 
Inderatio 1.250*** 1.278*** 1.254*** 1.254*** 1.247*** 1.279*** 1.251*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bsize 0.010** 0.011** 0.010** 0.010** 0.009* 0.010** 0.009* 
 (0.038) (0.026) (0.039) (0.045) (0.051) (0.040) (0.052) 
Bage -0.574** -0.517** -0.566** -0.515* -0.575** -0.518* -0.569** 
 (0.032) (0.049) (0.034) (0.050) (0.034) (0.051) (0.035) 
Btenure -0.036 -0.034 -0.036 -0.039 -0.033 -0.032 -0.033 
 (0.245) (0.274) (0.251) (0.214) (0.299) (0.312) (0.304) 
Nfunds 0.021 0.037** 0.050** 0.041** 0.028 0.040** 0.053** 
 (0.330) (0.031) (0.022) (0.022) (0.198) (0.023) (0.021) 
Disp.Bage -0.377 -0.401 -0.378 -0.633* -0.538 -0.561 -0.539 
 (0.271) (0.248) (0.270) (0.067) (0.121) (0.110) (0.120) 
Disp.Btenure -0.019 -0.022 -0.020 -0.032 -0.029 -0.030 -0.029 
 (0.591) (0.533) (0.582) (0.333) (0.386) (0.365) (0.381) 
Fsize -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fage -0.045* -0.046* -0.045* -0.047* -0.049* -0.049* -0.049* 
 (0.078) (0.067) (0.079) (0.062) (0.058) (0.053) (0.059) 
Flow -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Turnover -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 
 (0.326) (0.359) (0.328) (0.284) (0.256) (0.284) (0.257) 
        
IS&Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,795 4,795 4,795 4,817 4,656 4,656 4,656 
r2_p 0.202 0.201 0.202 0.201 0.204 0.204 0.204 











Table 3-16. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment objectives and investment companies after 
matching for Return, Fsize, Fage, and investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every observation 
for funds that were merged during the GFC period (between Sep 2007 and Mar 2009) and it is equal to zero for every 
observation for the funds that have not exited the market for at least 6 months after the end of the periods of investigation. 
The observations cover the GFC period.  P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical 
significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
                
Return -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.569) (0.118) (0.573) (0.544) (0.567) (0.112) (0.572) 
Comp_fam 0.041    0.039   
 (0.699)    (0.716)   
ExcComp  0.016***    0.016***  
  (0.000)    (0.000)  
Comp_fund   0.041    0.040 
   (0.704)    (0.722) 
Ownership    0.005 0.002 -0.011 0.002 
    (0.911) (0.956) (0.759) (0.958) 
Inderatio 1.456*** 0.972*** 1.461*** 1.494*** 1.453*** 1.002*** 1.459*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
Bsize 0.038** 0.033** 0.038** 0.040** 0.038** 0.033** 0.038** 
 (0.016) (0.028) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.028) (0.017) 
Bage 1.073 0.687 1.087 1.111 1.076 0.686 1.090 
 (0.167) (0.279) (0.158) (0.142) (0.164) (0.275) (0.155) 
Btenure -0.009 0.047 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 0.047 -0.009 
 (0.919) (0.549) (0.913) (0.906) (0.918) (0.550) (0.913) 
Nfunds -0.062 -0.006 -0.018 -0.038 -0.062 0.000 -0.020 
 (0.485) (0.934) (0.798) (0.501) (0.482) (0.999) (0.785) 
Disp.Bage -1.307 -1.563* -1.312 -1.434 -1.316 -1.583* -1.320 
 (0.231) (0.099) (0.229) (0.190) (0.224) (0.095) (0.222) 
Disp.Btenure -0.246* -0.104 -0.246* -0.242* -0.245* -0.097 -0.246* 
 (0.052) (0.357) (0.051) (0.057) (0.052) (0.407) (0.051) 
Fsize -0.024 -0.033 -0.024 -0.023 -0.024 -0.032 -0.024 
 (0.344) (0.245) (0.342) (0.357) (0.344) (0.252) (0.342) 
Fage -0.053 -0.052 -0.054 -0.059 -0.053 -0.057 -0.053 
 (0.509) (0.535) (0.503) (0.459) (0.518) (0.500) (0.512) 
Flow -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Turnover 0.011 0.020 0.012 0.013 0.011 0.021 0.012 
 (0.726) (0.513) (0.724) (0.697) (0.726) (0.489) (0.725) 
        
IS&Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 235 235 235 238 235 235 235 
r2_p 0.252 0.338 0.252 0.254 0.252 0.339 0.252 











Table 3-17. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment objectives and investment companies. The 
dependent variable is equal to one for every observation for funds that were liquidated during the non-GFC periods (before 
Sep 2007, or after Mar 2009) and it is equal to zero for every observation for the funds that have not exited the market for 
at least 6 months after the end of the periods of investigation. The observations cover the non-GFC period.  P-values in 
brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
                
Return -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Comp_fam 0.005    0.005   
 (0.402)    (0.430)   
ExcComp  0.001***    0.001***  
  (0.009)    (0.006)  
Comp_fund   0.007    0.007 
   (0.237)    (0.264) 
Ownership    -0.001 -0.002 -0.002* -0.002 
    (0.473) (0.149) (0.070) (0.122) 
Inderatio -0.029 -0.046 -0.030 -0.003 -0.019 -0.038 -0.021 
 (0.422) (0.217) (0.399) (0.927) (0.603) (0.317) (0.576) 
Bsize -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.120) (0.130) (0.106) (0.268) (0.164) (0.191) (0.149) 
Bage 0.048 0.045 0.045 0.025 0.043 0.039 0.041 
 (0.307) (0.321) (0.332) (0.585) (0.383) (0.409) (0.410) 
Btenure 0.012 0.014 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.017 0.014 
 (0.323) (0.245) (0.328) (0.280) (0.251) (0.175) (0.253) 
Nfunds -0.000 0.005 0.006 0.002 -0.001 0.005 0.005 
 (0.958) (0.257) (0.257) (0.647) (0.909) (0.249) (0.286) 
Disp.Bage 0.105 0.090 0.103 0.089 0.119 0.101 0.117 
 (0.168) (0.219) (0.174) (0.248) (0.127) (0.174) (0.132) 
Disp.Btenure 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Fsize -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.024*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fage -0.011** -0.012** -0.011** -0.011** -0.010* -0.011** -0.010* 
 (0.044) (0.027) (0.044) (0.036) (0.055) (0.038) (0.057) 
Flow -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Turnover -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.005* -0.004* -0.005* 
 (0.075) (0.093) (0.077) (0.083) (0.065) (0.090) (0.068) 
        
IS&Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 27,152 27,152 27,152 26,972 25,444 25,444 25,444 
r2_p 0.287 0.290 0.287 0.288 0.289 0.292 0.289 
ll -4855 -4836 -4853 -4907 -4585 -4564 -4583 
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Table 3-18. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment objectives and investment companies. The 
dependent variable is equal to one for every observation for funds that were liquidated during the GFC period (between 
Sep 2007 and Mar 2009) and it is equal to zero for every observation for the funds that have not exited the market for at 
least 6 months after the end of the periods of investigation. The observations cover the GFC period.  P-values in brackets. 
*** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
                
Return -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.493) (0.613) (0.490) (0.735) (0.550) (0.676) (0.543) 
Comp_fam -0.009    -0.008   
 (0.139)    (0.214)   
ExcComp  0.000    0.000  
  (0.408)    (0.288)  
Comp_fund   -0.010    -0.009 
   (0.120)    (0.185) 
Ownership    -0.003** -0.003* -0.004*** -0.003* 
    (0.023) (0.053) (0.008) (0.056) 
Inderatio 0.045 0.028 0.045 0.043 0.062 0.037 0.063 
 (0.362) (0.558) (0.360) (0.357) (0.184) (0.415) (0.180) 
Bsize -0.003 -0.003* -0.003 -0.003* -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.119) (0.085) (0.124) (0.097) (0.259) (0.178) (0.267) 
Bage 0.120* 0.114 0.119 0.082 0.088 0.082 0.086 
 (0.098) (0.112) (0.103) (0.298) (0.263) (0.279) (0.270) 
Btenure -0.006 -0.003 -0.006 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.008 
 (0.510) (0.747) (0.503) (0.521) (0.359) (0.217) (0.362) 
Nfunds 0.002 -0.004 -0.008 0.002 0.006 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.776) (0.500) (0.199) (0.736) (0.504) (0.846) (0.755) 
Disp.Bage 0.350*** 0.334** 0.351*** 0.296** 0.362*** 0.343** 0.363*** 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) (0.024) (0.009) (0.021) (0.009) 
Disp.Btenure -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.006 
 (0.577) (0.664) (0.568) (0.725) (0.676) (0.934) (0.662) 
Fsize -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fage -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.582) (0.491) (0.588) (0.700) (0.741) (0.656) (0.748) 
Flow -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Turnover 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
                
IS&Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,810 3,810 3,810 3,719 3,565 3,565 3,565 
r2_p 0.254 0.251 0.254 0.257 0.266 0.265 0.266 
ll -410.5 -411.9 -410.3 -368.4 -352.8 -353.1 -352.7 
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Table 3-19. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment objectives and investment companies. The 
dependent variable is equal to one for every observation for funds that were merged during the non-GFC periods (before 
Sep 2007, or after Mar 2009) and it is equal to zero for every observation for the funds that have not exited the market for 
at least 6 months after the end of the periods of investigation. The observations cover the non-GFC period.  P-values in 
brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
                
Return -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Comp_fam 0.009    0.006   
 (0.165)    (0.432)   
ExcComp  0.001    0.000  
  (0.110)    (0.476)  
Comp_fund   0.011*    0.008 
   (0.087)    (0.260) 
Ownership    0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 
    (0.246) (0.433) (0.416) (0.452) 
Inderatio 0.368*** 0.366*** 0.367*** 0.352*** 0.379*** 0.380*** 0.377*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bsize 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) 
Bage -0.076 -0.065 -0.080 -0.078 -0.082 -0.074 -0.087 
 (0.246) (0.320) (0.222) (0.221) (0.220) (0.262) (0.195) 
Btenure -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.682) (0.794) (0.688) (0.656) (0.986) (0.926) (0.982) 
Nfunds -0.001 0.005 0.010* 0.005 -0.000 0.003 0.007 
 (0.828) (0.239) (0.091) (0.240) (0.962) (0.485) (0.274) 
Disp.Bage -0.220** -0.231** -0.222** -0.304*** -0.294*** -0.300*** -0.294*** 
 (0.018) (0.013) (0.018) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Disp.Btenure 0.020** 0.020* 0.021** 0.023** 0.022** 0.022** 0.022** 
 (0.048) (0.054) (0.047) (0.013) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) 
Fsize -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.022*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fage 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.017** 0.017** 0.017** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) 
Flow -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Turnover 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.874) (0.861) (0.878) (0.975) (0.958) (0.971) (0.953)         
        
IS&Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 27,466 27,466 27,466 27,287 25,760 25,760 25,760 
r2_p 0.245 0.246 0.246 0.240 0.245 0.245 0.245 
ll -6006 -6004 -6004 -6074 -5688 -5689 -5687 
112 
 
Table 3-20. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment objectives and investment companies. The 
dependent variable is equal to one for every observation for funds that were merged during the GFC period (between Sep 
2007 and Mar 2009) and it is equal to zero for every observation for the funds that have not exited the market for at least 6 
months after the end of the periods of investigation. The observations cover the GFC period.  P-values in brackets. *** - 
1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
                
Return 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.356) (0.562) (0.355) (0.445) (0.457) (0.576) (0.459) 
Comp_fam 0.007    0.002   
 (0.361)    (0.828)   
ExcComp  0.002***    0.002***  
  (0.000)    (0.000)  
Comp_fund   0.006    0.000 
   (0.431)    (0.942) 
Ownership    0.004 0.004 -0.000 0.004 
    (0.562) (0.570) (0.993) (0.563) 
Inderatio 0.089** 0.054 0.090** 0.091* 0.099** 0.053 0.100** 
 (0.046) (0.236) (0.043) (0.051) (0.031) (0.262) (0.030) 
Bsize 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005** 0.006*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) 
Bage 0.041 0.013 0.045 0.008 0.007 -0.041 0.010 
 (0.538) (0.841) (0.492) (0.920) (0.929) (0.635) (0.905) 
Btenure 0.023** 0.024** 0.023** 0.027** 0.023** 0.025** 0.023** 
 (0.039) (0.036) (0.038) (0.019) (0.044) (0.034) (0.043) 
Nfunds -0.014** -0.006 -0.007 -0.013** -0.014** -0.007 -0.013** 
 (0.016) (0.298) (0.268) (0.019) (0.037) (0.326) (0.045) 
Disp.Bage -0.210** -0.271** -0.211** -0.204* -0.209* -0.281** -0.209* 
 (0.040) (0.018) (0.038) (0.056) (0.059) (0.028) (0.058) 
Disp.Btenure -0.008 -0.004 -0.008 -0.007 -0.011 -0.006 -0.011 
 (0.548) (0.778) (0.552) (0.628) (0.452) (0.744) (0.451) 
Fsize -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fage 0.014* 0.014* 0.014* 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 
 (0.069) (0.065) (0.070) (0.180) (0.189) (0.162) (0.191) 
Flow -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Turnover -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.584) (0.643) (0.580) (0.974) (0.933) (0.873) (0.935) 
                
IS&Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,782 3,782 3,782 3,725 3,563 3,563 3,563 
r2_p 0.219 0.243 0.218 0.221 0.221 0.244 0.221 




3.4.2 Board characteristics and fund expense ratios 
The last section shows that board characteristics can influence investors’ benefits through the 
impact on fund exit decisions. To shed more light on how board characteristics influence 
investors’ benefits, as an additional analysis, this section investigates another important 
decision on which board characteristics may have impact, fund expense ratios. Directors are 
legally empowered to negotiate fees charged investors with fund-families. To protect investors’ 
interests, directors are expected to exert efforts to lower fund expense ratios. This section is to 
investigate how board characteristics are related to expense ratios, and whether their 
relationship, if any, changes with market regimes.  
Before the effect of the GFC was incorporated in the analysis, I first replicated the past 
literature that investigate the effect of various board characteristics on expense ratios but using 
the new sample in this chapter. To test the relationship between board characteristics and 
expense ratios, pooled OLS regressions and fund-fixed-effect panel regressions where the 
dependent variables are expense ratios and independent variables are ExcComp, Ownership, 
Inderatio, Bsize, Bage, Btenure, and Nfunds, with control variables for fund characteristics 
(Fsize, Fage, Flow, and Turnover), and for board diversity (Disp. Bage, and Disp. Btenure) 
plus the investment objective and time dummies, were adopted. The OLS regressions are 
clustered by investment objectives and investment companies, and the fixed-effect panel 
regressions are clustered by funds. 
Table 3-21 reports the OLS regression results for the relationship between board characteristics 
and expense ratios. Each of the board characteristics enters the regressions alone in turn 
(Models 1-7) before all of them together are included in the regression (Model 8). Model 9 
further controls for board diversity which has not been examined in the past literature. Finally, 
an exit dummy which is equal to one for the exit funds and zero for the surviving funds is added 
in Model 10 to show whether the exit and the surviving funds charge differently to their 
investors.  
Models 1-8 confirm the findings in the past literature that larger boards and higher director 
excessive compensation are associated with higher expense ratios. Given the arguments in past 
literature (Tufano and Sevick, 1997; Del Guercio et al., 2003; Ferris and Yan, 2007; Meschke, 
114 
 
2007), the positive relationship between board sizes and expense ratios is possibly due to the 
higher collaboration costs associated with larger number of board members, and the positive 
relationship between director excessive compensation and expense ratios is possibly explained 
by that overpaid directors are not willing to jeopardize their remuneration. The results also 
confirm the literature on the determinants of fund fees51 in that larger funds with shorter 
histories, higher cash inflows, and lower holdings turnover ratio tend to charge lower expense 
ratios.  
The results also show that independent directors’ ownership is statistically significantly and 
positively related to expense ratios. This evidence is sort of in line with the results documented 
by Chen et al. (2008) and Cremers et al. (2009) that there is no evidence of positive effects of 
director ownership on lowering fees. The results in this chapter further show that higher 
director ownership is associated with higher fees. The results give support to the optimal 
contracting view documented by Chen et al. (2008) which states that higher ownership is more 
prominent in funds where monitoring effort is expected to generate more value to shareholders, 
such as the funds that have less sophisticated investors, and/or that conduct more risky or active 
investment strategies. These funds that need more monitoring effort from directors are also the 
funds that are expected to charge higher fees to investors, consistent with the results that higher 
director ownership is associated with higher fees. 
Table 3-21 also shows that expense ratios are positively related to board ages, but negatively 
related to board tenures and the number of funds overseen by directors. These three variables 
all can measure directors’ experience. Yet, directors of older ages not only have more 
experience, but also may be less concerned about shareholders’ longer-term interests and fund-
families’ longer-term reputation given that their retirement date is in the foreseen future. The 
results suggest that directors’ experience (indicated by tenures and the number of funds 
overseen) is beneficial to investors in lowering fees, but having older directors in a board may 
increase fees charged to investors. What’s more, Models 9 and 10 show that the dispersion of 
director tenure is not related to fund fees. Yet, the wider the age diversity is, the higher funds 
charge investors. This is understandable in the sense that people of different ages tend to share 
 
51 See, for example, McLeod and Malhorta (1994, 1997), Latzko (1999), LaPlante (2001), and Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-




different cultures and values, which increases the communication costs and thus the internal 
costs of running a business. Finally, Model 10 confirms the past literature on fund exits in that 
funds with higher expense ratios have a higher propensity of exiting the market.  
To control for any unobserved heterogeneity across funds over time, fund-fixed-effect panel 
regressions were run to make sure the robustness of the analysis. Table 3-22 reports the results 
of the equivalent specifications (Models 1-9) in Table 3-21 but using fixed-effect panel 
regressions, except for Model 10 as the exit dummy does not vary over time for each fund. The 
main results for the OLS regressions are preserved for the fixed-effect regressions.  In terms of 
the differences in results, although the statistically significantly positive relationships between 
board sizes and expense ratios, between board ages and expense ratios become statistically 
insignificant in Models 8 and 9 for the fixed-effect regressions, the positive relationships are 
preserved in Models 4 and 5 when the two variables are investigated separately.  
As a further step, this section incorporates the effect of the financial crisis in the analysis of 
how various board characteristics affect fund expense ratios. To achieve this, a crisis dummy 
which takes value of one for the observations during the GFC period, and zero for the 
observations outside the GFC period, was added to the OLS and fixed-effect regressions used 
in last section. In addition, the interaction terms of the crisis dummy and each of the fund and 
board characteristics were also added to the regressions to investigate whether the financial 
crisis changed the extent of these factors affecting expense ratios.  Tables 3-23 and 3-24 report 
the results for the OLS regressions and the fixed-effect regressions respectively. 
The results obtained from the OLS and fixed-effect regressions are similar for the majority of 
the variables of investigation. Specifically, Tables 3-23 and 3-24 confirm that higher excessive 
compensation is associated with higher expense ratios over the whole sample period, and find 
that the financial crisis does not change the extent of the effect of excessive compensation on 
fund fees. The independence ratio of a board is negatively related to fund fees (in the fixed-
effect regressions) and its effect becomes stronger during the GFC. The results suggest that the 
independence of a board is in particular important during the GFC to successfully lower 
expense ratios. In addition, although a larger board is associated with higher fees over the whole 
period, the positive relationship becomes weaker (in the OLS regressions) or even becomes 
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negative (in the fixed-effect regressions) during the GFC. The negative relationship between 
board sizes and expense ratios during the GFC may be driven by the positive effect of 
increasing number of independent directors in a board on lowering fund fees.  
What’s more, directors’ experience (represented by tenures and the number of funds overseen 
by directors) is negatively related to expense ratios over the whole sample period, but the 
negative relationship becomes weaker during the GFC. Table 3-23 (but not Table 3-24) also 
shows that whilst director ages are positively related to expense ratios over the whole period, 
the adverse impact of older directors becomes weaker during the GFC. This suggests that the 
experience of older directors is in particular important under extreme market conditions in 
successfully negotiating for lower fund fees. The two tables show that the positive relationship 
between age diversity and expense ratios becomes weaker during the GFC. This suggests the 
importance of different insights and division of work brought by age diversity in particular 
during such a complex business environment as the GFC. 
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Table 3-21. Pooled OLS regressions of fund expense ratios on fund and board characteristics. The regressions are clustered by investment objectives and investment 
companies. P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
                      
ExcComp 0.006***       0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000)       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ownership  0.009**      0.022*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
  (0.029)      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inderatio   0.027     -0.220*** -0.239*** -0.267*** 
   (0.765)     (0.007) (0.004) (0.001) 
Bsize    0.009***    0.019*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 
    (0.004)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bage     0.583***   0.671*** 0.839*** 0.839*** 
     (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Btenure      0.002  -0.055*** -0.067*** -0.070*** 
      (0.918)  (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) 
Nfunds       -0.074*** -0.092*** -0.084*** -0.086*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Disp.Bage         1.152*** 1.140*** 
         (0.000) (0.000) 
Disp.Btenure         -0.016 -0.019 
         (0.506) (0.420) 
1.exit          0.091*** 
          (0.000) 
Fsize -0.106*** -0.111*** -0.107*** -0.107*** -0.106*** -0.108*** -0.107*** -0.105*** -0.104*** -0.099*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fage 0.150*** 0.193*** 0.183*** 0.179*** 0.177*** 0.191*** 0.164*** 0.143*** 0.140*** 0.142*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Flow -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Turnover 0.052*** 0.056*** 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 2.030*** 1.457*** 1.548*** 1.514*** -0.825* 1.546*** 1.999*** -0.822 -1.635** -1.627** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.082) (0.000) (0.000) (0.279) (0.032) (0.031)            
IS &Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 35,116 45,435 55,101 55,101 55,055 51,808 40,305 32,942 32,759 32,759 




Table 3-22. Fixed-effect panel regressions of fund expense ratios on fund and board characteristics. The regressions are clustered by funds. P-values in brackets. *** - 1% 
statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
                    
ExcComp 0.001***       0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000)       (0.000) (0.000) 
Ownership  0.002***      0.002** 0.002** 
  (0.009)      (0.016) (0.014) 
Inderatio   -0.005     -0.088*** -0.097*** 
   (0.784)     (0.000) (0.000) 
Bsize    0.002***    0.001 0.000 
    (0.001)    (0.252) (0.717) 
Bage     0.052*   -0.006 0.043 
     (0.081)   (0.888) (0.337) 
Btenure      0.003  -0.007* -0.010* 
      (0.402)  (0.086) (0.052) 
Nfunds       -0.011** -0.010* -0.009 
       (0.032) (0.081) (0.107) 
Disp.Bage         0.128*** 
         (0.007) 
Disp.Btenure         0.004 
         (0.403) 
Fsize -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.019*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fage 0.029*** 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Flow -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Turnover 0.002 0.003* 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.237) (0.051) (0.157) (0.154) (0.153) (0.223) (0.411) (0.007) (0.010) 
Constant 1.133*** 1.113*** 1.159*** 1.143*** 0.942*** 1.137*** 1.168*** 1.292*** 1.087*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)           
IS &Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 35,116 45,435 55,101 55,101 55,055 51,808 40,305 32,942 32,759 
R-squared 0.132 0.138 0.131 0.132 0.131 0.137 0.120 0.128 0.129 
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Table 3-23. Pooled OLS regressions of fund expense ratios on fund and board characteristics, plus crisis dummy and its interaction 
terms with fund and board characteristics. The regressions are clustered by investment objectives and investment companies. P-
values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  
ExcComp 
                
0.006***       0.004*** 
 (0.000)       (0.000) 
1.crisis*ExcComp -0.002       -0.000 
 (0.154)       (0.920) 
Ownership  0.010**      0.021*** 
  (0.013)      (0.000) 
1.crisis*Ownership  0.012      0.012 
  (0.110)      (0.222) 
Inderatio   0.081     -0.214*** 
   (0.328)     (0.009) 
1.crisis*Inderatio   -0.193*     -0.179 
   (0.079)     (0.114) 
Bsize    0.013***    0.021*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
1.crisis*Bsize    -0.007**    -0.011** 
    (0.038)    (0.018) 
Bage     0.712***   0.908*** 
     (0.000)   (0.000) 
1.crisis*Bage     -0.406**   -0.565*** 
     (0.019)   (0.007) 
Btenure      -0.003  -0.064** 
      (0.903)  (0.011) 
1.crisis*Btenure      -0.024  -0.012 
      (0.273)  (0.661) 
Nfunds       -0.067*** -0.090*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) 
1.crisis* Nfunds       0.026** 0.048*** 
       (0.026) (0.000) 
1.crisis -0.004 -0.088 0.171 0.076 1.727** 0.066 -0.072 2.316*** 
 (0.948) (0.356) (0.106) (0.230) (0.019) (0.364) (0.394) (0.009) 
Disp. Bage 1.013*** 0.632*** 0.596*** 0.705*** 0.826*** 0.597*** 0.923*** 1.214*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
1.crisis* Disp. Bage -0.434 -0.367 -0.181 -0.287 -0.352 -0.223 -0.604* -0.561* 
 (0.165) (0.187) (0.533) (0.324) (0.244) (0.443) (0.055) (0.086) 
Disp. Btenure -0.063*** -0.034 -0.044** -0.061*** -0.035* -0.042** -0.046** -0.024 
 (0.005) (0.140) (0.033) (0.006) (0.092) (0.042) (0.035) (0.335) 
1.crisis*Disp. Btenure 0.111*** 0.043 0.076** 0.078** 0.067** 0.066** 0.134*** 0.071* 
 (0.003) (0.214) (0.014) (0.015) (0.034) (0.040) (0.000) (0.054) 
Fsize -0.105*** -0.109*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.104*** -0.106*** -0.107*** -0.103*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1.crisis* Fsize -0.001 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.003 -0.004 
 (0.854) (0.428) (0.540) (0.415) (0.690) (0.437) (0.515) (0.453) 
Fage 0.151*** 0.190*** 0.187*** 0.183*** 0.178*** 0.188*** 0.171*** 0.139*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1.crisis* Fage -0.014 -0.026* -0.024* -0.024* -0.019 -0.022* -0.036** 0.004 
 (0.389) (0.066) (0.086) (0.081) (0.175) (0.096) (0.022) (0.802) 
Flow -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1.crisis* Flow -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000** -0.001** 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.030) (0.012) 
Turnover 0.054*** 0.057*** 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.057*** 0.059*** 0.054*** 0.051*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1.crisis* Turnover -0.008 -0.016* -0.017** -0.015* -0.016* -0.016* -0.014 -0.010 
 (0.323) (0.071) (0.039) (0.061) (0.057) (0.059) (0.105) (0.286) 
Constant 1.917*** 1.396*** 1.513*** 1.483*** -1.393*** 1.574*** 2.135*** -1.924** 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) 
         
IS &Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 34,927 44,917 51,494 51,494 51,494 51,494 39,283 32,759 




Table 3-24. Fixed-effect panel regressions of fund expense ratios on fund and board characteristics, plus crisis dummy and its 
interaction terms with fund and board characteristics. The regressions are clustered by funds. P-values in brackets. *** - 1% 
statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
                  
ExcComp 0.001***       0.001*** 
 (0.000)       (0.000) 
1.crisis*ExcComp -0.000*       -0.000 
 (0.100)       (0.931) 
Ownership  0.001**      0.002** 
  (0.016)      (0.018) 
1.crisis*Ownership  0.000      0.002** 
  (0.762)      (0.035) 
Inderatio   -0.025     -0.089*** 
   (0.188)     (0.000) 
1.crisis*Inderatio   -0.020     -0.019 
   (0.325)     (0.447) 
Bsize    0.002***    0.001 
    (0.000)    (0.314) 
1.crisis*Bsize    -0.002***    -0.004*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Bage     0.109***   0.042 
     (0.001)   (0.355) 
1.crisis*Bage     0.035   -0.005 
     (0.502)   (0.924) 
Btenure      0.003  -0.012** 
      (0.463)  (0.031) 
1.crisis*Btenure      0.012***  0.009** 
      (0.000)  (0.050) 
Nfunds       -0.015*** -0.011* 
       (0.004) (0.054) 
1.crisis* Nfunds       0.010*** 0.012*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) 
1.crisis -0.011 -0.009 0.015 0.016* -0.147 -0.023** -0.044*** -0.038 
 (0.308) (0.388) (0.388) (0.097) (0.506) (0.021) (0.009) (0.859) 
Disp. Bage 0.155*** 0.131*** 0.178*** 0.162*** 0.195*** 0.170*** 0.163*** 0.161*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
1.crisis* Disp. Bage -0.219*** -0.121** -0.104** -0.147*** -0.110** -0.132*** -0.171*** -0.166** 
 (0.001) (0.015) (0.039) (0.002) (0.033) (0.006) (0.003) (0.017) 
Disp. Btenure 0.008** 0.005 0.009*** 0.006* 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.005 
 (0.045) (0.189) (0.006) (0.074) (0.001) (0.005) (0.009) (0.286) 
1.crisis*Disp. Btenure -0.008 -0.006 -0.009** -0.005 -0.010** -0.007 -0.017*** -0.006 
 (0.213) (0.248) (0.047) (0.290) (0.047) (0.169) (0.002) (0.384) 
Fsize -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.018*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1.crisis* Fsize 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.630) (0.559) (0.096) (0.076) (0.082) (0.066) (0.293) (0.945) 
Fage 0.026*** 0.043*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.027*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
1.crisis* Fage 0.009** 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.004 0.009** 
 (0.015) (0.192) (0.778) (0.684) (0.974) (0.654) (0.278) (0.030) 
Flow -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
1.crisis* Flow 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.426) (0.133) (0.382) (0.320) (0.363) (0.310) (0.354) (0.256) 
Turnover 0.002 0.003** 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004*** 
 (0.318) (0.047) (0.223) (0.242) (0.226) (0.236) (0.461) (0.009) 
1.crisis* Turnover -0.002 -0.003** -0.003* -0.003** -0.003* -0.003* -0.002 -0.003* 
 (0.379) (0.050) (0.058) (0.048) (0.081) (0.058) (0.282) (0.079) 
Constant 1.123*** 1.095*** 1.145*** 1.112*** 0.674*** 1.122*** 1.161*** 1.092*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IS &Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 34,927 44,917 51,494 51,494 51,494 51,494 39,283 32,759 




The aim of this chapter is to explore whether the effect of board characteristics on fund exit 
decisions varies in the non-GFC period (between January 2000 and August 2007, or between 
April 2009 and December 2014) and the GFC period (between September 2007 and March 
2009). Fund exit decisions are assumed to be affected by both independent directors’ private-
interests concerns, i.e. remuneration and career concerns, and the value of the shares in the 
funds they oversee, and fund-families’ exit policy, i.e. the exit strategy to reduce internal costs. 
The main hypothesis is that independent directors’ concerns in their own interests is more 
pronounced during the GFC, and that fund-families’ exit policy varies across market regimes, 
and that the combination of these two forces changes the way of board characteristics affecting 
liquidation and within-family merger decisions. As an additional test for the role of 
independent directors in representing shareholders’ interests, this chapter also investigates the 
relationship between board characteristics and fund expense ratios, and whether such a 
relationship changes during the GFC. 
Several important findings emerge from the analyses in this chapter. First, the comparison in 
board characteristics between the non-GFC and the GFC periods shows that although the total 
compensation directors received from a fund-family was lower, on average, the excessive 
(unexplained) compensation was actually higher during the GFC than in the other times. This 
implies that directors extracted more profits from their shareholders if their responsibilities 
remained the same during the GFC than in the other times. 
Second, the comparison of the board characteristics between the surviving and the exit funds 
shows that the boards of the surviving fund are larger with lower proportion of independent 
directors, have older and more experienced directors, who oversee more funds and receive 
higher total compensation from its fund-families than the boards of the exit funds. However, 
after considering the amount of assets a director oversees, the family size, the business 
complexity of a family, and directors’ experience (as measured by ages and tenures), the 
directors of the surviving funds receive lower excessive compensation than the directors of the 
exit funds. In addition, directors of the surviving funds on average own more shares in the 
funds they oversee than the directors of the exit funds. The dispersion of director age and tenure 
of the boards of the surviving funds is lower than that for the boards of the exit funds. Such 
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differences in the board characteristics between the surviving and the exit funds are much alike 
during the non-GFC and the GFC periods. 
Third, the regression analysis of the fund fees confirms the findings presented in the past 
literature that generally the expense ratios are positively related to boards’ size and directors’ 
excessive compensation, and negatively related to board independence. In addition, the 
analysis for the first time provides the evidence that fund fees are statistically significantly and 
positively related to director ownership and the dispersion of director ages. The results also 
show that board independence and dispersion of director ages are in particular important in 
lowering fund fees during the GFC.  
 
Finally, the analysis of the relationship between board characteristics and exit decisions shows 
that there is a positive relationship between excessive compensation and fund liquidations 
during the non-GFC period. Yet, during the GFC, the more directors are paid, the less likely 
they approve fund liquidations, and instead the more likely they conduct within-family mergers 
to deal with the poorly performing funds. In addition, director ownership in the funds they 
oversee is negatively related to fund liquidations and this negative relationship is stronger 
during the GFC.  
 
The negative relationship between director excessive compensation and fund liquidations 
during the GFC is consistent with the intuition and Khorana et al. (2007) that directors are 
reluctant to approve fund liquidations when their own private interests, i.e. in keeping board 
seats and the associated remuneration, contradict with shareholders’ interests, i.e. in poorly 
performing funds being exited. The positive relationship between excessive compensation and 
fund liquidations in non-GFC times, on the other hand, is consistent with fund-families’ cost-
reduction strategy that they tend to liquidate the poorly performing funds that pay higher 
compensation to directors.  
The tendency of directors to merge poorly performing funds or to improve fund performance 
when directors themselves hold shares in these funds rather than liquidate them is consistent 
with the notion that director ownership better aligns the interests of directors and shareholders 
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of the target funds, given that acquisitions can generally improve the performance of the targets 
(Jayaraman et al., 2002; Khorana et al., 2007; Namvar and Phillips, 2013; Park, 2013). Yet, if 
a poorly performing fund with high director ownership is not ‘appropriate’ to become a target 
fund, e.g. one that performs extremely poorly, or has unique portfolio design that makes the 
portfolio rebalancing too costly for mergers, the acquisition of such a fund could potentially 
erode the wealth of the shareholders of the acquiring funds. In addition, the negative 
relationship between director ownership and fund liquidations is possibly reinforced by fund-
families’ policy to rely on director ownership to attract investor inflows. This is in line with 
the finding in Zhao (2007) that director ownership is positively associated with investor inflows. 
This chapter makes several contributions. First, the results deepen the understanding of the role 
of mutual funds’ independent directors in representing shareholders’ interests, i.e. in affecting 
fund exit decisions. Numerous papers document that fund directors may make decisions for 
their own private interests at the expense of shareholders’ interests (Tufano and Sevick, 1997; 
Del Guercio et al., 2003; Ferris and Yan, 2007; Meschke, 2007; Chen et al., 2008; Kong and 
Tang, 2008; Kryzanowski and Mohebshahedin, 2016). The results add to this strand of the 
literature by providing the evidence that mutual funds’ exit decisions may be affected by 
directors’ own wealth (remuneration and the shares in the funds they oversee) concern, and 
that directors’ remuneration concern is more visible during the GFC.  
Second, this chapter also contributes to the literature on the agency conflicts between fund-
families and shareholders. It is well established that fund-families take advantage of investors, 
especially unsophisticated investors to maximize family profits (Gaspar et al., 2006; Aydogdu 
and Wellman, 2011; Shirley and Stark, 2016). The results provide some evidence that fund-
families may use director ownership as a sort of advertisement to attract investor inflows, not 
liquidating poorly performing funds with the expectation that higher director ownership will 
successfully bring higher investor inflows regardless of fund performance. In addition, fund-
families’ reliance on director ownership to attract investors may be more pronounced during 
the GFC when they have less motivation to exit poorly performing funds than in the other times.  
There are some limitations of the analysis in this chapter. First, given the yearly frequency of 
the governance data, there are at most 3 observations for each fund during the GFC. Therefore, 
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the regression results for the variables during the GFC may not be as robust as those for the 
non-GFC periods. Second, this chapter only investigates the internal governance of mutual 
funds from the board structure perspective, but the effect of internal governance on fund 
performance and exit decisions should be beyond the board structure. Therefore, extra data of, 
for example, meeting minis etc. are needed to comprehensively illustrate how board members 
affect the decision-making of fund exits and fees.
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CHAPTER 4: MARKET CLEARING MECHANISMS IN THE U.K. 
MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY 
4.1 Background 
It is well established in the organization literature that in more competitive industries, few firms 
persistently perform well and the worst performers are removed from the market (Harrigan, 
1982; Waring, 1996; Keswani and Stolin, 2006). It suggests that market competitiveness plays 
an important role in the market clearing mechanisms, and that the negative performance-exit 
relationship may be weaker in a less competitive industry. If such a relationship between the 
market force to remove poorly performing funds and market competitiveness is true, the 
evidence documented in Chapter 2 suggests that the competitiveness in the US market is 
intense enough to remove poorly performing funds over the periods of January 2000-March 
2003, April 2004-August 2007, and April 2009-December 2014, except for the GFC period 
when the crisis distorts the natural market clearing mechanism. To shed more light on whether 
market competition matters in the market clearing mechanisms, this chapters analyses whether 
and how the strength of the market force to eliminate poor performers is different between the 
US market and a market of a different level of competition. The UK market is selected as the 
comparator market for the analysis.  
The reason to investigate the UK market as the counterpart to the US market is fourfold. First, 
the US and the UK mutual fund markets share many similarities with respect to industry history, 
investor profile, and security regulations etc. These similarities mitigate the impact of the 
factors other than the market competition on the market clearing mechanisms. Thus, the 
difference, if any, in the strength of the market force to remove poorly performing funds 
between the US and the UK markets can be attributed to the difference in the competitiveness 
between the two markets.  
Second, it is important to understand the practices of the UK mutual fund industry, of which 
the importance in the financial market has been rising in the recent years. As of 2017, the total 
net assets of the UK mutual fund industry reached $1.915 trillion, ranked the third in the Europe 
following France ($2.314 trillion) and Germany ($2.312 trillion), except for the two offshore 
centres in Ireland and Luxembourg (ICI FactBook, 2018). Besides, the proportion of mutual 
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fund investment in the asset allocation of UK Insurance companies and pension funds (ICPFs) 
increased from 2% in 1987 to 21% in 2013 (Haldane, 2014). Given the lifting position of the 
UK mutual fund industry in accumulating after-retirement wealth of the old age, it is necessary 
to investigate if the UK mutual fund industry is able to persistently provide high-quality 
products to the public. 
Third, there is no reason to assume that the market competitiveness on the US and the UK 
markets is the same. The UK is lagging behind the US in terms of total mutual fund assets 
($21.078 trillion in the US versus $1.683 trillion in the UK at the year-end 2018), and the 
number of mutual funds on the market (10,066 in the US versus 3,033 in the UK at the year-
end 2018). However, this does not necessarily mean that the competition in the UK market is 
less intense in comparison with the US market. To assess the competitiveness of the two 
markets, two statistics measuring market concentration- the market share of the largest five 
fund-families, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in each year over the period 2000-
2014 were calculated and plotted in Figures 4-1 and 4-2. 
 






Figure 4-2. The Herfindahl- Hirschman Index in the US and the UK mutual fund industry 
 
The two figures show a clear upward trend of the market concentration in the US market, and 
a downward trend of the market concentration in the UK market during the period of 2000-
2014. The UK market is more concentrated than the US market before 2003, as an indication 
of the less competitiveness in the UK market. Yet, the UK market becomes less concentrated 
than the US market since 2004. Thus, it can be expected that the negative performance-exit 
relationship should exist in the UK mutual fund industry at least after 2004 (probably with the 
exception of the GFC), and that the negative relationship may be weaker in the first several 
years.  
Fourth, the regulatory framework of the UK mutual fund industry is unique relative to that of 
the US market. Specifically, the portfolio holdings of UK funds are regulated and monitored 
closely by the Investment Association (IA). IA requires the actual portfolio holdings of a fund 
to be consistent with its declared investment objective, and it requires the fund to adjust to its 
declared investment strategy if the actual holdings diverge its declared investment 
objective(Keswani and Stolin, 2006, 2008). In contrast, U.S. fund managers are not monitored 
so closely, and they are free to game sector affiliations regardless of the declared investment 
styles and compete freely (Cooper et al., 2005) in the whole mutual fund market. This creates 
a context in which the UK funds of different objectives operate in separate sectors, and the 
competitiveness in each sector may differ due to their different development stages. Therefore, 
such a regulatory framework in the UK market creates a natural experiment to investigate the 
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competition-clearing relationship in different sectors within the UK market. Thus, this chapter 
looks into the impact of competition on the market clearing mechanisms not only in the context 
of the US and the UK markets, but also in the context of the individual sectors within the UK 
market. 
The research on the determinants of UK mutual fund exits is rather limited and outdated52, due 
to the lack of a survivorship-bias-free database of UK mutual funds in past years. Thanks to 
the updated version 3.4 of Morningstar Direct in 2008, data for exit funds become available 
now for empirical analysis. The empirical results of this chapter show that the negative 
performance-exit relationship exists in the UK mutual fund industry during the period between 
2000 and 2017. As expected, such a relationship appears to be more pronounced in more 
competitive sectors such as domestic equity sector, global equity, domestic non-equity, but in 
the global non-equity sector, bad performers are not necessarily forced out of the market.  
Chapter 2 documents the breakdown of the market forces that remove bad performers during 
the GFC. In order to test whether the distortion of market clearing mechanisms brought by the 
GFC is a country-specific or a universal phenomenon at least in the Anglo-Saxons world, this 
chapter also tests whether the performance-exit relationship in the UK market differs in 
different market conditions. The empirical results confirm the findings in Chapter 2 that during 
the GFC, the negative relationship between fund performance and fund exiting becomes 
statistically insignificant. 
This chapter contributes to the literature on the UK mutual fund industry by filling the gap in 
understanding the determinants of UK mutual fund exits. The factors contributing to fund exits 
are found to be universal across the UK and US markets in that small, poorly performing funds 
as well as those with a shorter operational history and smaller fund inflows and belong to 
smaller fund-families are more likely to exit the market. It also deepens the understanding of 
how industry structure affects product performance and market clearing mechanisms. That is, 
industry competitiveness strengthens the market force to remove bad performers, whilst in less 
competitive sectors, fund-families do not have the motivation to take actions on bad performers. 
 
52 See Blake and Timmermann (1998) and Lunde et al. (1999) which mentioned the underperformance of exit 
funds before their terminations. 
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Instead, they may conduct strategic business exits (Decker and Mellewigt, 2012) for non-
performance reasons such as increasing the interrelatedness of businesses to achieve economies 
of scale (Decker and Mellewigt, 2007). Finally, the investigation of fund performance after 
mergers show that mergers are beneficial for both the targets and the acquirers in the UK market, 
in contrast to the case in the US fund market where only the targets benefit from improved 
post-merger performance.  
Relevant literature and hypotheses are developed in the next section. Data of UK mutual funds 
during the period between 2000 and 2018 are described in the third section. The examination 
of the performance-exit relationship of UK funds, and of the funds within different sectors is 
done in the empirical analysis section, followed by the examination of the pre- and post-merger 
performance of the targets and the acquirers. The final section concludes with findings and 
implications for future research. 
4.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
The mutual fund markets in the UK and the US share many similarities when it comes to the 
industry history, concentration, investor wealth and financial literacy, security regulations, 
common law systems (Ferreira and Ramos, 2009; Ferreira et al., 2013), the universal 
underperformance of mutual funds relative to the markets (Blake and Timmermann, 1998; 
Cuthbertson et al., 2010, 2012), and the convex performance-inflow relationship (Keswani and 
Stolin, 2008, 2012). In addition, the two markets share the similar market fluctuations, in 
particular experiencing the dotcom bubble and the GFC53. The FTSE 250 index declined from 
6444.9 in December 1999 to 4016.3 in March 2003, and declined from 10,984.5 in July 2007 
to 6351.52 in March 2009.  
Given the above similarities shared by the UK and the US markets, it is natural to expect that 
the determinants of fund exits revealed in Chapter 2 on the US market may also apply to the 
UK market. Indeed, poor performance is documented to be an important determinant of exits 
of UK mutual funds (Blake and Timmermann, 1998; Lunde et al., 1999). Blake and 
Timmermann (1998) document the underperformance of exit funds in the past 6-24 months 
 
53 See Figure 4-3. 
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before their terminations. Lunde et al. (1999) confirm Blake and Timmermann (1998) in that 
exit funds underperform before their closures. They also find an inverse U-shaped pattern in 
the relationship between a fund’s age and its hazard rate. To my best knowledge, except for 
these two studies, there is no other research on the determinants of UK mutual. Also, there is 
no research examining the time-varying relationship between fund performance and exits for 
the UK market. Therefore, this chapter will fill this gap by investigating the effect of various 
fund and family characteristics on the UK mutual fund exit decisions in different times, and 
the first hypothesis is proposed as follows. 
Hypothesis 1. There is a negative relationship between fund performance and the probability 
of exits during the non-GFC periods, and there is a weaker or no relationship between 
performance and exits during the GFC. 
It is well established in the organization studies that in more competitive industries, few firms 
persistently perform well and the worst performers are removed out of the market (Harrigan, 
1982; Waring, 1996; Keswani and Stolin, 2006). In other words, if the industry is not 
competitive enough, worst performers will not necessarily exit the market. This argument is 
also supported by the research on the mutual fund industry (Berk and Green, 2004; Gil‐Bazo 
and Ruiz‐Verdú, 2009). Figures 4-1 and 4-2 show that the concentration of the UK mutual 
fund industry declined since 2000, becoming lower than that of the US market since 2004. 
Thus, it can be conjectured that the negative performance-exit relationship strengthens over 
time, under the assumption that competitiveness matters in exiting poorly performing funds. 
Hypothesis 2. The negative performance-exit relationship in the UK mutual fund market is 
stronger during the post-GFC period than in the pre-GFC period. 
Another unique feature in the UK market is that ‘UK mutual funds compete in a large number 
of unambiguously defined peer groups (sectors), whose membership is monitored and enforced 
by the industry trade body’ (Keswani and Stolin, 2006, 2008). In contrast, US fund managers 
are free to game sector affiliations and compete in the whole market (Cooper et al., 2005). 
Therefore, rather than thinking of the UK mutual fund industry as a whole, it makes more sense 
131 
 
to examine the performance-exit relationship in each sector independently. Keswani and Stolin 
(2006) find that performance persistence is high in the sectors of high asset concentration. 
Blake and Timmermann (1998), and Lunde et al. (1999) find that the underperformance of the 
exit funds in the domestic equity sector is statistically and economically significant, while the 
exit funds in foreign asset sectors do not underperform significantly.  
The domestic equity is the most traditional asset class in the UK fund market, and one could 
expect that investors are sophisticated in investing in this asset class and sensitive to the 
performance of domestic equity funds. In this case, fund-families need take actions on worse 
performers in order to retain and attract investors. In contrast, the global non-equity sector is 
the most innovative where the supply of funds may not be enough to meet investors’ demands. 
This predicts that the fund-families that specialise in global non-equity may not need deal with 
poorly performing funds. The maturity and history of the other two sectors-domestic non-
equity and global equity sectors are in between of domestic equity and global non-equity 
sectors. Therefore, it is not clear how the investors and families would react to bad performers. 
In this regard, the hypotheses for the domestic equity and global non-equity sectors can be 
proposed, and it is an empirical question of whether or to what extent fund exits are related to 
bad performance for the other two sectors-domestic non-equity and global equity sectors. 
Hypothesis 3. There is a strong negative performance-exit relationship in the domestic equity 
sector, and weak or no such a relationship in the global non-equity sector.  
4.3 Data and methodology 
4.3.1 Data and descriptive analysis 
To test the hypotheses, the data for 5,184 UK mutual funds (only primary share classes were 
used for the analysis, consistent with Chapter 2) during the period between January 2000 and 
December 2018 were collected from Morningstar Direct database. As the research focuses on 
fund liquidations and within-family mergers, across-family merged funds and the funds 
without a clear exit form were dropped, leaving 4,682 sample funds in total. Out of the 4,682 
funds, 1,626 funds exited the market during the sample period and 3,056 funds had not exited 
till December 2018 when the data were collected.  
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Following the cut-off times for different market conditions in Chapter 2, the whole sample 
period was split into four sub-periods:  the dotcom bubble correction period between January 
2000 and March 2003, the growth period between April 2003 and August 2007, the GFC period 
between September 2007 and March 2009, and the post-crisis period between April 2009 and 
December 2018. Figure 4-3 plots the weekly values of FTSE 250 index during the sample 
period and justifies the separation of the four periods.  
 
Figure 4-3. The weekly values (in British pounds) of the U.K. market index for the January 
2000 – December 2018 period. Data Source: Datastream, FTSE 250 Index 
 
Table 4-1 reports the number of exit funds in each sub period by exit form. It shows that UK 
mutual funds exited the market mainly in the form of liquidation (1,303 liquidations versus 323 
within-family mergers during the 19 years). Due to the small sample size during the dotcom 
correction period, in following analysis the first and second periods were combined together, 
given the argument in Chapter 2 that the dotcom correction is not expected to have the same 
adverse impact on the mutual fund industry as the GFC.  
Table 4-1. Number of exit funds in each period. 
 Liquidation Within-family mergers Total 
Jan 2000-Mar 2003 62 0 62 
Apr 2003-Aug 2007 244 8 252 
Sep 2007-Mar 2009 171 28 199 
Apr 2009-Dec 2018 826 287 1,113 
Total 1,303 323 1,626 
From Morningstar Direct, for each UK fund, the following monthly fund characteristics data 
were collected: values of total net assets (TNA), net returns, fund inception dates, investment 
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objectives (defined by the IMA and by Morningstar), and the family a fund belongs to54. The 
database provides two types of fund sizes-comprehensive size as the sum of the values of net 
assets for all share classes of a fund, and the share size as the value of total net assets of each 
share class. However, for some unknown reason, share sizes have more missing values than 
comprehensive sizes, which causes trouble for the single-share analysis. In order to fill the 
missing values of share sizes, I firstly calculated the ratio of the primary-share’s size (if any) 
over the comprehensive size of a fund in each month, then got the mean ratio across all months 
in the sample period for each fund, and finally filled the missing primary shares’ sizes by 
multiplying a fund’s comprehensive size by the mean ratio for the primary share class. Monthly 
fund flow was calculated as (TNAt-TNAt-1*Returnt)/TNAt-1.  
In order to reduce the possible high volatility of monthly statistics, quarterly variables were 
constructed for the regression analysis. Monthly statistics were used to get quarterly averages 
which are referred to as Return, Size, Age, Flow, Family size, and Family specialisation.  
Following Chapter 2, two survivor definitions were used. The first one defines surviving funds 
as the funds that were in operation six months after the end of each period, and the other defines 
surviving funds as the funds that were operational as at the end of each period. Therefore, in 
the following analysis, the exit sample was restricted to the funds that exited the market 
between January 2000 and December 2017 from this point onwards, and the funds that exited 
the market after December 2017 were grouped into the surviving sample.  
Table 4-2 reports the descriptive quarterly statistics for the exit sample and the two surviving 
samples.  The statistics over the 18 years confirm the findings in the past literature and Chapter 
2 that exit funds, on average, earned lower net returns, were smaller in size, had a shorter 
operational history, and smaller fund inflows and belonged to smaller families. Compared to 
US funds, UK mutual funds, on average, were smaller in size (for surviving funds, £160 million 
versus $700+ million), belonged to smaller families (for surviving funds, £1.318 billion versus 
$10+ billion), and had higher investment style specialization (for surviving funds, 0.49 versus 
 
54 Morningstar Direct does not provide the historical data for fund expenses and turnover ratio, so they cannot be 
used in following analysis. 
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0.13+). This confirms that the UK mutual fund industry was not as well-developed as the US 
with respect to industry scale and product variety over the sample period.  
The analogous statistics were calculated for each sub-period separately. During the pre-crisis 
and the GFC periods, exit funds were not necessarily younger than surviving funds, or belonged 
to smaller families. The total net assets of an average fund shrunk during the GFC. The number 
of fund-families in the market was reduced by the GFC from 256 to 230, whilst the size of an 
average fund-family almost doubled after the GFC. This trend implies that the mutual fund 
industry was trying to achieve economies of scale given that more assets were under the 
management of fewer families. The statistics also show that in every period, the performance 
difference between exit and surviving funds was small. 
To test whether the performance-exit relationship differs in different sector structures, the 
4,682 sample funds are categorized into four broad sector groups, domestic equity sector (DE), 
global equity sector (GE), domestic non-equity sector (DNE), global non-equity sector (GNE)55, 
plus an unclassified sector, following the categories in Keswani and Stolin (2006). Table 4-3 
summarizes the number of funds in each sector. It shows that 196 funds do not have a clearly 
defined investment objective, so it is impossible to assign them to a sector. Among the 
remaining funds, global equity and domestic non-equity sectors have the largest numbers of 
funds, and the global non-equity sector have the least funds.  
Table 4-4 reports the means, medians, and standard deviations of fund- and family- 
characteristics for the funds (including the exit and the surviving funds) in each sector across 
the 19 years between 2000 and 2018.  It shows that equity funds earned higher net returns 
(1.875% for global equity funds and 1.747% for domestic equity funds) over the 19 years, on 
average. The domestic equity sector had the longest history and the average age of domestic 
equity funds doubled that of global non-equity funds. The average size of domestic equity funds 
was the largest in comparison with other three sectors, and was almost three times that of global 
non-equity funds. Over the 19 years, the domestic equity sector was the only sector which 
experienced net fund outflows (-0.176%) and global non-equity enjoyed the highest fund 
 
55 The investment styles that form a sector are reported in the Appendix Table A4-1. The investment styles defined 
by IMA were used to group funds into sectors. When the data of IMA styles were not available for some funds, 
the ‘Morningstar Global Category’ was used for classification. 
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inflows (0.868%). This is an indication of the fastest growth in investor demands of the newly 
developed global non-equity sector. Based on the statistics of fund characteristics, the 
development of the domestic non-equity and global equity sectors seemed in between that of 
the domestic equity and global non-equity sectors. 
The family size of global equity funds and global non-equity funds was a bit larger than that of 
domestic funds. This may be due to the fact that more resources and research are required in 
global investments relative to domestic investments, and larger families are more likely to 
possess sufficient resources to explore global investment opportunities.  
Furthermore, in order to illustrate the structure of each sector, several measures of sector 
competitiveness were constructed. The first measure is the value of the total net assets of all 
the funds in each sector, as a larger sector is expected to be more competitive and mature. The 
second measure is the average market share across all the fund-families in each sector. The 
third measures the total market share of the largest 5 families in each sector. The fourth measure 
is the Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (HHI) in each sector. The final measure is the ratio of the 
number of new funds over the number of existing funds in a sector, which indicates the 
activeness and attractiveness of a sector for potential new entries. Figures 4-4-4-8 and Tables 
A4-2 -A4-6 (in the Appendix) show the five measures of each sector (except for the 
unclassified sector) in each of the 19 years between 2000 and 2018. 
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Table 4-2. Means, medians, and standard deviations of fund and family characteristics of exit and surviving funds over the whole period and the three sub-periods. Quarterly statistics. The 
statistics are based on all quarters within the period specified in the top row. Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative, percentage 3-month returns/flows. Age is the number of 
years in operation till the end-month of each quarter. The Size, FF-size and FF-spec statistics are based on the quarterly means of the corresponding statistics. 
 1/2000-12/2017  1/2000-8/2007  9/2007-3/2009  4/2009-12/2017 
 Mean Median St dev  Mean Median St dev  Mean Median St dev  Mean Median St dev 
Panel A. Exit funds 
Return (%) 1.18 1.344 7.388  2.072 2.741 4.758  -4.591 -2.446 6.766  2.568 2.007 6.88 
Size (£mil) 60.789 17.434 138.337  17.007 4.999 28.358  53.475 6.455 164.139  52.092 13.53 128.585 
Age (yrs) 9.672 6.338 9.428  13.551 10.422 11.111  11.277 5.838 12.639  9.364 6.005 9.195 
Flow (%) -0.423 -0.338 7.555  -2.724 -0.819 8.668  -3.522 -0.777 10.117  -0.813 -0.418 6.757 
Family size (£mil) 10,499.10 5,130.37 12,269.74  8,853.82 8,198.34 8,169.07  9,812.15 4,421.70 10,642.46  13,650.09 8,086.06 14,027.94 
Family 
specialisation 
0.456 0.456 0.271 
 
0.433 0.516 0.239 
 
0.509 0.476 0.301 
 
0.425 0.4 0.268 
No of funds 828 828 828  19 19 19  56 56 56  710 710 710 
No of families 169 169 169  68 68 68  61 61 61  152 152 152 
No of obs 19,868 19,868 19,868  71 71 71  219 219 219  10,860 10,860 10,860                 
Panel B. Surviving funds: plus 6 months 
Return (%) 1.987 2.053 6.694  2.049 2.597 7.555  -4.334 -3.605 6.953  2.742 2.352 5.897 
Size (£mil) 159.759 40.88 384.274  131.576 39.28 318.003  128.547 34.133 302.701  63.203 39.681 396.432 
Age (yrs) 12.034 9.005 10.579  11.678 8.674 10.282  10.661 7.507 10.084  12.118 9.005 10.661 
Flow (%) 0.56 -0.16 6.786  0.937 0.058 7.326  0.292 -0.142 8.241  0.42 -0.258 6.516 
Family size (£mil) 13,182.44 7,431.361 14,657.86  6,901.73 4,355.58 7,595.11  9,297.00 5,681.30 8,985.94  15,229 8,735 16,084.89 
Family 
specialisation 
0.492 0.5 0.258 
 
0.507 0.538 0.253 
 
0.507 0.544 0.265 
 
0.483 0.465 0.483 
No of funds 2,350 2,350 2,350  1,388 1,388 1,388  1,715 1,715 1,715  2,348 2,348 2,348 
No of families 241 241 241  265 265 265  253 253 253  229 229 229 
No of obs 86,099 86,099 86,099  22,464 22,464 22,464  10,633 10,633 10,633  61,691 61,691 61,691                 
Panel C. Surviving funds: plus 0 month 
Return (%) 1.983 2.046 6.687  2.049 2.597 7.549  -4.356 -3.629 6.943  2.736 2.344 5.897 
Size (£mil) 158.965 40.644 382.899  131.297 39.004 317.713  125.941 33.514 299.087  162.611 39.483 395.332 
Age (yrs) 12.021 9.005 10.578  11.674 8.671 10.283  10.582 7.422 10.01  12.115 9.008 10.655 
Flow (%) 0.548 -0.168 6.772  0.935 0.057 7.344  0.246 -0.151 8.249  0.406 -0.266 6.501 
Family size (£mil) 13,282.67 7,552.741 14,708.01  6,889.21 4,330.00 7,591.71  9,290.42 5,643.24 9,058.85  15,355 8,838 16,144.08 
Family 
specialisation 
0.49 0.5 0.258 
 
0.507 0.538 0.253 
 
0.508 0.544 0.265 
 
0.482 0.464 0.26 
No of funds 2,377 2,377 2,377  1,400 1,400 1,400  1,765 1,765 1,765  2,375 2,375 2,375 
No of families 241 241 241  267 267 267  256 256 256  230 230 230 
No of obs 87,191 87,191 87,191   22,513 22,513 22,513   10,947 10,947 10,947   62,449 62,449 62,449 
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Table 4-3. Numbers of funds in each sector over the 19 years between 2000 and 2018. 
 Exit funds Surviving funds Total 
DE 273 448 721 
GE 503 850 1,353 
DNE 518 1,354 1,872 
GNE 186 354 540 
Unclassified 146 50 196 
Total 1,626 3,056 4,682 
 
Table 4-4. Means, median, and standard deviations of fund and family characteristics of the funds in each sector over the 19 years between 2000 and 2018. Quarterly statistics. 
Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative, percentage 3-month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till the end-month of each quarter. The 
Size, FF-size and FF-spec statistics are based on the quarterly means of the corresponding statistics. 
 Domestic equity 
 Domestic non-equity  Global equity  Global non-equity 
 mean median Std. dev 
 mean median Std. dev  mean median Std. dev  mean median Std. dev 
Return (%) 1.747 2.367 7.969  1.308 1.397 4.757  1.875 2.505 8.602  1.177 1.017 4.202 
Size (£mil) 211.690 54.714 492.465  106.509 24.746 262.148  166.456 45.407 419.902  75.143 18.553 215.676 
Age (yrs) 15.735 12.175 12.908  9.071 7.174 7.781  13.715 10.923 11.182  7.257 5.090 6.672 
Flow (%) -0.176 -0.441 6.012  0.620 -0.092 7.152  0.167 -0.252 6.541  0.868 -0.150 8.032 
Family size (£mil) 12,732 7,173 14,153  12,364 5,883 14,712  14,520 9,012 15,288  14,817 8,516 15,998 
Family specialisation 0.586 0.563 0.187  0.403 0.292 0.284  0.576 0.566 0.202  0.272 0.211 0.235 
                
No of funds  272 272 272  637 637 637  479 479 479  181 181 181 
No of family 147 147 147  201 201 201  187 187 187  111 111 111 







Figure 4-4. Total net assets of each sector in the UK mutual fund industry 
 
 
Figure 4-5. Average market share of each sector in the UK mutual fund industry 
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Figure 4-8. The ratio of the number of new funds over the number of existing funds in each 
sector in the UK mutual fund industry 
 
Figure 4-4 shows that the importance of the domestic equity sector in the UK mutual fund 
industry kept declining since 2000, consistent with the well-documented ‘de-risking’ trend in 
the UK asset management industry (Blake et al., 2014; Haldane, 2014). The proportion of 
global equity funds kept stable at around 40% in each year, and that of global non-equity funds 
increased stably from almost none to 6% in 2018. The importance of the domestic non-equity 
sector grew rapidly in the first decade of the 21st century, but such growing trend stopped after 
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Figure 4-4 implies that the domestic equity sector was the only declining sector in the UK 
mutual fund market. It shows that investors’ demand of domestic equities kept declining, and 
this may intensify the competition within this sector. This is also supported by Figure 4-8 
showing that the domestic equity sector had the least new funds entering into the sector in each 
year relative to the existing funds. In other words, the domestic equity sector was least attractive 
to potential new entries and the statistics support the hypothesis that in such a competitive 
sector, badly performing funds can be removed from the market during the non-GFC period.  
In addition, Figure 4-4 indicates that the assets invested in global non-equity funds were 
gaining continuous increases, reflecting investors’ increasing demands of the new types of 
portfolios. Combined with Figures 4-5 to 4-8, it can be seen that the global non-equity sector 
was least competitive, as the average market share, the market share of the largest 5 fund-
families, and the HHI for the global non-equity sector were much higher than those for the 
other sectors. What’s more, of the existing global non-equity funds in each year, a high 
proportion were new entries. This reflects the expectation of the market that there were still 
growth potential and profits to be extracted from the global non-equity sector. The high investor 
demands of global non-equity funds and the activeness in this sector indicate that the 
competition in this sector was not fierce enough to remove badly performing funds over the 
sample period.  
The average market shares in the domestic non-equity and global equity sector were at a similar 
low level of 0.01. However, the largest five fund-families accounted for over 50% of the total 
market share in the global equity sector before the GFC, while the largest five accounted for 
only 35% in the domestic non-equity sector. The large market share of the five largest families 
in the global equity sector may have distorted the competition within the sector during the pre-
crisis period. The competition patterns for the global equity and the domestic non-equity 
sectors are not as clear as those for the domestic equity and the global non-equity sectors, so it 
is an empirical question of whether there is a negative performance-exit relationship in the two 
sectors. 
4.3.2 Methodology 
4.3.2.1 Performance-exit relationship 
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To test the role of performance in determining fund exits and following the methodology in 
Chapter 2, quarterly logit regressions were used where the dependent variables take the value 
of one for the exit funds and zero for the surviving funds, and the independent variables are 
funds’ Return, Age, Size, Flows, FF-size and FF-spec, plus the investment objective and time 
dummies. All the regressions are clustered by funds and investment styles56. All the regressions 
were run on the whole sample period between January 2000 and December 2017, and the three 
sub-periods, to test the performance-exit relationship in different times. In quarterly regressions, 
the funds that exited within the first three months were dropped in each period, for the same 
reason as argued in Chapter 2. The regressions were repeated on monthly statistics to show the 
robustness of the analysis, and the results are reported in the Appendix Tables A4-15-A4-26. 
To ensure that the regression results were not caused by the different variable distributions of 
the surviving and the exit funds, the nearest-neighbour matching conducted in the Chapter 2 
was used in this chapter. Two sets of matching variables were used. The first was on a fund’s 
Size, Age, and Investment style, and the second added fund-family in the matching. Then the 
regressions were repeated on the matched pairs of the exit and the surviving funds. 
To investigate the performance-exit relationship in different sectors, the regressions before- 
and post-matching were repeated on the funds in each of the four sectors (DE, DNE, GE, and 
GNE). As the numbers of funds and observations shrank much after the funds were separated 
into sectors, the regressions were only done for the whole period between 2000 and 2017 and 
not for the three sub-periods within each sector. In addition, the investment style of a fund was 
excluded from the matching variables in the matchings for each sector, in order to keep 
sufficient numbers of observations for the regressions after matching. Also, it is reasonable to 
drop investment style in matching, as funds are allowed to compete freely within a sector no 
matter what their specific investment styles are. 
4.3.2.2 Market-risk factors 
To assess any potential differences in the post– and the pre– merger performance of the 
acquirers and of their targets, funds’ alphas estimated from the six-factor risk model are 
 
56 The results of the regressions clustered by investment styles are reported in the Appendix Tables A4-9-A4-14. 
The clustering by investment styles is inferior to that by funds due to the smaller number of clusters of investment 
styles than the number of independent variables in many regressions.  
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compared. For this purpose, the data on the three Fama–French factors for UK market57, the 
UK Benchmark 10-year DataStream Government Bond total return index, JPMorgan Global 
Government Bond ex UK total return index and the S&P GSCI Gold total return index 
(converted to Sterling) were collected. Their corresponding time series of monthly returns are 
denoted as MKTRF, SMB, HML, UK gov bond, Global gov bond and Gold. The bond and 
gold indices were downloaded from Datastream. Table 4-5 shows the summary statistics of the 
factors for the whole period and for the three subperiods.  
Table 4-5. Summary statistics of the monthly returns of the risk factors (%). MRTRF, SMB and HML are returns on the 
three Fama – French factors, UK GOV BOND  are returns on the UK Benchmark 10-year DataStream Government Bond 
total return index, GLOBAL  GOV BOND are returns on the JPMorgan Global Government Bond ex UK total return index 
and GOLD are returns on S&P GSCI Gold total return index (converted to Sterling). 
2000-2017 Mean  Median  Std. dev  Min  
 Max   Obs 
MKTRF  0.278  0.893  3.966  -13.606 
 9.896  216 
SMB  0.240  0.161  3.504  -14.775 
 15.607  216 
HML  0.348  0.308  3.430  -18.608 
 12.287  216 
UK gov bond  0.518  0.596  1.757  -4.321 
 5.497  216 
Global gov bond  0.495  0.234  2.641  -6.890 
 15.156  216 
Gold  0.848  0.734  4.906  -12.370 
 17.895  216 
1/2000-8/2007           
MKTRF  -0.040  0.827  3.829  -12.068 
 9.091  92 
SMB  0.431  0.069  3.490  -10.956 
 9.791  92 
HML  1.181  0.788  4.214  -18.608 
 12.287  92 
UK gov bond  0.436  0.508  1.337  -3.322 
 3.372  92 
Global gov bond  0.287  0.214  1.747  -4.397 
 6.052  92 
Gold  0.708  0.394  3.883  -7.865 
 10.648  92 
9/2007-3/2009           
MKTRF  -2.428  -1.805  5.710  -13.606 
 5.859  19 
SMB  -1.864  -0.914  4.228  -11.476 
 4.201  19 
HML  -1.581  -0.314  2.850  -7.015 
 1.835  19 
UK gov bond  1.183  0.750  2.428  -4.285 
 5.497  19 
Global gov bond  2.589  2.159  4.636  -3.726 
 15.156  19 
Gold  3.612  4.831  6.298  -6.385 
 15.163  19 
4/2009-12/2017           
MKTRF  1.046  1.156  3.467  -6.929 
 9.896  105 
SMB  0.454  0.447  3.277  -14.775 
 15.607  105 
HML  -0.033  -0.123  2.438  -4.469 
 9.006  105 
UK gov bond  0.469  0.649  1.926  -4.321 
 5.334  105 
Global gov bond  0.298  0.059  2.674  -6.890 
 12.172  105 








4.4 Empirical evidence 
4.4.1 Performance-exit relationship 
Table 4-6 shows the marginal effects of the logit regressions for the whole period and each of 
the three sub-periods. The surviving sample is defined as the funds that remained operational 
for at least 6 months following the end of each period (Panel A) or as the funds that remained 
operational at the end of each period (Panel B).  
The first columns of Table 4-6 Panels A and B show that during the 18 years, the exit funds on 
average underperform the surviving funds, and the marginal effect in Panel B (-0.127) is 
slightly smaller than that in Panel A (-0.131). This is consistent with the intuition that the 
inclusion of the funds that exited soon after each periods’ ends in the surviving sample would 
weaken the negative performance-exit relationship. The marginal effects of the returns are 
statistically significant during the pre-crisis period at 10 percent (Panel A) or insignificant 
(Panel B), and are statistically significant during the post-crisis period at 1 percent. This 
confirms Hypothesis 2 that the negative performance-exit relationship is stronger during the 
post-crisis than the pre-crisis period. This may be the result of the rapid growth of the UK 
mutual fund industry after the GFC.  
Alike the situation in the US market, bad performance during the GFC do not force funds out 
of the market, as the marginal effect of the returns is not statistically significant during the GFC 
period. This finding indicates that the distortion of market clearing mechanisms during the 
GFC is not a sample-specific phenomenon. This is reasonable as the effects of the GFC on the 
investment opportunities, investor behaviours and family strategies are quite likely to be the 
same in the US and the UK which share similar regulation and law systems, investor wealth 
and education background etc.  
A fund’s size is statistically significantly and negatively related to the probability of fund exits 
in every period. During the 18 years, on average, the funds that have smaller fund inflows, a 
shorter history and belong to smaller families have higher probabilities to exit the market. If a 
fund-family spreads its resources to offer funds of more investment objectives, then its funds 
have a higher propensity towards exiting the market. This implies that the economies of scale 
instead of business diversification do matter in the UK mutual fund market if a family attempts 
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to gain a high market share. The significant effects of the age, flow, family size and 
specialisation are mostly driven by the post-crisis period. In the pre-crisis and the GFC periods, 
small fund sizes contribute the most to the propensity towards exiting the market (the effect of 
lower fund inflows is also statistically significant during the GFC but not the pre-crisis period), 
while the family size and specialisation do not explain fund exits. This may be because fund-
families are not large enough in the early development stage of the industry to benefit from 
economies of scale.  
The weak marginal effect of the returns during the pre-crisis may be driven by the relatively 
immature sectors such as the global non-equity sector. Therefore, the same logit regressions 
were repeated for each sector, in order to test whether the negative performance-exit 
relationship differs in the four sectors.  
Table 4-7 reports the marginal effects of logit regressions for the domestic equity, the global 
equity, the domestic non-equity, and the global non-equity sectors, when the surviving sample 
was requested to remain operation for at least 6 months beyond the end of the corresponding 
period (Panel A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B). Both panels 
show that the market force is strong enough to force out the worse performing funds in all the 
sectors except for the global non-equity sector. This confirms Hypothesis 3 that there is no 
negative performance-exit relationship in the least competitive sector. A fund’s age and family 
specialisation only affect the fates of domestic non-equity funds, and older funds belonging to 
more specialised families are less likely to exit the market. The effects of other control variables 
for a single sector are consistent with those for the whole sample, presented in Table 4-6. The 
separate regressions on each sector also prove the robustness of the findings in Table 4-6 using 
smaller samples. 
To ensure that the above results were not driven by the different data distributions of the 
surviving and the exit funds, the same regressions were repeated on the samples after NNM. 
Tables 4-8 and 4-9 show the marginal effects of the logit regressions after the matching on a 
fund’s size, age, and investment style, and the matching with an additional matching variable-
fund-family, respectively. The results of the impact of Return on the probability of fund exits 
in Table 4-6 are preserved after both matchings. The effects of a fund’s size and age becomes 
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statistically insignificant, as the matchings reduce the differences between the surviving and 
the exit funds in their sizes and ages.  
Tables 4-8 and 4-9 show that there are only 36 (30 for the plus-zero survivor definition) and 
16 (18 for the plus-zero survivor definition) matched funds in the regressions for the pre-crisis 
period. Given such a small number of samples (clusters), the equivalent regressions but without 
fund clusters were done on the matched samples to ensure the robustness of the analysis. The 
results are reported in the Appendix Tables A4-7 and A4-8 and the results presented in Tables 
4-8 and 4-9 are still preserved. 
Similarly, the regressions for Table 4-7 were repeated on the samples after NNM. Tables 4-10 
and 4-11 show the marginal effects of the logit regressions after the matching on a fund’s size 
and age, and the matching with an additional matching variable-fund-family, respectively. The 
finding that the market force is not strong enough to squeeze out the worst performing funds 
in the global non-equity sector is confirmed in the two tables.  
To sum up, the empirical evidence shows that the market force in the U.K. mutual fund industry 
increased during the 18 years, and became strongest during the post-crisis period. Industry 
structure affects market clearing mechanisms, and the negative performance-exit relationship 
is the weakest in the least competitive sector. Finally, the distortion of market clearing 
mechanisms brought by the GFC is not a country-specific phenomenon, and it also exists in 




Table 4-6. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by funds. The dependent variable equals to one for every quarter for the funds that exited within the period specified at the top row, 
and it is equal to zero for every quarter for the funds that have not exited the market before the end of the periods as specified at the top row. The surviving funds are requested to remain 
operation for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding period (Panel A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B). Quarterly returns/flows are (not 
annualised) cumulative 3-month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till the end-month of current quarter. Size, and family size are the mean statistics of the three variables 
respectively over the three months in a quarter. ***-1% statistical significance, **-5% statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance. 
 Panel A. plus 6 months  Panel A. plus 0 month 
1/2000-12/2017 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2017 1/2000-12/2017 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2017 
Return -0.131***  -0.037*  -0.043  -0.109***  -0.127***  -0.033  -0.043  -0.106*** 
 (0.000)  (0.062)  (0.313)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.122)  (0.293)  (0.000) 
Size -0.030***  -0.007***  -0.010***  -0.029***  -0.030***  -0.007***  -0.010***  -0.029*** 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age -0.017**  0.006  0.008  -0.014**  -0.016**  0.006  0.008  -0.013** 
 (0.027)  (0.176)  (0.142)  (0.038)  (0.031)  (0.155)  (0.135)  (0.047) 
Flow -0.343***  -0.023*  -0.086***  -0.361***  -0.337***  -0.024*  -0.082***  -0.355*** 
 (0.000)  (0.077)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.060)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Family size -0.014***  0.001  -0.003  -0.011***  -0.015***  0.002  -0.002  -0.011*** 
 (0.000)  (0.481)  (0.367)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.448)  (0.383)  (0.001) 
Family specialisation -0.101***  -0.001  -0.014  -0.085***  -0.098***  0.001  -0.014  -0.083*** 
 (0.000)  (0.963)  (0.519)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.963)  (0.529)  (0.000) 
                                
IS &Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 99,805  6,275  7,534  67,475  100,861  6,315  7,749  68,194 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 17,586/82,819  71/6,204  222/7,312  8,988/58,487  17,586/83,275  71/6,244  222/7,527  8,988/59,206 
No. of exit/surviving funds 754/2,263  19/779  58/1,389  634/2,261  754/2,289  19/789  58/1,429  634/2,287 
No. of clusters 3,017  798  1,447  2,895  3,043  808  1,487  2,921 
r2_p 0.160  0.281  0.144  0.200  0.159  0.274  0.141  0.197 










Table 4-7. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by funds, on the four sectors separately. The dependent variable equals to one for every quarter for the funds that exited the market 
between January 2000 and December 2017, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for the funds that have not exited the market before the end of the sample period. The surviving funds are 
requested to remain operation for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding period (Panel A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B). Quarterly 
returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3-month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till the end-month of current quarter. Size, and family size are the mean statistics 
of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. ***-1% statistical significance, **-5% statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance.  
 Panel A. plus 6 months  Panel A. plus 0 month 
 DE  DNE  GE  GNE 
 
         DE        DNE         GE GNE 
Return -0.096***  -0.150***  -0.088***  -0.132 -0.093***  -0.144***  -0.087***  -0.131 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.157)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.160) 
Size -0.036***  -0.024***  -0.038***  -0.021**  -0.036***  -0.024***  -0.038***  -0.021** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.013) 
Age 0.002  -0.029***  -0.019  -0.029  0.003  -0.028**  -0.019  -0.029 
 (0.902)  (0.008)  (0.126)  (0.320)  (0.878)  (0.010)  (0.121)  (0.330) 
Flow -0.318***  -0.301***  -0.390***  -0.411***  -0.312***  -0.292***  -0.385***  -0.411*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Family size 0.000  -0.019***  -0.022***  -0.023*  0.000  -0.020***  -0.022***  -0.023* 
 (0.959)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.093)  (0.958)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.084) 
Family specialisation -0.004  -0.241***  0.037  -0.214  0.001  -0.237***  0.037  -0.216 
 (0.960)  (0.000)  (0.442)  (0.161)  (0.993)  (0.000)  (0.442)  (0.157)                 
                
IS &Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 21,749  41,208  33,961  4,933  21,983  41,865  34,114  4,958 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 4,232/17,517  6,804/34,404  6,289/27,672  721/4,212  4,232/17,751  6,804/35,061  6,289/27,825  721/4,237 
No. of exit/surviving funds 160/380  293/1,053  258/685  43/145  160/386  293/1,069  258/689  43/146 
No. of clusters 540  1,346  943  188  545  1,362  947  189 
r2_p 0.136  0.184  0.189  0.172  0.136  0.181  0.189  0.170 












Table 4-8. Marginal effects of logit regressions on matched samples clustered by funds. The matching is done by fund size, age and investment objective, with replacement. The dependent 
variable equals to one for every quarter for the funds that exited within the period specified at the top row, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for the funds that have not exited the market 
before the end of the periods as specified at the top row. The surviving funds are requested to remain operation for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding period (Panel A) 
and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B). Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3-month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till 
the end-month of current quarter. Size, and family size are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. ***-1% statistical significance, **-5% 
statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance. 
 Panel A. plus 6 months  Panel A. plus 0 month 
 1/2000-12/2017 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2017 1/2000-12/2017 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2017 
Return -0.104***  -0.218  -0.371  -0.199***  -0.104***  -0.038  -0.343  -0.200*** 
 (0.000)  (0.485)  (0.340)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.906)  (0.378)  (0.000) 
Size 0.012  -0.104*  0.008  -0.006  0.012  -0.110*  0.013  -0.006 
 (0.105)  (0.081)  (0.821)  (0.429)  (0.102)  (0.067)  (0.720)  (0.429) 
Age -0.003*  0.005  -0.002  -0.002  -0.003*  0.006  -0.002  -0.002 
 (0.097)  (0.663)  (0.691)  (0.340)  (0.093)  (0.574)  (0.715)  (0.309) 
Flow -0.004***  -0.006  -0.008***  -0.007***  -0.004***  -0.006*  -0.008***  -0.007*** 
 (0.000)  (0.135)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.063)  (0.003)  (0.000) 
Family size -0.010  0.087  -0.021  -0.017  -0.011  0.086  -0.023  -0.018* 
 (0.291)  (0.296)  (0.474)  (0.104)  (0.263)  (0.307)  (0.418)  (0.094) 
Family specialisation -0.234***  -0.381  -0.250  -0.242***  -0.230***  -0.318  -0.219  -0.235*** 
 (0.003)  (0.400)  (0.327)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.485)  (0.392)  (0.005)                 
                
IS &Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 29,798  167  434  15,817  29,890  174  438  15,833 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 16,675 /13,123  61/106  226/208  8,811 /7,006  16,675 /13,215  63/111  226/212  8,811 /7,022 
No. of exit/surviving funds 675/482  18/18  58/55  620/464  671/485  15/15  56/54  588/448 
No. of clusters 1,153  28  110  1,035  1,156  30  110  1,036 
r2_p 0.0206  0.229  0.0454  0.0219  0.0204  0.235  0.0454  0.0218 











Table 4-9. Marginal effects of logit regressions on matched samples clustered by funds. The matching is done by fund size, age, fund-family, and investment objective, with replacement. The 
dependent variable equals to one for every quarter for the funds that exited within the period specified at the top row, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for the funds that have not exited 
the market before the end of the periods as specified at the top row. The surviving funds are requested to remain operation for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding period 
(Panel A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B). Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3-month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in 
operation till the end-month of current quarter. Size, and family size are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. ***-1% statistical significance, 
**-5% statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance. 
 Panel A. plus 6 months  Panel A. plus 0 month 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
Return -0.083**  -0.497  0.254  -0.109**  -0.081**  -0.505  0.254  -0.111** 
 (0.015)  (0.110)  (0.641)  (0.033)  (0.017)  (0.104)  (0.641)  (0.030) 
Size -0.052***  -0.190***  -0.080**  -0.066***  -0.050***  -0.193***  -0.080**  -0.063*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.000) 
Age -0.004*  0.011  -0.001  -0.005**  -0.004*  0.012  -0.001  -0.006** 
 (0.097)  (0.313)  (0.943)  (0.040)  (0.073)  (0.278)  (0.943)  (0.023) 
Flow -0.005***  -0.009***  -0.006  -0.008***  -0.005***  -0.009***  -0.006  -0.008*** 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.116)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.116)  (0.000) 
Family size 0.025  0.265***  0.007  0.023  0.024  0.263**  0.007  0.023 
 (0.168)  (0.008)  (0.947)  (0.247)  (0.189)  (0.014)  (0.947)  (0.261) 
Family specialisation 0.096  0.942**  -0.367  0.027  0.095  0.915**  -0.367  0.025 
 (0.441)  (0.022)  (0.678)  (0.839)  (0.446)  (0.032)  (0.678)  (0.851)                 
                
IS &Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 16,400  101  259  8,232  16,494  103  259  8,279 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 8,753/7,647  43/58  129/130  4,624/3,608  8,753/7,741  44/59  129/130  4,624/3,655 
No. of exit/surviving funds 338/246  8/8  28/27  291/213  338/247  9/9  28/27  291/214 
No. of clusters 584  16  55  504  585  18  55  505 
r2_p 0.0644  0.604  0.0998  0.100  0.0630  0.604  0.0998  0.0977 









Table 4-10. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by funds on matched samples, on the four sectors separately. The matching is done by fund size, and fund age, with replacement. The 
dependent variable equals to one for every quarter for the funds that exited the market between January 2000 and December 2017, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for the funds that 
have not exited the market before the end of the sample period. The surviving funds are requested to remain operation for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding period (Panel 
A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B). Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3-month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation 
till the end-month of current quarter. Size, and family size are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. ***-1% statistical significance, **-5% 
statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance.  
 Panel A. plus 6 months  Panel A. plus 0 month 
 DE  DNE  GE  GNE 
 
DE  DNE  GE  GNE 
Return -0.142***  -0.213***  -0.108***  -0.225 -0.146***  -0.212***  -0.105***  -0.225 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.306)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.306) 
Size 0.005  0.011  0.003  -0.028  0.005  0.010  0.003  -0.028 
 (0.771)  (0.296)  (0.823)  (0.204)  (0.762)  (0.344)  (0.829)  (0.204) 
Age -0.003  -0.010**  -0.004  -0.016  -0.003  -0.010**  -0.004  -0.016 
 (0.317)  (0.021)  (0.309)  (0.144)  (0.302)  (0.032)  (0.309)  (0.144) 
Flow -0.004***  -0.003***  -0.004***  -0.006***  -0.004***  -0.003***  -0.004***  -0.006*** 
 (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Family size 0.030  -0.029*  0.005  -0.024  0.030  -0.032**  0.005  -0.024 
 (0.143)  (0.061)  (0.755)  (0.455)  (0.130)  (0.040)  (0.766)  (0.455) 
Family specialisation -0.056  -0.598***  0.190  -0.340  -0.054  -0.595***  0.192  -0.340 
 (0.743)  (0.000)  (0.148)  (0.351)  (0.753)  (0.000)  (0.143)  (0.351)                 
                
IS &Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 7,343  11,069  9,847  1,899  7,336  11,203  9,848  1,899 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 3,986/3,357  6,232/4,837  5,536/4,311  639/1,260  3,986/3,350  6,279/4,924  5,536/4,312  639/1,260 
No. of exit/surviving funds 145/101  257/198  219/153  33/49  145/100  260/201  219/153  33/49 
No. of clusters 246  455  372  82  245  461  372  82 
r2_p 0.0387  0.111  0.0424  0.0715  0.0397  0.104  0.0425  0.0715 









Table 4-11. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by funds on matched samples, on the four sectors separately. The matching is done by fund size, fund age, and fund-family, with 
replacement. The dependent variable equals to one for every quarter for the funds that exited the market between January 2000 and December 2017, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for 
the funds that have not exited the market before the end of the sample period. The surviving funds are requested to remain operation for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding 
period (Panel A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B). Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3-month returns/flows. Age is the number of years 
in operation till the end-month of current quarter. Size, and family size are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. ***-1% statistical significance, 
**-5% statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance.  
 Panel A. plus 6 months  Panel A. plus 0 month 
 DE  DNE  GE  GNE 
 
DE  DNE  GE  GNE 
Return -0.138***  -0.279***  -0.084*  -0.441 -0.143***  -0.280***  -0.088**  -0.414 
 (0.006)  (0.000)  (0.056)  (0.108)  (0.004)  (0.000)  (0.044)  (0.117) 
Size -0.038**  -0.020  -0.036**  -0.038  -0.036**  -0.016  -0.033**  -0.032 
 (0.033)  (0.116)  (0.021)  (0.193)  (0.041)  (0.200)  (0.033)  (0.215) 
Age 0.000  -0.009**  -0.002  0.004  -0.000  -0.009**  -0.002  0.006 
 (0.985)  (0.040)  (0.635)  (0.834)  (0.920)  (0.025)  (0.542)  (0.791) 
Flow -0.005***  -0.002*  -0.004***  -0.001  -0.005***  -0.002*  -0.003***  -0.001 
 (0.003)  (0.089)  (0.000)  (0.326)  (0.004)  (0.079)  (0.001)  (0.285) 
Family size 0.051*  -0.024  0.030  0.013  0.048*  -0.024  0.030  0.002 
 (0.076)  (0.234)  (0.181)  (0.769)  (0.095)  (0.232)  (0.185)  (0.957) 
Family specialisation 0.153  -0.157  0.104  -2.586***  0.177  -0.159  0.117  -2.639*** 
 (0.488)  (0.351)  (0.522)  (0.000)  (0.420)  (0.341)  (0.469)  (0.000) 
                
IS &Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 5,649  8,825  7,449  876  5,807  8,832  7,425  915 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 3,098/2,551  5,286/3,539  4,180/3,269  527/349  3,209/2,598  5,286/3,546  4,180/3,245  527/388 
No. of exit/surviving funds 107/69  215/123  148/100  24/16  110/70  215/123  148/99  24/18 
No. of clusters 176  338  248  40  180  338  247  42 
r2_p 0.0530  0.101  0.0795  0.263  0.0535  0.106  0.0810  0.278 
ll -3683   -5342   -4701   -433.9  -3779   -5319   -4676   -450.2 
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4.4.2 Pre- and post-merger performance 
Following Chapter 2, the post-merger performance of the acquirers is compared (i) against their 
pre–merger performance and (ii) against the pre-merger performance of the target funds. Funds’ 
performance is measured by their alphas obtained from regressing the funds’ excess returns 
(relative to the three-month Treasury bill rate) against the six factors specified in Section 
4.3.2.2, i.e. the Fama–French three factors, returns on two bond indices and on the gold index. 
The performance of the acquirers and of the targets is assessed when all the mergers that 
occurred in 2000–2015 were taken into account, and for each of the three sub-periods 
separately58. 
Table 4-12 shows the results of the analysis. The first two columns of Table 4-12 show the 
average pre–merger alphas of the targets, of the acquirers and the results of the t–tests of 
whether the acquirers’ alphas are statistically significantly different from those estimated for 
the targets (rows named ‘Acquirer–Target’).  The alphas are calculated for year one before the 
mergers (column headed ‘-1’), and for year two before the mergers (column headed ‘-2’).  
Consistent with the literature, the results confirm that the pre–merger performance of the 
acquirers is statistically superior to the performance of the targets, except for the period January 
2000-August 2007 which may be due to the small number of mergers commencing during that 
period.  
The next two columns of Table 4-12 show the average alphas for year one (column ‘1’) and 
year two (column ‘2’) of the post-merger funds. The following four columns compare the post–
merger and the pre–merger performance. First, the differences in the post– and the pre–merger 
performance of the acquirers are shown. Then, the differences in the post–merger performance 
of the acquirers and of the targets are shown.  The differences in the performance are calculated 
as the differences between year one after the merger and year one before the merger (columns 
headed ‘1-(-1)’), and between year two after the merger and year one before the merger (‘2-(-
1)’). The differences in the post-merger performance of the acquirers and of the targets confirm 
 
58 The data for the UK Fama-French three factors are updated till December 2017. Thus, I only considered the 
mergers that occurred before December 2015 to ensure that there are complete 2-year return data for the estimation 
of post-merger alphas. Thus, for the empirical analysis regarding pre- and post-merger performance, the whole 




the findings in the past literature that acquisitions are beneficial to the shareholders of the 
targets for all the periods except for the period January 2000-August 2007 which has too few 
observations to generate statistically significant results.  
However, the tables also show that the post-merger performance of the acquirers is improved 
after the acquisitions compared with the pre-merger performance of themselves (statistically 
significant for the whole period and for the post-crisis period). The results are contradictory to 
the past literature which documents that the performance of acquirers deteriorates after mergers 
(Carhart et al., 2002; Jayaraman et al., 2002; Khorana et al., 2007; Namvar and Phillips, 2013; 
Park, 2013). Yet, these papers all investigated the U.S. mutual fund market and attributed the 
deteriorated post-merger performance of the acquirers to the rebalancing costs and 
diseconomies of scale after acquisitions. This explanation is also consistent with the literature 
that shows a negative relationship between fund sizes and fund performance in the U.S. market 
(Indro et al., 1999; Berk and Green, 2004; Chen et al., 2004; Yan, 2008; Elton et al., 2012; 
Edelen et al., 2013). In contrast, the assets under management of a UK mutual fund may not 
have reached an efficient size to fully benefit from economies of scale (Otten and Bams, 2002). 
In this sense, the combination of two funds is probability able to produce a bigger fund that 
delivers better performance relative to both the target and the acquirer.  
Consistent with Chapter 2, the post-crisis period was split to two sub-periods which almost 
evenly split the number of mergers occurred during the post-crisis period, to investigate 
whether the mergers that happened soon after the GFC had different wealth effects than those 
that happened several years after the GFC. The results are reported in the last two panels in 
Table 4-12. The results show that there are no visible differences in the wealth effects on the 
targets and the acquirers for the mergers that took place during the first or the latter several 
years during the post-crisis period. During both sub-periods, the mergers statistically 
significantly improved the performance of the targets as well as the acquirers, in contrast to the 
case in the US market where the mergers that took place during the first years after the financial 




Table 4-12. The alpha estimates from the six-factor model for the target funds and their acquirers for year one (-1), year two (-2) before the acquisitions 
and year one (1) and year two (2) after the acquisitions, as well as t-tests for the significance of their differences. The periods of mergers are indicated 
in bold headings. P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
  -2  -1  1  2  1-(-1)  2-(-1)  1- (-1)  2-(-1) 
2000-2015 
              
Target -0.197  -0.213             
Acquirer 0.007  -0.064  0.135  0.101         
Acquirer – Target  0.204***  0.149***          0.315***  0.295*** 
 (0.005) 
 (0.001)          (0.000)  (0.000) 
Acquirer - Acquirer         0.214***  0.163**     
         (0.004)  (0.033)     
Obs. 195  210  225  234  213  205  220  227 
1/2000-8/2007                
Target -0.274  -0.583             
Acquirer -0.157  -0.497  -0.971  -0.385         
Acquirer – Target  0.117  0.087          -0.433  0.324 
 (0.104)  (0.194)          (0.539)  (0.320) 
Acquirer - Acquirer         -0379  0.113     
         (0.526)  (0.708)     
Obs. 5  6  7  8  7  7  6  7 
9/2007-3/2009                
Target -0.532  -0.698             
Acquirer -0.264  -0.343  -0.256  0.239         
Acquirer – Target  0.268**  0.356*          0.386*  0.917*** 
 (0.026)  (0.056)          (0.070)  (0.007) 
Acquirer - Acquirer         0.085  0.529     
         (0.648)  (0.134)     
Obs. 21  22  24  26  23  22  23  24 
4/2009-12/2015                
Target -0.154  -0.142             
Acquirer 0.045  0.016  0.223  0.103         
Acquirer – Target  0.199***  0.126***          0.330***  0.218*** 
 (0.003)  (0.008)          (0.000)  (0.004) 
Acquirer - Acquirer         0.253***  0.119     
         (0.002)  (0.123)     
Obs. 169  182  194  200  183  176  191  196 
4/2009-6/2012                
Target -0.418  -0.176  0.172  0.103         
Acquirer -0.174  -0.034             
Acquirer – Target  0.244**  0.142*          0.296**  0.250** 
 (0.041)  (0.088)          (0.010)  (0.032) 
Acquirer - Acquirer         0.243**  0.122     
         (0.038)  (0.291)     
Obs. 84  91  99  102  91  87  97  100 
7/2012-12/2015                
Target 0.108  -0.108  0.276  0.102         
Acquirer 0.262  0.002             
Acquirer – Target  0.154***  0.110**          0.366***  0.185* 
 (0.009)  (0.019)          (0.003)  (0.052) 
Acquirer - Acquirer         0.263**  0.117     
         (0.021)  (0.261)     




This chapter aims to examine the market clearing mechanisms in the U.K. mutual fund industry 
over the period between 2000 and 2017. The main hypotheses are that the negative 
performance-exit relationship is the strongest during the post-crisis period, and disappears 
during the GFC. Also, the natural market clearing mechanisms are weakest in the least 
competitive sector-the global non-equity sector in the U.K. mutual fund industry. These three 
hypotheses are tested using the surviving and exit funds over the period between 2000 and 
2018.  
The chapter portrays a whole picture of the determinants of fund exits in the U.K. mutual fund 
industry and several findings emerge from the analysis. First, the comparison of the summary 
statistics between the surviving and the exit funds show that the determinants of UK fund exits 
are much alike those of US fund exits. UK exit funds have lower returns, are smaller in size, 
have smaller fund inflows, and come from smaller families that diversify family recourses into 
more investment styles in comparison with the surviving funds. However, the return 
differences in the exit and the surviving funds in the UK market are not as big as those in the 
US market.  
Second, the measures of market competitiveness of the four sectors (domestic equity, domestic 
non-equity, global equity, and global non-equity sectors) show that the global non-equity sector 
is still a new sector with fastest growth and least competition relative to the other three during 
the sample period. 
Third, the regression analysis over the three sub-periods show that during the pre-crisis period 
(January 2000-August 2007), the negative performance-exit relationship is rather weak and 
even does not exist for some specifications. The relationship disappears completely during the 
GFC, and is the strongest during the post-crisis period. This indicates that in the early 2000s, 
the UK mutual fund industry is not so developed to form effective market clearing mechanisms. 
This situation improved after the GFC, when the importance of mutual fund investments 
increased rapidly e.g. in the pension fund asset allocation, fostering the development of the UK 
mutual fund industry and the corresponding market clearing mechanisms. In addition, the 
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impact of the GFC on market clearing mechanisms is proved not a country-specific 
phenomenon, and the impact is preserved also in the UK besides the US market. 
Fourth, this chapter for the first time investigates the wealth effects of within-family mergers 
on the targets and the acquirers in the UK mutual fund industry. It finds some evidence that 
fund mergers in the UK market are beneficial to both the targets and the acquirers during the 
period of 2000-2017, in contrast to the case in the US market where only the shareholders of 
the targets benefit from mergers but the acquirers get deteriorated performance after the 
mergers.  
This chapter makes some contributions. First, this chapter is the first study that 
comprehensively investigates the determinants of the fund exits in the U.K. market. The 
empirical evidence shows that the determinants of US mutual funds also apply to the UK 
market, such as poor fund performance, smaller size, lower inflows, and smaller family sizes.  
Second, this chapter adds to the understanding of the effect of industry structures on market 
clearing mechanisms. The UK mutual fund industry creates a suitable context to investigate 
how market competitiveness affects fund exits. Unlike the US market where funds of all 
investment styles can compete with each other, the funds in the UK market are required to 
compete within separate sectors. This artificial separation of the market creates several 
independent sectors which are in different development stages. The market clearing mechanism 
is found to only exist in competitive sectors and not in start-up sector like the global non-equity 
sector. It can be expected that along with the development of global non-equity funds, the 
market force may become stronger to remove poorly performing funds.  
Third, this chapter confirms the distortion brought by the GFC in the market clearing 
mechanisms in another developed mutual fund market besides the U.S. market investigated in 
Chapter 2. This deepens the understanding that in the markets which share similar law systems, 
investor wealth, education and cultures, relevant participants on a financial market tend to react 
similarly (passive investors do not search for better opportunities and fund-families 
subsequently take advantage of them, etc.) to an extreme market event. Thus, when facing such 
extreme market conditions as the GFC, not only the authorities in the US where the crisis 
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originated, but also the authorities in each country suffering the similar situation are expected 
to improve the ethical standards and further regulate the practices of their asset management 
industries. 
Fourth, this chapter is the first study on the fund merger activities in the UK mutual fund market 
and finds that mergers benefit both the targets and the acquirers, which is probably explained 
by the average small size of the UK funds relative to the US funds and the consequent 
economies of scale for both the targets and the acquirers achieved through mergers.  
This chapter has several limitations arising from data availability. First, due to the small 
number of the exit funds during the pre-crisis period (January 2000-August 2007), it is not able 
to fully understand the determinants of the fund exits during that period. Second, as the detailed 
portfolio holding data and manager data is not available, where the benefits of acquisitions for 
the targets and the acquirers come from could not be detected. Thus, the research on how fund 




CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis mainly addresses three issues. The first issue is on market clearing mechanisms in 
the U.S. mutual fund industry in different times. The second is on the role of board structure in 
affecting market clearing mechanisms and fund expense ratios in the U.S. mutual fund industry 
in different times. The final one is on the market clearing mechanism in the U.K. mutual fund 
industry in different times. 
Chapter 2 addresses the first issue. There is solid evidence showing that the negative 
performance-exit relationship (natural market clearing mechanisms) exists in all the periods 
between 2000 and 2014 in the U.S. market except for the 2008 financial crisis between 
September 2007 and March 2009. This phenomenon could be explained by the weaker ethics 
of fund-families during the GFC, who took advantage of the remaining passive investors and 
did not bother with taking actions on badly performing funds. The chapter documents the 
changes in fund-families’ profit-maximization strategies and the breakdown of the market 
clearing mechanisms during the GFC. 
Chapter 3 examines whether certain board characteristics remedy the breakdown of the market 
clearing mechanisms during the GFC. No evidence is found to support that funds’ boards are 
strong enough to exit badly performing funds out of the market during the GFC. Directors’ 
excessive compensation is positively related to the probability of a poorly performing fund 
being liquidated during the non-GFC times, but not during the GFC. The more directors own 
the shares of the funds they oversee, the less likely these funds are liquidated. A higher age 
diversity on a board is associated with higher probability of fund liquidations during both the 
non-GFC and the GFC periods. 
Chapter 3 also confirms the findings presented in the past literature that directors’ excessive 
compensation and board sizes are positively associated with fund fees, and that board 
independence is negatively related to fund fees. The chapter, for the first time, documents a 
positive relationship between director ownership and expense ratios. Chapter 3 also documents 
a positive relationship between the dispersion of age diversity and expense ratios, supporting 
the notion that people of different ages may share different cultures and values, which could 
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increase the communication and collaboration costs in decision-making processes. As a further 
step, the chapter finds that the GFC changes the way of some board characteristics affecting 
fund fees. For example, board independence is in particular important in lowering fund fees 
during the GFC than during the other times. 
Chapter 4 examines the market clearing mechanisms in the U.K. mutual fund industry. The 
empirical evidence shows that the market force is rather weak during the pre-crisis period 
(January 2000 – August 2007) in the U.K. market, consistent with the insufficient competition 
in the U.K. mutual fund industry during that period. In addition, the unique industry structure 
of the U.K. fund market relative to the U.S. makes it possible to investigate the market clearing 
mechanisms in different and independent sectors. The empirical evidence confirms that the 
market force is the weakest to remove badly performing funds in the least competitive sector-
global non-equity sector. Finally, this chapter confirms the finding in Chapter 2 using a new 
sample in a different market. The distortion brought by the GFC of the market clearing 
mechanisms is not a country-specific phenomenon. 
This thesis makes several contributions. First it contributes to the literature about the 
determinants of mutual fund exits. It shows that although poor performance is a crucial 
determinant of fund exits during the non-GFC times, it could not force badly performing funds 
out of the market during the GFC. In addition, this thesis fills the gap in the U.K. mutual fund 
research on the determinants of fund exits. The impact of fund performance on the probability 
of fund exits becomes stronger as the U.K. mutual fund industry grows more competitive. 
Second, the thesis deepens the understanding of the changes in companies’ profit-maximization 
strategies in different times, and the adverse impacts of the GFC on business environment and 
business ethics. Fund-families sticking to the profit-maximizing strategy may erode their 
shareholders’ interests under such extreme market conditions as the GFC. In other words, the 
conflicts of interest of fund-families and shareholders intensifies during the GFC, which calls 
for stricter regulations on fund-families’ unethical behaviours in hard times. 
Third, the thesis adds to the organisation studies literature by investigating how the industry 
structure affects the market clearing mechanisms in the U.K. mutual fund industry. The 
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evidence that the market clearing mechanisms are effective only in competitive sectors 
confirms the importance of market competition in exiting poor-quality products out of the 
market. 
Fourth, the thesis contributes to the literature regarding the role of independent directors in 
representing shareholders’ interests. The thesis, for the first time, investigates the effects of 
board characteristics on fund exit decisions under different market conditions. Fund boards’ 
effect on fund exit decisions varies in different times, which can be explained by directors’ 
different extents of concerns about their own remuneration and by fund-families’ changing exit 
policy over time. The thesis proposes another side of agency problems-the conflicts of interest 




A. Numbers of fund exits per annum (Chapter 2) 
Table A2-1. The number of fund exits per annum. The numbers of fund exits were counted after manually 
searching for the exit form of unclassified funds and before screening for the funds with incomplete return 
history59. 
Year  Liquidation WFM AFM Unclassified merger Unclassified exit Total 
2000  138 201 62 7 21 429 
2001  119 206 114 16 49 504 
2002  191 233 78 9 30 541 
2003  163 261 46 7 17 494 
2004  183 149 53 2 28 415 
2005  154 232 92 6 31 515 
2006  118 215 35 9 35 412 
2007  116 275 52 12 28 483 
2008  232 236 46 33 103 650 
2009  338 374 26 43 164 945 
2010  181 198 39 25 121 564 
2011  158 337 15 2 44 556 
2012  366 264 29 4 70 733 
2013  342 159 9 8 70 588 
2014  400 194 9 4 83 690 

















59 See Section 2.3. 
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B. Numbers of funds in each investment objective (Chapter 2)  
Table A2-2. The numbers of funds in each of the 56 investment objectives. The investment objective was defined and 
provided by CRSP.  
 Surviving funds Exit funds Total 
EDCI 42 24 66 
EDCL 54 59 113 
EDCM 365 292 657 
EDCS 575 421 996 
EDSA 18 19 37 
EDSC 115 22 137 
EDSF 54 34 88 
EDSG 58 21 79 
EDSH 49 61 110 
EDSI 42 11 53 
EDSM 27 10 37 
EDSN 53 15 68 
EDSR 99 55 154 
EDSS 27 8 35 
EDST 74 127 201 
EDSU 31 29 60 
EDYB 879 519 1,398 
EDYG 1,336 1,119 2,455 
EDYH 445 130 575 
EDYI 207 81 288 
EDYS 106 50 156 
Domestic equity funds 4656 3107 7763 
EF 954 556 1,510 
EFCS 100 29 129 
EFRE 76 86 162 
EFRI 15 4 19 
EFRJ 24 26 50 
EFRL 30 32 62 
EFRM 351 110 461 
EFRP 22 34 56 
EFRQ 55 17 72 
EFRX 40 50 90 
EFSF 17 14 31 
EFSH 16 11 27 
EFSI 39 1 40 
EFSN 68 20 88 
EFSR 86 21 107 
EFST 17 15 32 
Foreign equity funds 1910 1026 2936 
I 975 477 1,452 
ICQH 21 62 83 
ICQY 89 32 121 
IF 259 101 360 
IG 72 63 135 
IGD 12 17 29 
IGDI 23 38 61 
IGDS 63 33 96 
IGT 90 19 109 
IM 387 304 691 
IMM 83 65 148 
IU 511 482 993 
IUI 183 141 324 
IUS 39 16 55 
Fixed-income funds 2807 1850 4657 
M 1,059 512 1,571 
MT 0 42 42 
Mixed funds 1,059 554 1,613 
O 284 12 296 
OC 35 7 42 
OM 136 44 180 
Other funds 455 63 518 
Total 10,887 6,600 17,487 
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C. Matching statistics for nearest-neighbour matching (NNM) (Chapter 2) 
Table A2-3. Matching statistics (‘bad’ matching statistics are in bold) for Nearest-Neighbour Matching (NNM) by Size, Age, and Investment objective. The surviving 
sample definition: plus six months.  
All exits                 
 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio 
 Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched 
size -0.955 -0.053 0.650 1.053 -0.804 -0.043 0.714 1.057 -0.834 -0.033 0.834 1.057 -1.175 -0.049 0.997 1.062 
age -0.475 0.009 0.600 1.029 -0.167 -0.010 0.573 1.021 -0.222 0.002 1.034 0.976 -0.162 -0.008 0.938 1.014 
Number of matched/unmatched 
funds 
1,027/0 1,145/0 428/0 1,905/4 
Liquidations                 
 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio 
 Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched 
size -1.411 -0.068 0.491 1.038 -1.207 -0.074 0.638 1.069 -0.976 -0.015 0.844 1.016 -1.495 -0.068 0.763 1.057 
age -0.798 0.004 0.571 1.099 -0.383 -0.007 0.564 1.069 -0.544 0.010 1.229 0.935 -0.581 -0.014 0.885 1.022 
Number of matched/unmatched 
funds 
397/0 467/0 182/0 964/3 
Within-family mergers                 
 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio 
 Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched 
size -0.717 -0.051 0.625 1.066 -0.559 -0.025 0.626 1.031 -0.734 -0.049 0.806 1.105 -0.909 -0.035 1.128 1.062 
age -0.283 0.012 0.538 0.987 -0.020 -0.013 0.539 0.992 0.037 -0.004 0.738 1.024 0.283 -0.002 0.652 0.996 
Number of matched/unmatched 
funds 






Table A2-4. Matching statistics (‘bad’ matching statistics are in bold) for Nearest-Neighbour Matching (NNM) by Size, Age, Investment objective and Fund-family. The 
surviving sample definition: plus six months. 
All exits 
 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio 
 Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched 
size -0.955 -0.558 0.650 1.188 -0.804 -0.498 0.714 1.331 -0.834 -0.445 0.834 1.112 -1.175 -0.600 0.997 1.281 
age -0.475 -0.094 0.600 1.004 -0.167 -0.071 0.573 0.876 -0.222 -0.151 1.034 1.064 -0.162 -0.157 0.938 1.016 
Number of matched/unmatched 
funds 
590/437 740/405 266/163 1,468/441 
Liquidations 
 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio 
 Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched 
size -1.425 -0.906 0.497 0.837 -1.226 -0.896 0.642 1.190 -0.968 -0.585 0.867 1.089 -1.515 -0.769 0.782 0.978 
age -0.816 -0.410 0.583 1.056 -0.401 -0.226 0.575 0.864 -0.518 -0.225 1.192 1.073 -0.603 -0.226 0.909 0.816 
Number of matched/unmatched 
funds 
161/236 227/240 77/105 635/332 
Within-family mergers 
 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio 
 Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched 
size -0.729 -0.462 0.625 1.180 -0.575 -0.335 0.633 1.189 -0.750 -0.392 0.816 1.092 -0.926 -0.508 1.147 1.447 
age -0.302 0.013 0.548 0.847 -0.039 -0.004 0.549 0.818 0.015 -0.121 0.758 1.033 0.264 -0.115 0.670 1.167 
Number of matched/unmatched 
funds 










Table A2-5. Matching statistics (‘bad’ matching statistics are in bold) for PSM-NNM by Size, Age, and Investment objective. The surviving sample definition: plus six 
months.  
All exits                 
 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio 
 Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched 
size -0.955 -0.046 0.650 1.033 -0.804 0.001 0.714 1.007 -0.834 -0.031 0.834 1.048 -1.175 -0.079 0.997 0.945 
age -0.475 0.285 0.600 0.878 -0.167 0.080 0.573 0.700 -0.222 -0.063 1.034 1.104 -0.162 -0.127 0.938 0.946 
Number of matched/unmatched funds 1,027/0 1,145/0 428/0 1,905/4 
Liquidations                 
 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio 
 Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched 
size -1.411 -0.084 0.491 1.004 -1.207 -0.021 0.638 1.012 -0.976 -0.037 0.844 0.979 -1.495 -0.035 0.763 0.985 
age -0.798 0.247 0.571 1.069 -0.383 0.115 0.564 0.763 -0.544 0.107 1.229 1.185 -0.581 -0.107 0.885 0.849 
Number of matched/unmatched funds 397/0 467/0 182/0 964/3 
Within-family mergers                 
 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio 
 Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched 
size -0.729 -0.004 0.625 1.054 -0.575 0.029 0.633 0.953 -0.750 -0.098 0.816 0.946 -0.926 -0.090 1.147 0.980 
age -0.302 0.311 0.548 0.742 -0.039 0.087 0.549 0.676 0.015 -0.147 0.758 0.765 0.264 -0.086 0.670 0.746 






Table A2-6. Matching statistics (‘bad’ matching statistics are in bold) for PSM-NNM by Size, Age, Investment objective and Fund-family. The surviving sample 
definition: plus six months. 
All exits 
 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio 
 Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched 
size -0.955 -0.498 0.650 1.226 -0.804 -0.424 0.714 1.399 -0.834 -0.409 0.834 1.182 -1.175 -0.584 0.997 1.281 
age -0.475 0.018 0.600 0.759 -0.167 -0.023 0.573 0.639 -0.222 -0.149 1.034 0.850 -0.162 -0.154 0.938 0.846 
Number of matched/unmatched 
funds 
590/437 740/405 266/163 1,468/441 
Liquidations 
 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio 
 Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched 
size -1.425 -0.805 0.497 0.855 -1.226 -0.834 0.642 1.234 -0.968 -0.537 0.867 1.173 -1.515 -0.710 0.782 1.085 
age -0.816 -0.192 0.583 0.751 -0.401 -0.162 0.575 0.722 -0.518 -0.105 1.192 1.090 -0.603 -0.208 0.909 0.725 
Number of matched/unmatched 
funds 
161/236 227/240 77/105 635/332 
Within-family mergers 
 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio 
 Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched 
size -0.729 -0.360 0.625 1.236 -0.575 -0.264 0.633 1.222 -0.750 -0.449 0.816  0.995 -0.926 -0.475 1.147 1.286 
age -0.302 0.138 0.548 0.650 -0.039 0.025 0.549 0.587 0.015 -0.304 0.758 0.724 0.264 -0.078 0.670 0.843 
Number of matched/unmatched 
funds 






Table A2-7. Matching statistics (‘bad’ matching statistics are in bold) for PSM-K by Size, Age, and Investment objective. The surviving sample definition: plus six 
months.  
All exits                 
 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio 
 Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched 
size -0.955 -0.044 0.650 0.959 -0.804 0.013 0.714 0.929 -0.834 -0.015 0.834 0.958 -1.175 -0.160 0.997 0.767 
age -0.475 0.283 0.600 0.831 -0.167 0.105 0.573 0.712 -0.222 0.013 1.034 0.991 -0.162 -0.128 0.938 0.915 
Number of matched/unmatched funds 935/92 1,053/92 393/35 1,736/173 
Liquidations                 
 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio 
 Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched 
size -1.411 -0.170 0.491 0.746 -1.207 -0.038 0.638 0.821 -0.976 -0.112 0.844 0.819 -1.495 -0.093 0.763 0.786 
age -0.798 0.208 0.571 0.938 -0.383 0.137 0.564 0.756 -0.544 0.130 1.229 1.089 -0.581 -0.162 0.885 0.812 
Number of matched/unmatched funds 370/27 422/45 165/17 880/87 
Within-family mergers                 
 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio 
 Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched 
size -0.729 0.006 0.625 0.984 -0.575 0.015 0.633 0.894 -0.750 -0.072 0.816 0.992 -0.926 -0.099 1.147 0.836 
age -0.302 0.289 0.548 0.765 -0.039 0.042 0.549 0.648 0.015 -0.116 0.758 0.844 0.264 -0.024 0.670 0.731 





Table A2-8. Matching statistics (‘bad’ matching statistics are in bold) for PSM-K by Size, Age, Investment objective and Fund-family. The surviving sample definition: 
plus six months. 
All exits 
 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio 
 Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched 
size -0.955 -0.710 0.650 0.844 -0.804 -0.546 0.714 0.827 -0.834 -0.603 0.834 0.789 -1.175 -0.815 0.997 0.957 
age -0.475 -0.151 0.600 0.653 -0.167 -0.080 0.573 0.639 -0.222 -0.168 1.034 0.903 -0.162 -0.146 0.938 0.887 
Number of matched/unmatched funds 554/473 668/457 249/179 1,388/521 
Liquidations 
 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio 
 Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched 
size -1.411 -1.261 0.491 0.680 -1.207 -1.308 0.638 1.041 -0.976 -0.800 0.844      1.030 -1.495 -1.132 0.763 0.810 
age -0.798 0.527 0.571 0.578 -0.383 -0.451 0.564 0.644 -0.544 -0.195 1.229 1.064 -0.581 -0.345 0.885 0.738 
Number of matched/unmatched funds 158/239 226/241 75/107 620/347 
Within-family mergers 
 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio Standardized diff Variance ratio 
 Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched 
size -0.729 -0.546 0.625 0.826 -0.575 -0.322 0.633 0.805 -0.750 -0.599 0.816 0.813 -0.926 -0.626 1.147 0.973 
age -0.302 -0.020 0.548 0.593 -0.039 0.025 0.549 0.574 0.015 -0.240 0.758 0.892 0.264 -0.008 0.670 0.830 
Number of matched/unmatched funds 408/222 485/193 178/69 777/165 
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D. Quarterly logit regressions clustered by funds (Chapter 2) 
Table A2-9. Marginal effects of logit regression clustered by funds. The dependent variable is equal to one for every quarter for funds that exited within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal 
to zero for every quarter for funds that have not exited the market before the end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns. The surviving funds are requested to remain operational for at least 6 months 
following the end of the corresponding period (Panel A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B) Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3–month returns/flows. Age is the 
number of years in operation till the end–month of current quarter. Size, family size and family size are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. *** - 1% statistical 
significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
  1/2000-12/2014   1/2000–3/2003   4/2003–8/2007   9/2007–3/2009   4/2009–12/2014 
 Panel A. plus six months  
Returns -0.077***  -0.078***  -0.124***  0.074***  -0.038*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Flows -0.248***  -0.132***  -0.172***  -0.076***  -0.189*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.059***  -0.028***  -0.024***  -0.012***  -0.037*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.021***  0.011*  0.020***  0.008***  0.012*** 
 (0.000)  (0.058)  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.004) 
Turnover 0.008***  0.004*  -0.002  0.004***  0.003 
 (0.002)  (0.092)  (0.310)  (0.007)  (0.219) 
FF–size -0.002  -0.010***  -0.005***  -0.004***  0.001 
 (0.221)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.577) 
FF–spec -0.089***  -0.091***  -0.043*  -0.010  0.022 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.065)  (0.460)  (0.233) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 393,919  56,843  105,714  32,609  183,292 
Clusters 14,676  6,344  7,791  7,363  11,508 
r2_p 0.234  0.189  0.169  0.169  0.226 
LL 
-171960   -14166   -27680   -4392   -54579 
Panel  B. plus zero month 
Returns -0.076***  -0.075***  -0.115***  0.072***  -0.037*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Flows -0.241***  -0.128***  -0.168***  -0.073***  -0.179*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.057***  -0.027***  -0.024***  -0.011***  -0.035*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.020***  0.010*  0.019***  0.008***  0.010** 
 (0.000)  (0.092)  (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.017) 
Turnover 0.006**  0.003  -0.002  0.004***  0.001 
 (0.016)  (0.168)  (0.245)  (0.005)  (0.674) 
FF–size -0.003*  -0.010***  -0.005***  -0.003***  -0.000 
 (0.062)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.972) 
FF–spec -0.084***  -0.091***  -0.042*  -0.003  0.019 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.069)  (0.816)  (0.291) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 403,050  57,992  107,552  34,015  188,291 
Clusters 14,964  6,495  7,929  7,682  11,794 
r2_p 0.227  0.182  0.166  0.157  0.216 




Table A2-10. Marginal effects of logit regression clustered by funds after matching by Age, Size, investment style (Panel A), and by Age, Size, fund-family, and investment style (Panel B). The dependent variable is 
equal to one for every quarter for funds that exited within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for funds that have not exited the market for at least six months 
beyond end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns. Quarterly data.  Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3–month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till the end–
month of current quarter. Size, family size and family size are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. P–values in brackets.  *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% 
statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000–3/2003   4/2003–8/2007   9/2007–3/2009   4/2009–12/2014 
 Panel A. NNM on Size, Age, and investment style 
Returns -0.102***  –0.194***  –0.333***  –0.105  –0.073** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.633)  (0.007) 
Flows -0.219***  –0.336***  –0.453***  –0.502***  –0.348*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.012***  –0.002  0.007**  –0.009  –0.008** 
 (0.001)  (0.844)  (0.374)  (0.404)  (0.129) 
Age -0.032**  –0.002  –0.003***  –0.000  –0.002** 
 (0.057)  (0.558)  (0.198)  (0.902)  (0.112) 
Turnover 0.017***  0.017  0.002  0.012  0.014 
 (0.006)  (0.160)  (0.901)  (0.567)  (0.147) 
FF–size 0.008**  –0.018**  –0.007  –0.016  0.017*** 
 (0.048)  (0.012)  (0.388)  (0.338)  (0.004) 
FF–Spec 0.003  –0.245  –0.057  –0.036  0.223** 
 (0.888)  (0.019)  (0.592)  (0.909)  (0.004) 
Time & IS dummies    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 109963  9324  13823  1475  27034 
Clusters 6095  1625  1667  491  2734 
Pseudo R2 0.0181  0.0264  0.0193  0.0412  0.0232 
LL -72440   –6256   –9368   –979.1   –18066 
 Panel B. NNM on Size, Age, investment style, and fund-family 
Returns -0.075***  –0.164***  –0.260***  0.465**  –0.025 
 (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.093)  (0.368) 
Flows -0.223***  –0.376***  –0.415***  –0.414***  –0.381*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000) 
Size -0.055***  –0.061***  –0.051***  –0.072***  –0.059*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.004  0.001  –0.001  0.002  –0.001 
 (0.151)  (0.654)  (0.774)  (0.778)  (0.613) 
Turnover 0.012***  0.009  –0.021  0.006  0.001 
 (0.124)  (0.528)  (0.233)  (0.822)  (0.914) 
FF–size 0.029***  0.021***  0.011  –0.028*  0.030*** 
 (0.000)  (0.135)  (0.422)  (0.357)  (0.000) 
FF–Spec 0.096**  –0.046  –0.087  –0.240  0.189*** 
 (0.267)  (0.831)  (0.693)  (0.615)  (0.090) 
Time & IS dummies                                               Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 84,758  5515  9640  957  21792 
Clusters 4068  919  1052  305  2050 
Pseudo R2 0.061  0.063  0.049  0.076  0.09 




Table A2-11. Marginal effects of logit regression clustered by funds after matching by Age, Size, investment style (Panel A), and by Age, Size, fund-family, and investment style (Panel B). The dependent variable is 
equal to one for every quarter for funds that exited within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for funds that have not exited the market at the end of the periods as 
specified at the top of the columns. Quarterly data.  Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3–month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till the end–month of current quarter. Size, 
family size and family size are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. P–values in brackets.  *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% 
statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000–3/2003   4/2003–8/2007   9/2007–3/2009   4/2009–12/2014 
 Panel A. NNM on Size, Age, and investment style 
Returns -0.101***  -0.172***  -0.313***  -0.143  -0.065** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.402)  (0.016) 
Flows -0.207***  -0.333***  -0.441***  -0.502***  -0.331*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.012***  -0.002  0.006  -0.008  -0.008 
 (0.001)  (0.844)  (0.439)  (0.573)  (0.135) 
Age -0.002*  -0.001  -0.003  -0.001  -0.002 
 (0.058)  (0.709)  (0.249)  (0.904)  (0.104) 
Turnover 0.010*  0.012  -0.001  0.021  0.008 
 (0.087)  (0.320)  (0.942)  (0.305)  (0.373) 
FF–size 0.005  -0.018**  -0.005  -0.020  0.013** 
 (0.224)  (0.011)  (0.569)  (0.201)  (0.031) 
FF–Spec -0.004  -0.254**  0.001  -0.047  0.174** 
 (0.950)  (0.015)  (0.991)  (0.834)  (0.026) 
Time & IS dummies    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 110,705  9,406  13,842  1,482  27,033 
Clusters 6129  1644  1675  493  2744 
Pseudo R2 0.016  0.0249  0.0184  0.042  0.0206 
LL -73270   -6328   -9391   -983.2   -18113 
 Panel B. NNM on Size, Age, investment style, and fund-family 
Returns -0.075***  -0.154***  -0.272***  0.474*  -0.024 
 (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.000)  (0.083)  (0.385) 
Flows -0.216***  -0.369***  -0.418***  -0.398***  -0.367*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.000) 
Size -0.056***  -0.058***  -0.050***  -0.071***  -0.058*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.002  0.001  -0.001  0.001  -0.001 
 (0.145)  (0.724)  (0.621)  (0.836)  (0.596) 
Turnover 0.010  0.008  -0.019  0.004  -0.000 
 (0.184)  (0.591)  (0.269)  (0.873)  (0.973) 
FF–size 0.029***  0.021  0.011  -0.030  0.030*** 
 (0.000)  (0.134)  (0.422)  (0.324)  (0.000) 
FF–Spec 0.110  -0.044  -0.037  -0.278  0.175 
 (0.247)  (0.833)  (0.858)  (0.560)  (0.115) 
Time & IS dummies                                         Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 85,176  5,544  9,750  956  21,952 
Clusters 4094  932  1064  305  2067 
Pseudo R2 0.0585  0.058  0.0478  0.0753  0.0861 
LL -53822   -3574   -6364   -607.3   -13559 
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Table A2-12. Marginal effects of logit regression clustered by funds. The dependent variable is equal to one for every quarter for funds that exited within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal 
to zero for every quarter for funds that have not exited for at least 6 months after the end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns. Panel A:   mergers; Panel B: liquidations. P-values in brackets.  *** - 
1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
  1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Panel A. Within-family mergers 
Returns -0.060***  -0.062***  -0.093***  0.060***  -0.007* 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.074) 
Flows -0.177***  -0.090***  -0.114***  -0.047***  -0.105*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.046***  -0.019***  -0.018***  -0.007***  -0.021*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.045***  0.018***  0.025***  0.009***  0.032*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Turnover 0.006***  0.004**  -0.001  -0.001  -0.000 
 (0.009)  (0.037)  (0.434)  (0.463)  (0.923) 
FF-size 0.007***  0.001  0.003*  -0.000  0.004*** 
 (0.000)  (0.534)  (0.092)  (0.667)  (0.001) 
FF-spec -0.155***  -0.056*  -0.144***  -0.032*  -0.009 
 (0.000)  (0.056)  (0.000)  (0.054)  (0.587) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 354,697  54,313  101,701  30,529  168,822 
Clusters 12273  5922  7238  6866  10215 
Pseudo R2 0.236  0.135  0.142  0.15  0.215 
LL -128367   -10944   -22474   -2858   -32922 
 Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns -0.042***  -0.027***  -0.049***  0.025***  -0.033*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Flows -0.144***  -0.052***  -0.059***  -0.036***  -0.116*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.035***  -0.012***  -0.008***  -0.007***  -0.024*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age -0.014***  -0.010**  -0.006**  0.001  -0.010*** 
 (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.050)  (0.638)  (0.002) 
Turnover 0.003  0.001  -0.001  0.003***  0.003 
 (0.104)  (0.487)  (0.208)  (0.000)  (0.123) 
FF-size -0.011***  -0.011***  -0.007***  -0.003***  -0.003*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.009) 
FF-spec -0.036**  -0.055***  0.007  0.000  0.012 
 (0.028)  (0.000)  (0.447)  (0.983)  (0.376) 
Time & IS dummies                                             Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 329,556  52,579  97,355  30,121  171,519 
Clusters 11460  5651  6856  6767  10253 
Pseudo R2 0.247  0.332  0.31  0.219  0.239 





Table A2-13. Marginal effects of logit regression clustered by funds. The dependent variable is equal to one for every quarter for funds that exited within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal 
to zero for every quarter for funds that have not exited the market at the end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns. Panel A:   mergers; Panel B: liquidations. P-values in brackets.  *** - 1% statistical 
significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Panel A. Within-family mergers 
Returns -0.060***  -0.059***  -0.088***  0.058***  -0.008* 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.060) 
Flows -0.171***  -0.087***  -0.111***  -0.045***  -0.098*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.044***  -0.018***  -0.018***  -0.006***  -0.020*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.044***  0.017***  0.024***  0.009***  0.030*** 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Turnover 0.005**  0.004*  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001 
 (0.043)  (0.063)  (0.377)  (0.523)  (0.458) 
FF-size 0.006***  0.001  0.003*  -0.000  0.003*** 
 (0.001)  (0.484)  (0.070)  (0.964)  (0.005) 
FF-spec -0.144***  -0.056*  -0.141***  -0.027*  -0.009 
 (0.000)  (0.057)  (0.000)  (0.090)  (0.571) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 363,818  55,457  103,488  31,884  173,811 
Clusters 12561  6072  7371  7172  10501 
Pseudo R2 0.229  0.13  0.14  0.141  0.207 
LL -130907   -11069   -22640   -2917   -33563 
 Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns -0.041***  -0.026***  -0.043***  0.025***  -0.032*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Flows -0.141***  -0.050***  -0.059***  -0.035***  -0.111*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.033***  -0.011***  -0.008***  -0.006***  -0.023*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age -0.015***  -0.010***  -0.006**  0.001  -0.011*** 
 (0.000)  (0.006)  (0.030)  (0.571)  (0.000) 
Turnover 0.002  0.001  -0.002  0.003***  0.002 
 (0.270)  (0.649)  (0.151)  (0.000)  (0.338) 
FF-size -0.012***  -0.011***  -0.007***  -0.003***  -0.003*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002) 
FF-spec -0.034**  -0.055***  0.006  0.003  0.010 
 (0.032)  (0.000)  (0.472)  (0.668)  (0.438) 
Time & IS dummies                                             Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 338,687  53,716  99,175  31,464  176,518 
Clusters 11748  5801  6993  7075  10539 
Pseudo R2 0.239  0.322  0.306  0.206  0.229 




Table A2-14. Marginal effects of logit regression clustered by funds after matching for Age, Size and investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every quarter for funds that were merged (Panel 
A) and liquidated (Panel B) within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for funds that have not exited the market for at least 6 months after the end of the periods 
as specified at the top of the columns. Quarterly data.  Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3-month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till the end-month of current quarter. 
Size, family size and family size are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 
10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Panel A. Within-family mergers 
Returns -0.084***   -0.219***   -0.317***   -0.079   -0.066* 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.920)  (0.051) 
Flows -0.174***  -0.330***  -0.383***  -0.428**  -0.390*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.022)  (0.000) 
Size -0.011**  -0.007  0.002  0.005  -0.007 
 (0.010)  (0.526)  (0.877)  (0.952)  (0.285) 
Age -0.030  0.000  -0.002  0.001  -0.002 
 (0.213)  (0.909)  (0.445)  (0.755)  (0.336) 
Turnover 0.014*  0.030  0.013  -0.057*  -0.006 
 (0.092)  (0.105)  (0.472)  (0.084)  (0.679) 
FF-size 0.025***  0.021**  0.023**  -0.003  0.026*** 
 (0.000)  (0.038)  (0.041)  (0.935)  (0.004) 
FF-spec -0.161*  -0.131  -0.453***  -0.347  0.271** 
 (0.077)  (0.377)  (0.009)  (0.483)  (0.047) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 74,575  6,231  9,872  891  14,180 
Clusters 3791  1070  1089  298  1528 
r2_p 0.0241  0.0311  0.0384  0.0358  0.0226 
ll -49631   -4175   -6567   -594.3   -9563 
 Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns -0.108***   -0.138**   -0.345***   -0.091   -0.097** 
 (0.000)  (0.020)  (0.001)  (0.646)  (0.010) 
Flows -0.238***  -0.298***  -0.482***  -0.535***  -0.306*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size 0.004  0.009  0.013  -0.036  0.005 
 (0.518)  (0.503)  (0.317)  (0.131)  (0.479) 
Age -0.030  -0.008  -0.006  0.001  -0.003 
 (0.172)  (0.230)  (0.191)  (0.899)  (0.268) 
Turnover 0.016*  0.023  -0.028*  0.046*  0.032** 
 (0.057)  (0.111)  (0.071)  (0.084)  (0.016) 
FF-size -0.012*  -0.065***  -0.048***  -0.033  0.007 
 (0.059)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.139)  (0.360) 
FF-spec 0.047  -0.328**  0.134  0.038  0.162 
 (0.531)  (0.031)  (0.393)  (0.903)  (0.103) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 41,156  3,441  4,198  584  13,803 
Clusters 2718  635  627  194  1316 
r2_p 0.0268  0.0978  0.11  0.102  0.0297 




Table A2-15. Marginal effects of logit regression clustered by funds after matching for Age, Size and investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every quarter for funds that were merged (Panel 
A) and liquidated (Panel B) within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for funds that have not exited the market at the end of the periods as specified at the top of 
the columns. Quarterly data.  Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3-month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till the end-month of current quarter. Size, family size and family 
size are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Panel A. Within-family mergers 
Returns -0.083***  -0.195***  -0.278***  -0.104  -0.066* 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.710)  (0.053) 
Flows -0.159***  -0.335***  -0.380***  -0.379**  -0.349*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.021)  (0.000) 
Size -0.012**  -0.008  0.001  0.002  -0.009 
 (0.013)  (0.413)  (0.935)  (0.920)  (0.190) 
Age -0.002  -0.000  -0.002  0.000  -0.001 
 (0.224)  (0.927)  (0.471)  (0.979)  (0.354) 
Turnover 0.007  0.026  0.010  -0.051  -0.010 
 (0.409)  (0.124)  (0.555)  (0.115)  (0.474) 
FF-size 0.025***  0.022**  0.024**  -0.007  0.025*** 
 (0.000)  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.790)  (0.005) 
FF-spec -0.130  -0.135  -0.399**  -0.209  0.232* 
 (0.133)  (0.350)  (0.022)  (0.635)  (0.083) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 75,005  6,260  9,843  891  14,101 
Clusters 3812  1075  1089  300  1526 
r2_p 0.0208  0.0311  0.0341  0.0261  0.0205 
ll -50157   -4196   -6575   -600.2   -9524 
 Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns -0.100***  -0.098*  -0.362***  -0.083  -0.081** 
 (0.000)  (0.086)  (0.001)  (0.659)  (0.036) 
Flows -0.235***  -0.278***  -0.473***  -0.603***  -0.303*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size 0.005  0.010  0.010  -0.032  0.006 
 (0.396)  (0.454)  (0.419)  (0.185)  (0.427) 
Age -0.003  -0.003  -0.006  0.001  -0.004 
 (0.149)  (0.709)  (0.202)  (0.922)  (0.252) 
Turnover 0.011  0.013  -0.029*  0.060**  0.027** 
 (0.184)  (0.408)  (0.061)  (0.017)  (0.033) 
FF-size -0.020***  -0.069***  -0.045***  -0.039*  0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.084)  (0.889) 
FF-spec -0.015  -0.361**  0.184  -0.040  0.091 
 (0.851)  (0.012)  (0.250)  (0.896)  (0.361) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 41,375  3,471  4,225  587  13,770 
Clusters 2728  647  632  194  1314 
r2_p 0.0286  0.104  0.108  0.115  0.0276 




Table A2-16. Marginal effects of logit regression clustered by funds after matching for Age, Size, investment objectives and fund-family. The dependent variable is equal to one for every quarter for funds that were 
merged (Panel A) and liquidated (Panel B) within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for funds that have not exited the market for at least 6 months after the end 
of the periods as specified at the top of the columns. Quarterly data.  Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3-month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till the end-month of 
current quarter. Size, family size and family size are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical 
significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Panel A. Within-family mergers 
Returns -0.076***   -0.132**   -0.257***   0.342   -0.060 
 (0.000)  (0.028)  (0.002)  (0.288)  (0.104) 
Flows -0.195***  -0.438***  -0.377***  -0.337**  -0.456*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.035)  (0.000) 
Size -0.049***  -0.064***  -0.048***  -0.040*  -0.050*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.084)  (0.000) 
Age 0.020**  0.001  -0.001  -0.005  0.001 
 (0.023)  (0.684)  (0.785)  (0.577)  (0.696) 
Turnover 0.018*  0.015  -0.009  0.048  0.015 
 (0.078)  (0.480)  (0.668)  (0.352)  (0.367) 
FF-size 0.029***  0.029*  0.002  -0.017  0.031*** 
 (0.000)  (0.084)  (0.908)  (0.727)  (0.003) 
FF-Spec 0.099  0.047  -0.166  -0.295  0.226 
 (0.383)  (0.860)  (0.505)  (0.677)  (0.151) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 60,331  4,196  7,784  636  12,136 
Clusters 2779  694  786  214  1252 
Pseudo R2 0.0447  0.062  0.0412  0.0417  0.0595 
LL -38693   -2,684   -5,098   -421   -7,748 
 Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns -0.049**   -0.155   -0.353**   0.717*   0.000 
 (0.015)  (0.150)  (0.019)  (0.084)  (0.994) 
Flows -0.279***  -0.285***  -0.577***  -0.702***  -0.345*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.071***  -0.084***  -0.076***  -0.124***  -0.072*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age -0.073***  -0.005  -0.017  0.006  -0.009*** 
 (0.001)  (0.620)  (0.282)  (0.606)  (0.005) 
Turnover 0.006  -0.002  -0.041  0.000  -0.002 
 (0.565)  (0.918)  (0.126)  (0.997)  (0.909) 
FF-size 0.014  -0.037  -0.008  -0.013  0.015 
 (0.195)  (0.162)  (0.758)  (0.793)  (0.178) 
FF-Spec 0.043  -0.248  -0.241  0.512  -0.015 
 (0.853)  (0.487)  (0.580)  (0.586)  (0.927) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 26,814  1,382  1,920  323  9,879 
Clusters 1438  243  277  92  836 
Pseudo R2 0.125  0.128  0.154  0.221  0.151 




Table A2-17. Marginal effects of logit regression clustered by funds after matching for Age, Size, investment objectives and fund-family. The dependent variable is equal to one for every quarter for funds that were 
merged (Panel A) and liquidated (Panel B) within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for funds that have not exited the market at the end of the periods as specified 
at the top of the columns. Quarterly data.  Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3-month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till the end-month of current quarter. Size, family size 
and family size are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical 
significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Panel A. Within-family mergers 
Returns -0.071***  -0.127**  -0.270***  0.364  -0.053 
 (0.000)  (0.043)  (0.001)  (0.254)  (0.147) 
Flows -0.193***  -0.429***  -0.383***  -0.332**  -0.443*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.036)  (0.000) 
Size -0.051***  -0.058***  -0.048***  -0.039  -0.050*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.102)  (0.000) 
Age 0.003**  0.001  -0.001  -0.006  0.001 
 (0.014)  (0.786)  (0.645)  (0.545)  (0.528) 
Turnover 0.013  0.011  -0.010  0.036  0.007 
 (0.173)  (0.605)  (0.652)  (0.489)  (0.670) 
FF-size 0.030***  0.028*  0.002  -0.019  0.033*** 
 (0.000)  (0.094)  (0.884)  (0.687)  (0.001) 
FF-Spec 0.123  0.050  -0.157  -0.347  0.240 
 (0.315)  (0.846)  (0.504)  (0.624)  (0.124) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 60,527  4,203  7,820  635  12,187 
Clusters 2795  703  790  214  1260 
Pseudo R2 0.0448  0.0549  0.0408  0.0413  0.0568 
LL -38861   -2709   -5128   -420.4   -7812 
 Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns -0.058**  -0.146  -0.411***  0.711*  0.001 
 (0.012)  (0.160)  (0.008)  (0.087)  (0.987) 
Flows -0.276***  -0.284***  -0.554***  -0.650***  -0.335*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.067***  -0.085***  -0.075***  -0.123***  -0.070*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age -0.010***  -0.003  -0.015  0.007  -0.010*** 
 (0.000)  (0.714)  (0.270)  (0.578)  (0.001) 
Turnover 0.007  0.000  -0.036  0.001  0.000 
 (0.538)  (0.998)  (0.162)  (0.963)  (0.980) 
FF-size 0.012  -0.030  -0.005  -0.014  0.013 
 (0.250)  (0.243)  (0.834)  (0.783)  (0.240) 
FF-Spec 0.018  -0.231  -0.051  0.480  -0.086 
 (0.903)  (0.518)  (0.894)  (0.617)  (0.596) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 27,006  1,404  1,995  323  9,993 
Clusters 1446  247  286  92  843 
Pseudo R2 0.121  0.123  0.14  0.216  0.149 




E. Monthly logit regressions clustered by investment objectives (Chapter 2) 
Table A2-18. Marginal effects of monthly logit regression clustered by investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every month for funds that exited within the window specified at the top of 
the columns, and it is equal to zero for every month for funds that have not exited the market before the end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns. The surviving funds are requested to remain operational 
for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding period (Panel A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B)  *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 
10% statistical significance 
  1/2000-12/2014   1/2000–3/2003   4/2003–8/2007   9/2007–3/2009   4/2009–12/2014 
 Panel A. plus six months  
Returns -0.075***  -0.066***  -0.115***  0.008  -0.023*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.317)  (0.010) 
Flows -0.277***  -0.126***  -0.190***  -0.073***  -0.180*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.061***  -0.026***  -0.028***  -0.011***  -0.038*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.031***  0.014  0.029***  0.012***  0.018*** 
 (0.000)  (0.114)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Turnover 0.005  0.003  -0.003  0.003*  0.001 
 (0.145)  (0.352)  (0.173)  (0.059)  (0.746) 
FF–size -0.034*  -0.067***  -0.057**  -0.026***  -0.006 
 (0.092)  (0.000)  (0.018)  (0.000)  (0.680) 
FF–spec -0.111***  -0.090**  -0.062  -0.009  -0.005 
 (0.000)  (0.027)  (0.401)  (0.544)  (0.851) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 1,273,268  206,767  337,560  133,437  584,847 
Clusters 58  40  41  42  55 
r2_p 0.225  0.209  0.156  0.178  0.209 
LL 
-563150   -47163   -93938   -16933   -178434 
Panel  B. plus zero month 
Returns -0.076***  -0.062***  -0.100***  0.008  -0.024*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.324)  (0.007) 
Flows -0.270***  -0.122***  -0.184***  -0.070***  -0.173*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.059***  -0.024***  -0.027***  -0.011***  -0.037*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.030***  0.013  0.028***  0.011***  0.016*** 
 (0.000)  (0.126)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.005) 
Turnover 0.003  0.002  -0.003  0.003*  -0.001 
 (0.389)  (0.426)  (0.135)  (0.060)  (0.851) 
FF–size -0.040**  -0.067***  -0.048*  -0.023***  -0.010 
 (0.037)  (0.000)  (0.053)  (0.000)  (0.464) 
FF–spec -0.104***  -0.091**  -0.057  -0.004  -0.007 
 (0.000)  (0.025)  (0.433)  (0.768)  (0.786) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 1,302,183  210,829  344,145  139,080  600,667 
Clusters 58  40  41  42  55 
r2_p 0.218  0.202  0.152  0.168  0.200 






Table A2-19. Marginal effects of monthly logit regression clustered by investment objectives after matching by Age, Size, investment style (Panel A), and by Age, Size, fund-family, and investment style (Panel B). 
The dependent variable is equal to one for every month for funds that exited within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every month for funds that have not exited the market for 
at least six months beyond end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns.  P–values in brackets.  *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000–3/2003   4/2003–8/2007   9/2007–3/2009   4/2009–12/2014 
 Panel A. NNM on Size, Age, and investment style 
Returns -0.110***  -0.180***  -0.340***  -0.126***  -0.084*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.006)  (0.002) 
Flows -0.287***  -0.347***  -0.521***  -0.654***  -0.365*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.017***  0.012**  0.007**  0.003  -0.013*** 
 (0.001)  (0.030)  (0.047)  (0.527)  (0.007) 
Age -0.010  -0.025  -0.032**  -0.006  -0.008 
 (0.180)  (0.162)  (0.012)  (0.674)  (0.448) 
Turnover 0.008  0.009  -0.011  -0.005  0.005 
 (0.287)  (0.560)  (0.211)  (0.822)  (0.646) 
FF–size 0.006  -0.029***  -0.008  -0.028**  0.011* 
 (0.305)  (0.000)  (0.376)  (0.021)  (0.054) 
FF–Spec -0.018  -0.242**  -0.010  0.005  0.136** 
 (0.721)  (0.031)  (0.963)  (0.976)  (0.049) 
Time & IS dummies    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 486,721  28,884  60,970  7,352  125,658 
Clusters 57  39  41  40  55 
Pseudo R2 0.0159  0.0236  0.0111  0.0293  0.0133 
LL -314537   -19406   -41512   -4942   -83960 
 Panel B. NNM on Size, Age, investment style, and fund-family 
Returns -0.084***  -0.116***  -0.333***  0.038  -0.046* 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.767)  (0.061) 
Flows -0.330***  -0.425***  -0.530***  -0.694***  -0.438*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.055***  -0.070***  -0.055***  -0.067***  -0.056*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.023  0.057  0.027  0.023  -0.001 
 (0.110)  (0.235)  (0.226)  (0.553)  (0.942) 
Turnover 0.009*  0.008  -0.012  0.010  0.004 
 (0.054)  (0.654)  (0.467)  (0.628)  (0.560) 
FF–size 0.027***  0.023***  0.010  0.011  0.023*** 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.172)  (0.335)  (0.000) 
FF–Spec 0.102*  -0.059  -0.138  0.147  0.140** 
 (0.070)  (0.501)  (0.233)  (0.358)  (0.037) 
Time & IS dummies                                        Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 377,204  16,518  41,838  4,765  99,399 
Clusters 54  31  36  31  53 
Pseudo R2 0.0598  0.0662  0.0414  0.0675  0.0799 
LL -233045   -10542   -27178   -3055   -61079 
180 
 
Table A2-20. Marginal effects of monthly logit regression clustered by investment objectives after matching by Age, Size, investment style (Panel A), and by Age, Size, fund-family, and investment style (Panel B). 
The dependent variable is equal to one for every month for funds that exited within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every month for funds that have not exited the market at 
the end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns.  P–values in brackets.  *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000–3/2003   4/2003–8/2007   9/2007–3/2009   4/2009–12/2014 
 Panel A. NNM on Size, Age, and investment style 
Returns -0.112***  -0.177***  -0.330***  -0.136***  -0.089*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.001) 
Flows -0.285***  -0.356***  -0.503***  -0.709***  -0.354*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.016***  0.013**  0.006  0.007  -0.012*** 
 (0.001)  (0.016)  (0.106)  (0.248)  (0.005) 
Age -0.012  -0.027  -0.027**  -0.008  -0.012 
 (0.132)  (0.135)  (0.031)  (0.681)  (0.219) 
Turnover 0.004  0.006  -0.012  0.003  0.003 
 (0.549)  (0.676)  (0.146)  (0.899)  (0.762) 
FF–size 0.003  -0.030***  -0.008  -0.026**  0.008 
 (0.592)  (0.000)  (0.353)  (0.047)  (0.150) 
FF–Spec -0.020  -0.222*  -0.001  0.051  0.111* 
 (0.682)  (0.053)  (0.995)  (0.785)  (0.088) 
Time & IS dummies    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 490,403  29,085  61,122  7,451  126,136 
Clusters 57  39  41  40  55 
Pseudo R2 0.0141  0.0245  0.0107  0.0296  0.0120 
LL -318754   -19544   -41646   -5010   -84491 
 Panel B. NNM on Size, Age, investment style, and fund-family 
Returns -0.083***  -0.110***  -0.341***  0.046  -0.047* 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.706)  (0.050) 
Flows -0.326***  -0.417***  -0.546***  -0.672***  -0.422*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.053***  -0.066***  -0.054***  -0.065***  -0.055*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.023  0.057  0.019  0.038  -0.002 
 (0.148)  (0.222)  (0.354)  (0.365)  (0.872) 
Turnover 0.008*  0.007  -0.011  0.010  0.002 
 (0.066)  (0.675)  (0.453)  (0.607)  (0.749) 
FF–size 0.027***  0.023***  0.010  0.007  0.024*** 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.157)  (0.570)  (0.000) 
FF–Spec 0.106**  -0.060  -0.101  0.112  0.139** 
 (0.033)  (0.451)  (0.368)  (0.443)  (0.027) 
Time & IS dummies                                        Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 378,931  16,616  42,333  4,788  99,941 
Clusters 54  31  36  31  53 
Pseudo R2 0.0565  0.0590  0.0405  0.0615  0.0765 





Table A2-21. Marginal effects of monthly logit regression clustered by investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every month for funds that exited within the window specified at the top of 
the columns, and it is equal to zero for every month for funds that have not exited for at least 6 months after the end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns. Panel A:   mergers; Panel B: liquidations. P-
values in brackets.  *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
  1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Panel A. Within-family mergers 
Returns -0.064***  -0.061***  -0.074***  0.016***  0.002 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.010)  (0.651) 
Flows -0.191***  -0.087***  -0.117***  -0.047***  -0.091*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.047***  -0.019***  -0.020***  -0.006***  -0.022*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.052***  0.021**  0.031***  0.010***  0.035*** 
 (0.000)  (0.019)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Turnover 0.003  0.003  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001 
 (0.114)  (0.244)  (0.410)  (0.247)  (0.454) 
FF-size 0.076***  0.002  0.026  -0.006  0.039*** 
 (0.002)  (0.906)  (0.298)  (0.416)  (0.005) 
FF-spec -0.122**  -0.062  -0.130*  -0.024*  -0.001 
 (0.011)  (0.264)  (0.067)  (0.061)  (0.968) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 1,141,322  182,748  324,997  125,445  537,054 
Clusters 50  34  38  33  47 
Pseudo R2 0.231  0.140  0.127  0.158  0.210 
LL -413134   -35962   -74893   -11208   -105763 
 Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns -0.039***  -0.017***  -0.059***  -0.004  -0.025*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.463)  (0.002) 
Flows -0.143***  -0.045***  -0.067***  -0.032***  -0.107*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.036***  -0.011***  -0.011***  -0.006***  -0.025*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age -0.008  -0.007**  -0.001  0.004  -0.007 
 (0.118)  (0.024)  (0.769)  (0.375)  (0.122) 
Turnover 0.002  0.000  -0.002  0.003***  0.002 
 (0.492)  (0.807)  (0.233)  (0.002)  (0.516) 
FF-size -0.086***  -0.057***  -0.049***  -0.016***  -0.026*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.006) 
FF-spec -0.055***  -0.042***  0.011  0.006  -0.008 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.518)  (0.513)  (0.587) 
Time & IS dummies                                             Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 1,068,465  193,366  310,286  123,786  547,208 
Clusters 57  37  39  34  54 
Pseudo R2 0.235  0.320  0.290  0.220  0.218 





Table A2-22. Marginal effects of monthly logit regression clustered by investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every month for funds that exited within the window specified at the top of 
the columns, and it is equal to zero for every month for funds that have not exited at the end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns. Panel A:   mergers; Panel B: liquidations. P-values in brackets.  *** 
- 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
  1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Panel A. Within-family mergers 
Returns -0.064***  -0.058***  -0.071***  0.016**  0.002 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.013)  (0.763) 
Flows -0.186***  -0.084***  -0.113***  -0.044***  -0.086*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.045***  -0.018***  -0.020***  -0.006***  -0.021*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.051***  0.020**  0.030***  0.010***  0.033*** 
 (0.000)  (0.020)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Turnover 0.002  0.003  -0.002  -0.001  -0.002 
 (0.405)  (0.288)  (0.380)  (0.305)  (0.160) 
FF-size 0.069***  0.002  0.028  -0.004  0.034*** 
 (0.002)  (0.917)  (0.234)  (0.610)  (0.005) 
FF-spec -0.111**  -0.062  -0.126*  -0.020  -0.001 
 (0.012)  (0.260)  (0.068)  (0.111)  (0.976) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 1,170,217  186,720  331,492  130,908  552,854 
Clusters 50  34  38  33  47 
Pseudo R2 0.224  0.135  0.125  0.149  0.202 
LL -421021   -36352   -75475   -11427   -107723 
 Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns -0.039***  -0.015***  -0.044*  -0.004  -0.025*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.057)  (0.451)  (0.002) 
Flows -0.141***  -0.044***  -0.066***  -0.030***  -0.104*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.035***  -0.011***  -0.011***  -0.006***  -0.024*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age -0.009*  -0.007**  -0.002  0.004  -0.008* 
 (0.098)  (0.023)  (0.593)  (0.354)  (0.066) 
Turnover 0.001  0.000  -0.002  0.003***  0.001 
 (0.718)  (0.872)  (0.174)  (0.003)  (0.760) 
FF-size -0.087***  -0.056***  -0.042***  -0.015***  -0.027*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.004) 
FF-spec -0.051***  -0.042***  0.014  0.007  -0.010 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.397)  (0.387)  (0.520) 
Time & IS dummies                                             Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 1,097,380  197,389  316,818  129,251  563,028 
Clusters 57  37  39  34  54 
Pseudo R2 0.228  0.312  0.279  0.208  0.208 





Table A2-23. Marginal effects of monthly logit regression clustered by investment objectives after matching for Age, Size and investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every month for funds 
that were merged (Panel A) and liquidated (Panel B) within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every month for funds that have not exited the market for at least 6 months after 
the end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns. P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Panel A. Within-family mergers 
Returns -0.109***  -0.215***  -0.326***  -0.103*  -0.070*** 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.082)  (0.000) 
Flows -0.258***  -0.346***  -0.420***  -0.878***  -0.347*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.017***  -0.001  -0.002  0.008  -0.013** 
 (0.002)  (0.923)  (0.678)  (0.137)  (0.025) 
Age -0.002  0.007  -0.014  -0.007  0.003 
 (0.820)  (0.693)  (0.211)  (0.597)  (0.850) 
Turnover 0.005  0.020  -0.009  -0.050  -0.006 
 (0.445)  (0.280)  (0.538)  (0.254)  (0.529) 
FF-size 0.032***  0.005  0.023  -0.003  0.028*** 
 (0.000)  (0.693)  (0.102)  (0.867)  (0.003) 
FF-spec -0.085  -0.125  -0.318  -0.204  0.123 
 (0.464)  (0.507)  (0.256)  (0.399)  (0.441) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 329,472  19,223  44,035  4,134  66,199 
Clusters 50  34  38  30  47 
r2_p 0.0261  0.0141  0.0201  0.0212  0.0173 
ll -216711   -13104   -29824   -2803   -44743 
 Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns -0.083***  -0.087  -0.365***  -0.130*  -0.100** 
 (0.000)  (0.156)  (0.000)  (0.077)  (0.015) 
Flows -0.247***  -0.317***  -0.519***  -0.461***  -0.327*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size 0.007*  0.043***  0.032***  -0.014  0.007* 
 (0.055)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.219)  (0.081) 
Age -0.015  -0.092***  -0.098***  -0.000  -0.010 
 (0.306)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.998)  (0.534) 
Turnover 0.002  0.008  -0.027*  0.012  0.008 
 (0.868)  (0.679)  (0.050)  (0.554)  (0.603) 
FF-size -0.025***  -0.068***  -0.049***  -0.057***  -0.005 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.425) 
FF-spec -0.082  -0.350***  0.134  -0.014  0.061 
 (0.187)  (0.007)  (0.241)  (0.955)  (0.369) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 187,876  10,679  18,604  3,281  65,043 
Clusters 56  35  39  29  54 
r2_p 0.0227  0.106  0.0993  0.0917  0.0175 





Table A2-24. Marginal effects of monthly logit regression clustered by investment objectives after matching for Age, Size and investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every month for funds 
that were merged (Panel A) and liquidated (Panel B) within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every month for funds that have not exited the market at the end of the periods 
as specified at the top of the columns. P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Panel A. Within-family mergers 
Returns -0.110***  -0.207***  -0.300***  -0.090  -0.076*** 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.153)  (0.000) 
Flows -0.250***  -0.351***  -0.413***  -0.887***  -0.322*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.016***  0.001  -0.002  0.010*  -0.013** 
 (0.003)  (0.896)  (0.544)  (0.083)  (0.019) 
Age -0.004  0.001  -0.013  -0.012  -0.005 
 (0.655)  (0.953)  (0.218)  (0.439)  (0.678) 
Turnover 0.002  0.014  -0.012  -0.050  -0.008 
 (0.795)  (0.449)  (0.409)  (0.248)  (0.468) 
FF-size 0.029***  0.003  0.024*  -0.003  0.025*** 
 (0.000)  (0.843)  (0.085)  (0.892)  (0.006) 
FF-spec -0.093  -0.151  -0.298  -0.176  0.086 
 (0.424)  (0.423)  (0.301)  (0.496)  (0.601) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 331,173  19,282  44,029  4,156  66,088 
Clusters 50  34  38  30  47 
r2_p 0.0229  0.0132  0.0199  0.0199  0.0154 
ll -218919   -13160   -29825   -2822   -44743 
 Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns -0.081***  -0.088*  -0.386***  -0.161**  -0.103** 
 (0.000)  (0.096)  (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.016) 
Flows -0.249***  -0.318***  -0.506***  -0.517***  -0.319*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size 0.007*  0.041***  0.030***  -0.009  0.007* 
 (0.053)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.414)  (0.073) 
Age -0.018  -0.068**  -0.089***  0.008  -0.014 
 (0.261)  (0.015)  (0.002)  (0.823)  (0.330) 
Turnover -0.002  0.003  -0.028**  0.026  0.007 
 (0.835)  (0.887)  (0.046)  (0.351)  (0.655) 
FF-size -0.030***  -0.067***  -0.052***  -0.054***  -0.010 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.124) 
FF-spec -0.093  -0.259*  0.075  0.047  0.021 
 (0.166)  (0.050)  (0.482)  (0.854)  (0.734) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 189,677  10,753  18,698  3,334  65,304 
Clusters 56  35  39  29  54 
r2_p 0.0271  0.113  0.0969  0.0940  0.0180 





Table A2-25. Marginal effects of monthly logit regression clustered by investment objectives after matching for Age, Size, investment objectives and fund-family. The dependent variable is equal to one for every 
month for funds that were merged (Panel A) and liquidated (Panel B) within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every month for funds that have not exited the market for at least 
6 months after the end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns.  P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Panel A. Within-family mergers 
Returns -0.090***  -0.087**  -0.324***  -0.051  -0.071*** 
 (0.000)  (0.025)  (0.000)  (0.677)  (0.007) 
Flows -0.323***  -0.550***  -0.512***  -0.883***  -0.523*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.050***  -0.068***  -0.060***  -0.049***  -0.049*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.043**  0.060  0.045*  0.025  0.021 
 (0.022)  (0.189)  (0.069)  (0.714)  (0.243) 
Turnover 0.015**  0.008  -0.007  0.041  0.021 
 (0.015)  (0.765)  (0.755)  (0.256)  (0.126) 
FF-size 0.031***  0.028***  0.002  0.009  0.027*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.780)  (0.307)  (0.000) 
FF-Spec 0.133**  0.018  -0.200*  -0.008  0.179** 
 (0.027)  (0.853)  (0.053)  (0.943)  (0.031) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 265,629  12,545  33,627  3,040  55,277 
Clusters 44  28  33  28  40 
Pseudo R2 0.0477  0.0539  0.0407  0.0404  0.0557 
LL -167067   -8097   -21807   -2007   -35167 
 Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns -0.038*  -0.076  -0.464***  0.154  -0.033 
 (0.080)  (0.258)  (0.000)  (0.249)  (0.368) 
Flows -0.343***  -0.271***  -0.671***  -0.576***  -0.384*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.068***  -0.099***  -0.059***  -0.108***  -0.070*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age -0.052**  -0.011  -0.077**  0.023  -0.048* 
 (0.018)  (0.909)  (0.037)  (0.703)  (0.087) 
Turnover 0.003  0.001  -0.022  -0.003  -0.004 
 (0.788)  (0.943)  (0.305)  (0.880)  (0.801) 
FF-size 0.004  -0.032  0.001  -0.010  0.006 
 (0.552)  (0.155)  (0.934)  (0.575)  (0.272) 
FF-Spec -0.019  -0.289  -0.098  0.377  -0.037 
 (0.850)  (0.323)  (0.742)  (0.110)  (0.715) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 125,967  4,153  8,838  1,748  46,014 
Clusters 51  20  26  14  47 
Pseudo R2 0.101  0.147  0.0846  0.177  0.121 




Table A2-26. Marginal effects of monthly logit regression clustered by investment objectives after matching for Age, Size, investment objectives and fund-family. The dependent variable is equal to one for every 
month for funds that were merged (Panel A) and liquidated (Panel B) within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every month for funds that have not exited the market at the end 
of the periods as specified at the top of the columns.  P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Panel A. Within-family mergers 
Returns -0.089***  -0.083**  -0.335***  -0.024  -0.072*** 
 (0.000)  (0.022)  (0.000)  (0.822)  (0.004) 
Flows -0.317***  -0.534***  -0.539***  -0.850***  -0.500*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.000) 
Size -0.049***  -0.064***  -0.060***  -0.046***  -0.048*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.046**  0.060  0.037  0.053  0.027 
 (0.024)  (0.164)  (0.131)  (0.479)  (0.149) 
Turnover 0.012**  0.004  -0.008  0.040  0.015 
 (0.032)  (0.870)  (0.677)  (0.177)  (0.227) 
FF-size 0.031***  0.028***  0.003  0.002  0.030*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.708)  (0.791)  (0.000) 
FF-Spec 0.142***  0.026  -0.189*  -0.063  0.196** 
 (0.009)  (0.755)  (0.069)  (0.473)  (0.021) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 266,799  12,571  33,887  3,066  55,480 
Clusters 44  28  33  28  40 
Pseudo R2 0.0459  0.0477  0.0400  0.0350  0.0537 
LL -168386   -8167   -22037   -2035   -35396 
 Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns -0.039*  -0.071  -0.467***  0.161  -0.033 
 (0.074)  (0.290)  (0.001)  (0.230)  (0.352) 
Flows -0.345***  -0.275***  -0.667***  -0.557***  -0.374*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.065***  -0.093***  -0.057***  -0.110***  -0.067*** 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age -0.056**  -0.002  -0.078**  0.018  -0.053** 
 (0.014)  (0.980)  (0.035)  (0.755)  (0.042) 
Turnover 0.003  0.005  -0.019  -0.002  -0.002 
 (0.748)  (0.764)  (0.388)  (0.926)  (0.884) 
FF-size 0.005  -0.026  0.001  -0.005  0.007 
 (0.465)  (0.251)  (0.907)  (0.779)  (0.401) 
FF-Spec -0.007  -0.278  -0.010  0.451*  -0.065 
 (0.932)  (0.324)  (0.970)  (0.075)  (0.483) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 126,409  4,225  9,072  1,745  46,316 
Clusters 51  20  26  14  47 
Pseudo R2 0.0941  0.130  0.0804  0.180  0.114 





F. Monthly logit regressions clustered by funds (Chapter 2) 
Table A2-27. Marginal effects of monthly logit regression clustered by funds. The dependent variable is equal to one for every month for funds that exited within the window specified at the top of the columns, and 
it is equal to zero for every month for funds that have not exited the market before the end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns. The surviving funds are requested to remain operational for at least 6 
months following the end of the corresponding period (Panel A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B)  *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical 
significance 
 1/2000-12/2014  1/2000–3/2003  4/2003–8/2007  9/2007–3/2009  4/2009–12/2014 
 Panel A. plus six months  
Returns -0.075***  -0.066***  -0.115***  0.008  -0.023*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.183)  (0.001) 
Flows -0.277***  -0.126***  -0.190***  -0.073***  -0.180*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.061***  -0.026***  -0.028***  -0.011***  -0.038*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.031***  0.014***  0.029***  0.012***  0.018*** 
 (0.000)  (0.006)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Turnover 0.005*  0.003  -0.003  0.003**  0.001 
 (0.052)  (0.184)  (0.203)  (0.019)  (0.629) 
FF–size -0.034**  -0.067***  -0.057***  -0.026***  -0.006 
 (0.014)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.521) 
FF–spec -0.111***  -0.090***  -0.062**  -0.009  -0.005 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.460)  (0.791) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 1,273,268  206,767  337,560  133,437  584,847 
Clusters 15351  7128  8282  8143  12048 
r2_p 0.225  0.209  0.156  0.178  0.209 
LL 
-563150   -47163   -93938   -16933   -178434 
Panel  B. plus zero month 
Returns -0.076***  -0.062***  -0.100***  0.008  -0.024*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.170)  (0.001) 
Flows -0.270***  -0.122***  -0.184***  -0.070***  -0.173*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.059***  -0.024***  -0.027***  -0.011***  -0.037*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.030***  0.013***  0.028***  0.011***  0.016*** 
 (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Turnover 0.003  0.002  -0.003  0.003**  -0.001 
 (0.225)  (0.256)  (0.163)  (0.013)  (0.772) 
FF–size -0.040***  -0.067***  -0.048***  -0.023***  -0.010 
 (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.270) 
FF–spec -0.104***  -0.091***  -0.057**  -0.004  -0.007 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.020)  (0.715)  (0.726) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 1,302,183  210,829  344,145  139,080  600,667 
Clusters 15646  7292  8449  8491  12343 
r2_p 0.218  0.202  0.152  0.168  0.2 




Table A2-28. Marginal effects of monthly logit regression clustered by funds after matching by Age, Size, investment style (Panel A), and by Age, Size, fund-family, and investment style (Panel B). The dependent 
variable is equal to one for every month for funds that exited within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every month for funds that have not exited the market for at least six 
months beyond end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns.  P–values in brackets.  *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000–3/2003   4/2003–8/2007   9/2007–3/2009   4/2009–12/2014 
 Panel A. NNM on Size, Age, and investment style 
Returns -0.110***  -0.180***  -0.340***  -0.126  -0.084*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.117)  (0.000) 
Flows -0.287***  -0.347***  -0.521***  -0.654***  -0.365*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.017***  0.012  0.007  0.003  -0.013*** 
 (0.000)  (0.139)  (0.298)  (0.767)  (0.002) 
Age -0.010  -0.025  -0.032  -0.006  -0.008 
 (0.308)  (0.379)  (0.169)  (0.858)  (0.571) 
Turnover 0.008  0.009  -0.011  -0.005  0.005 
 (0.146)  (0.407)  (0.294)  (0.772)  (0.527) 
FF–size 0.006  -0.029***  -0.008  -0.028***  0.011** 
 (0.127)  (0.000)  (0.225)  (0.010)  (0.021) 
FF–Spec -0.018  -0.242**  -0.010  0.005  0.136** 
 (0.710)  (0.018)  (0.919)  (0.976)  (0.033) 
Time & IS dummies    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 486,721  28,884  60,970  7,352  125,658 
Clusters 8138  1680  2485  844  4168 
Pseudo R2 0.0159  0.0236  0.0111  0.0293  0.0133 
LL -314537   -19406   -41512   -4942   -83960 
 Panel B. NNM on Size, Age, investment style, and fund-family 
Returns -0.084***  -0.116**  -0.333***  0.038  -0.046** 
 (0.000)  (0.019)  (0.000)  (0.744)  (0.049) 
Flows -0.330***  -0.425***  -0.530***  -0.694***  -0.438*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.055***  -0.070***  -0.055***  -0.067***  -0.056*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.023**  0.057  0.027  0.023  -0.001 
 (0.045)  (0.122)  (0.326)  (0.654)  (0.957) 
Turnover 0.009  0.008  -0.012  0.010  0.004 
 (0.168)  (0.609)  (0.413)  (0.630)  (0.698) 
FF–size 0.027***  0.023  0.010  0.011  0.023*** 
 (0.000)  (0.130)  (0.395)  (0.611)  (0.000) 
FF–Spec 0.102  -0.059  -0.138  0.147  0.140 
 (0.188)  (0.783)  (0.437)  (0.631)  (0.129) 
Time & IS dummies                                        Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 377,204  16,518  41,838  4,765  99,399 
Clusters 5466  930  1561  536  3130 
Pseudo R2 0.0598  0.0662  0.0414  0.0675  0.0799 




Table A2-29. Marginal effects of monthly logit regression clustered by funds after matching by Age, Size, investment style (Panel A), and by Age, Size, fund-family, and investment style (Panel B). The dependent 
variable is equal to one for every month for funds that exited within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every month for funds that have not exited the market at the end of the 
periods as specified at the top of the columns.  P–values in brackets.  *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000–3/2003   4/2003–8/2007   9/2007–3/2009   4/2009–12/2014 
 Panel A. NNM on Size, Age, and investment style 
Returns -0.112***  -0.177***  -0.330***  -0.136*  -0.089*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.085)  (0.000) 
Flows -0.285***  -0.356***  -0.503***  -0.709***  -0.354*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.016***  0.013*  0.006  0.007  -0.012*** 
 (0.000)  (0.090)  (0.365)  (0.571)  (0.004) 
Age -0.012  -0.027  -0.027  -0.008  -0.012 
 (0.231)  (0.346)  (0.240)  (0.835)  (0.372) 
Turnover 0.004  0.006  -0.012  0.003  0.003 
 (0.412)  (0.569)  (0.222)  (0.843)  (0.672) 
FF–size 0.003  -0.030***  -0.008  -0.026**  0.008 
 (0.454)  (0.000)  (0.223)  (0.017)  (0.113) 
FF–Spec -0.020  -0.222**  -0.001  0.051  0.111* 
 (0.678)  (0.030)  (0.989)  (0.767)  (0.083) 
Time & IS dummies    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 490,403  29,085  61,122  7,451  126,136 
Clusters 8171  1693  2493  851  4180 
Pseudo R2 0.0141  0.0245  0.0107  0.0296  0.012 
LL -318754   -19544   -41646   -5010   -84491 
 Panel B. NNM on Size, Age, investment style, and fund-family 
Returns -0.083***  -0.110**  -0.341***  0.046  -0.047** 
 (0.000)  (0.030)  (0.000)  (0.691)  (0.043) 
Flows -0.326***  -0.417***  -0.546***  -0.672***  -0.422*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.053***  -0.066***  -0.054***  -0.065***  -0.055*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.023**  0.057  0.019  0.038  -0.002 
 (0.049)  (0.127)  (0.470)  (0.461)  (0.914) 
Turnover 0.008  0.007  -0.011  0.010  0.002 
 (0.228)  (0.649)  (0.420)  (0.616)  (0.807) 
FF–size 0.027***  0.023  0.010  0.007  0.024*** 
 (0.000)  (0.131)  (0.389)  (0.764)  (0.000) 
FF–Spec 0.106  -0.060  -0.101  0.112  0.139 
 (0.170)  (0.776)  (0.547)  (0.711)  (0.130) 
Time & IS dummies                                        Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 378,931  16,616  42,333  4,788  99,941 
Clusters 5495  942  1581  537  3148 
Pseudo R2 0.0565  0.059  0.0405  0.0615  0.0765 





Table A2-30. Marginal effects of monthly logit regression clustered by funds. The dependent variable is equal to one for every month for funds that exited within the window specified at the top of the columns, and 
it is equal to zero for every month for funds that have not exited for at least 6 months after the end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns. Panel A:   mergers; Panel B: liquidations. P-values in brackets.  
*** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Panel A. Within-family mergers 
Returns -0.064***  -0.061***  -0.074***  0.016***  0.002 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.580) 
Flows -0.191***  -0.087***  -0.117***  -0.047***  -0.091*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.047***  -0.019***  -0.020***  -0.006***  -0.022*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.052***  0.021***  0.031***  0.010***  0.035*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Turnover 0.003  0.003  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001 
 (0.180)  (0.109)  (0.334)  (0.374)  (0.468) 
FF-size 0.076***  0.002  0.026*  -0.006  0.039*** 
 (0.000)  (0.867)  (0.064)  (0.407)  (0.000) 
FF-spec -0.122***  -0.062**  -0.130***  -0.024*  -0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.041)  (0.000)  (0.066)  (0.940) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 1,141,322  182,748  324,997  125,445  537,054 
Clusters 12761  6181  7680  7585  10657 
Pseudo R2 0.231  0.14  0.127  0.158  0.21 
LL -413134   -35962   -74893   -11208   -105763 
 Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns -0.039***  -0.017***  -0.059***  -0.004  -0.025*** 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.375)  (0.000) 
Flows -0.143***  -0.045***  -0.067***  -0.032***  -0.107*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.036***  -0.011***  -0.011***  -0.006***  -0.025*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age -0.008**  -0.007*  -0.001  0.004*  -0.007** 
 (0.022)  (0.064)  (0.732)  (0.068)  (0.029) 
Turnover 0.002  0.000  -0.002  0.003***  0.002 
 (0.277)  (0.750)  (0.169)  (0.000)  (0.299) 
FF-size -0.086***  -0.057***  -0.049***  -0.016***  -0.026*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
FF-spec -0.055***  -0.042***  0.011  0.006  -0.008 
 (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.385)  (0.400)  (0.575) 
Time & IS dummies                                             Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 1,068,465  193,366  310,286  123,786  547,208 
Clusters 11991  6396  7267  7473  10711 
Pseudo R2 0.235  0.32  0.29  0.22  0.218 




Table A2-31. Marginal effects of monthly logit regression clustered by funds. The dependent variable is equal to one for every month for funds that exited within the window specified at the top of the columns, and 
it is equal to zero for every month for funds that have not exited at the end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns. Panel A:   mergers; Panel B: liquidations. P-values in brackets.  *** - 1% statistical 
significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Panel A. Within-family mergers 
Returns -0.064***  -0.058***  -0.071***  0.016***  0.002 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.712) 
Flows -0.186***  -0.084***  -0.113***  -0.044***  -0.086*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.045***  -0.018***  -0.020***  -0.006***  -0.021*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.051***  0.020***  0.030***  0.010***  0.033*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Turnover 0.002  0.003  -0.002  -0.001  -0.002 
 (0.452)  (0.151)  (0.307)  (0.430)  (0.161) 
FF-size 0.069***  0.002  0.028**  -0.004  0.034*** 
 (0.000)  (0.882)  (0.032)  (0.593)  (0.000) 
FF-spec -0.111***  -0.062**  -0.126***  -0.020  -0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.040)  (0.000)  (0.107)  (0.956) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 1,170,217  186,720  331,492  130,908  552,854 
Clusters 13056  6343  7845  7919  10952 
Pseudo R2 0.224  0.135  0.125  0.149  0.202 
LL -421021   -36352   -75475   -11427   -107723 
 Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns -0.039***  -0.015***  -0.044***  -0.004  -0.025*** 
 (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.365)  (0.000) 
Flows -0.141***  -0.044***  -0.066***  -0.030***  -0.104*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.035***  -0.011***  -0.011***  -0.006***  -0.024*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age -0.009**  -0.007*  -0.002  0.004*  -0.008*** 
 (0.014)  (0.059)  (0.548)  (0.059)  (0.009) 
Turnover 0.001  0.000  -0.002  0.003***  0.001 
 (0.557)  (0.834)  (0.119)  (0.000)  (0.613) 
FF-size -0.087***  -0.056***  -0.042***  -0.015***  -0.027*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
FF-spec -0.051***  -0.042***  0.014  0.007  -0.010 
 (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.269)  (0.261)  (0.504) 
Time & IS dummies                                                   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 1,097,380  197,389  316,818  129,251  563,028 
Clusters 12286  6559  7433  7813  11006 
Pseudo R2 0.228  0.312  0.279  0.208  0.208 





Table A2-32. Marginal effects of monthly logit regression clustered by funds after matching for Age, Size and investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every month for funds that were merged 
(Panel A) and liquidated (Panel B) within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every month for funds that have not exited the market for at least 6 months after the end of the 
periods as specified at the top of the columns. P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Panel A. Within-family mergers 
Returns -0.109***  -0.215***  -0.326***  -0.103  -0.070** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.335)  (0.011) 
Flows -0.258***  -0.346***  -0.420***  -0.878***  -0.347*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.017***  -0.001  -0.002  0.008  -0.013** 
 (0.000)  (0.960)  (0.845)  (0.619)  (0.023) 
Age -0.002  0.007  -0.014  -0.007  0.003 
 (0.873)  (0.844)  (0.629)  (0.899)  (0.905) 
Turnover 0.005  0.020  -0.009  -0.050  -0.006 
 (0.432)  (0.222)  (0.481)  (0.109)  (0.532) 
FF-size 0.032***  0.005  0.023**  -0.003  0.028*** 
 (0.000)  (0.609)  (0.013)  (0.860)  (0.000) 
FF-spec -0.085  -0.125  -0.318**  -0.204  0.123 
 (0.231)  (0.376)  (0.024)  (0.429)  (0.250) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 329,472  19,223  44,035  4,134  66,199 
Clusters 5017  1108  1672  502  2310 
r2_p 0.0261  0.0141  0.0201  0.0212  0.0173 
ll -216711   -13104   -29824   -2803   -44743 
 Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns -0.083***  -0.087  -0.365***  -0.130  -0.100*** 
 (0.000)  (0.181)  (0.000)  (0.224)  (0.003) 
Flows -0.247***  -0.317***  -0.519***  -0.461***  -0.327*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size 0.007  0.043***  0.032***  -0.014  0.007 
 (0.158)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.430)  (0.237) 
Age -0.015  -0.092*  -0.098***  -0.000  -0.010 
 (0.325)  (0.051)  (0.007)  (0.999)  (0.640) 
Turnover 0.002  0.008  -0.027**  0.012  0.008 
 (0.795)  (0.586)  (0.028)  (0.521)  (0.429) 
FF-size -0.025***  -0.068***  -0.049***  -0.057***  -0.005 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.461) 
FF-spec -0.082  -0.350**  0.134  -0.014  0.061 
 (0.232)  (0.014)  (0.376)  (0.960)  (0.457) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 187,876  10,679  18,604  3,281  65,043 
Clusters 3703  650  931  352  2067 
r2_p 0.0227  0.106  0.0993  0.0917  0.0175 





Table A2-33. Marginal effects of monthly logit regression clustered by funds after matching for Age, Size and investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every month for funds that were merged 
(Panel A) and liquidated (Panel B) within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every month for funds that have not exited the market at the end of the periods as specified at the 
top of the columns. P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Panel A. Within-family mergers 
Returns -0.110***  -0.207***  -0.300***  -0.090  -0.076*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.392)  (0.006) 
Flows -0.250***  -0.351***  -0.413***  -0.887***  -0.322*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.016***  0.001  -0.002  0.010  -0.013** 
 (0.000)  (0.945)  (0.780)  (0.546)  (0.024) 
Age -0.004  0.001  -0.013  -0.012  -0.005 
 (0.751)  (0.976)  (0.640)  (0.835)  (0.800) 
Turnover 0.002  0.014  -0.012  -0.050  -0.008 
 (0.795)  (0.385)  (0.367)  (0.106)  (0.434) 
FF-size 0.029***  0.003  0.024***  -0.003  0.025*** 
 (0.000)  (0.801)  (0.008)  (0.881)  (0.000) 
FF-spec -0.093  -0.151  -0.298**  -0.176  0.086 
 (0.189)  (0.287)  (0.037)  (0.497)  (0.415) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 331,173  19,282  44,029  4,156  66,088 
Clusters 5035  1113  1672  504  2309 
r2_p 0.0229  0.0132  0.0199  0.0199  0.0154 
ll -218919   -13160   -29825   -2822   -44743 
 Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns -0.081***  -0.088  -0.386***  -0.161  -0.103*** 
 (0.000)  (0.158)  (0.000)  (0.130)  (0.002) 
Flows -0.249***  -0.318***  -0.506***  -0.517***  -0.319*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size 0.007  0.041***  0.030***  -0.009  0.007 
 (0.140)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.606)  (0.260) 
Age -0.018  -0.068  -0.089**  0.008  -0.014 
 (0.261)  (0.135)  (0.014)  (0.875)  (0.484) 
Turnover -0.002  0.003  -0.028**  0.026  0.007 
 (0.737)  (0.867)  (0.027)  (0.180)  (0.497) 
FF-size -0.030***  -0.067***  -0.052***  -0.054***  -0.010 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.152) 
FF-spec -0.093  -0.259*  0.075  0.047  0.021 
 (0.173)  (0.077)  (0.611)  (0.872)  (0.798) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 189,677  10,753  18,698  3,334  65,304 
Clusters 3711  657  935  355  2070 
r2_p 0.0271  0.113  0.0969  0.094  0.018 





Table A2-34. Marginal effects of monthly logit regression clustered by funds after matching for Age, Size, investment objectives and fund-family. The dependent variable is equal to one for every month for funds 
that were merged (Panel A) and liquidated (Panel B) within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every month for funds that have not exited the market for at least 6 months after 
the end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns.  P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Panel A. Within-family mergers 
Returns -0.090***  -0.087*  -0.324***  -0.051  -0.071** 
 (0.000)  (0.090)  (0.000)  (0.729)  (0.014) 
Flows -0.323***  -0.550***  -0.512***  -0.883***  -0.523*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Size -0.050***  -0.068***  -0.060***  -0.049***  -0.049*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.000) 
Age 0.043***  0.060  0.045  0.025  0.021 
 (0.003)  (0.166)  (0.157)  (0.716)  (0.372) 
Turnover 0.015*  0.008  -0.007  0.041  0.021 
 (0.061)  (0.710)  (0.702)  (0.359)  (0.125) 
FF-size 0.031***  0.028  0.002  0.009  0.027*** 
 (0.000)  (0.136)  (0.876)  (0.788)  (0.001) 
FF-Spec 0.133  0.018  -0.200  -0.008  0.179 
 (0.179)  (0.948)  (0.327)  (0.985)  (0.171) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 265,629  12,545  33,627  3,040  55,277 
Clusters 3686  701  1172  378  1886 
Pseudo R2 0.0477  0.0539  0.0407  0.0404  0.0557 
LL -167067   -8097   -21807   -2007   -35167 
 Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns -0.038*  -0.076  -0.464***  0.154  -0.033 
 (0.057)  (0.480)  (0.001)  (0.329)  (0.338) 
Flows -0.343***  -0.271***  -0.671***  -0.576***  -0.384*** 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.068***  -0.099***  -0.059***  -0.108***  -0.070*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age -0.052***  -0.011  -0.077  0.023  -0.048** 
 (0.009)  (0.899)  (0.173)  (0.757)  (0.040) 
Turnover 0.003  0.001  -0.022  -0.003  -0.004 
 (0.789)  (0.949)  (0.373)  (0.881)  (0.781) 
FF-size 0.004  -0.032  0.001  -0.010  0.006 
 (0.646)  (0.271)  (0.965)  (0.778)  (0.508) 
FF-Spec -0.019  -0.289  -0.098  0.377  -0.037 
 (0.881)  (0.413)  (0.780)  (0.570)  (0.776) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 125,967  4,153  8,838  1,748  46,014 
Clusters 2031  246  424  160  1337 
Pseudo R2 0.101  0.147  0.0846  0.177  0.121 





Table A2-35. Marginal effects of monthly logit regression clustered by funds after matching for Age, Size, investment objectives and fund-family. The dependent variable is equal to one for every month for funds 
that were merged (Panel A) and liquidated (Panel B) within the window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every month for funds that have not exited the market at the end of the periods 
as specified at the top of the columns.  P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-3/2003 4/2003-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
 Panel A. Within-family mergers 
Returns -0.089***  -0.083  -0.335***  -0.024  -0.072** 
 (0.000)  (0.123)  (0.000)  (0.874)  (0.012) 
Flows -0.317***  -0.534***  -0.539***  -0.850***  -0.500*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Size -0.049***  -0.064***  -0.060***  -0.046**  -0.048*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.011)  (0.000) 
Age 0.046***  0.060  0.037  0.053  0.027 
 (0.002)  (0.166)  (0.245)  (0.448)  (0.252) 
Turnover 0.012  0.004  -0.008  0.040  0.015 
 (0.132)  (0.846)  (0.628)  (0.385)  (0.242) 
FF-size 0.031***  0.028  0.003  0.002  0.030*** 
 (0.000)  (0.135)  (0.843)  (0.938)  (0.000) 
FF-Spec 0.142  0.026  -0.189  -0.063  0.196 
 (0.149)  (0.920)  (0.333)  (0.881)  (0.132) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 266,799  12,571  33,887  3,066  55,480 
Clusters 3707  709  1182  380  1898 
Pseudo R2 0.0459  0.0477  0.04  0.035  0.0537 
LL -168386   -8167   -22037   -2035   -35396 
 Panel B. Liquidations 
Returns -0.039*  -0.071  -0.467***  0.161  -0.033 
 (0.051)  (0.491)  (0.002)  (0.306)  (0.322) 
Flows -0.345***  -0.275***  -0.667***  -0.557***  -0.374*** 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.065***  -0.093***  -0.057***  -0.110***  -0.067*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age -0.056***  -0.002  -0.078  0.018  -0.053** 
 (0.005)  (0.977)  (0.152)  (0.805)  (0.024) 
Turnover 0.003  0.005  -0.019  -0.002  -0.002 
 (0.758)  (0.799)  (0.405)  (0.926)  (0.869) 
FF-size 0.005  -0.026  0.001  -0.005  0.007 
 (0.578)  (0.373)  (0.952)  (0.889)  (0.482) 
FF-Spec -0.007  -0.278  -0.010  0.451  -0.065 
 (0.954)  (0.429)  (0.974)  (0.504)  (0.618) 
Time & IS dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 126,409  4,225  9,072  1,745  46,316 
Clusters 2038  250  435  159  1341 
Pseudo R2 0.0941  0.13  0.0804  0.18  0.114 





G. The name and market share of the largest 30 fund-families as at the end of 2014. 
(Chapter 3) 
Table A3-1. The name and market share of the largestx 30 fund-family as at the end of 2014. 
Fund-family market share cumulative market share 
Vanguard 15.072 15.072 
Fidelity Investments 11.839 26.911 
BlackRock 9.337 36.248 
American Funds 6.977 43.225 
T Rowe Price Associates Inc 5.134 48.359 
SSgA 4.209 52.568 
Pimco 2.608 55.176 
Dimensional Fund Advisors LP 2.444 57.621 
Federated 1.686 59.307 
Dreyfus 1.682 60.989 
Dodge & Cox 1.662 62.650 
Goldman Sachs 1.619 64.269 
Schwab 1.513 65.782 
JPMorgan 1.506 67.289 
Franklin Templeton Investments 1.413 68.701 
Northern 1.246 69.947 
SEI Investments 0.906 70.853 
John Hancock 0.882 71.735 
Morgan Stanley 0.806 72.542 
OppenheimerFunds 0.800 73.342 
American Century Companies 0.791 74.133 
AIM 0.747 74.880 
HARRIS ASSOCIATES LP 0.716 75.596 
Columbia 0.691 76.287 
Wells Fargo Advantage 0.657 76.943 
Harbor 0.647 77.590 
TIAA-CREF 0.640 78.231 










H. Replication of the results in Chapter 2 using the sample for Chapter 3 (Chapter 
3) 
Table A3-2. Marginal effects of logit regression clustered by investment objectives (Panel A) or funds (Panel B).Yearly 
regressions. The dependent variable is equal to one for every year for funds that exited within the window specified at the 
top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every year for funds that have not exited the market before the end of the 
periods as specified at the top of the columns. The surviving funds are requested to remain operational for at least 6 months 
following the end of the corresponding period. Returns (Flows) are the cumulative net returns (flows) in the 12 months 
before a fund’s board information was reported to SEC. Size is a fund’s total net assets in the month 1-year before a fund’s 
board information was reported. Age is the number of years a fund was in operation till the month its board information 
was reported. Turnover is the latest reported turnover ratio by CRSP before the month a fund’s board information was 
reported. FF-size is the size of the family a fund belongs to in the month when board information was reported. FF-spec is 
the style specialisation in a family in the month when board information was reported. P-values in brackets. *** - 1% 











 Panel A. Clustered by investment style 
Returns -0.078***  -0.071*  -0.081***  0.046**  -0.079*** 
 (0.000)  (0.051)  (0.006)  (0.033)  (0.000) 
Flows -0.002***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.056***  -0.028***  -0.030***  -0.015***  -0.036*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.003  0.015  0.021***  0.007  0.002 
 (0.679)  (0.230)  (0.008)  (0.334)  (0.784) 
Turnover 0.002  0.006  -0.006*  0.002  -0.001 
 (0.554)  (0.112)  (0.052)  (0.383)  (0.705) 
FF–size -0.010**  -0.016***  -0.014***  -0.009***  -0.001 
 (0.017)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.656) 
FF–spec -0.086**  0.001  -0.103  0.006  -0.016 
 (0.029)  (0.974)  (0.110)  (0.837)  (0.600) 
Time & IS 
dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 58,080  7,517  13,560  6,570  28,860 
Clusters 55  38  39  33  53 
r2_p 0.265  0.248  0.169  0.173  0.263 
LL 
-24685   -1856   -4323   -1189   -8554 
Panel  B. Clustered by fund 
Returns -0.078***  -0.071***  -0.081***  0.046**  -0.079*** 
 (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.011)  (0.000) 
Flows -0.002***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.056***  -0.028***  -0.030***  -0.015***  -0.036*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.003  0.015*  0.021**  0.007  0.002 
 (0.637)  (0.056)  (0.014)  (0.296)  (0.694) 
Turnover 0.002  0.006  -0.006  0.002  -0.001 
 (0.418)  (0.123)  (0.116)  (0.424)  (0.603) 
FF–size -0.010***  -0.016***  -0.014***  -0.009***  -0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.442) 
FF–spec -0.086***  0.001  -0.103**  0.006  -0.016 
 (0.005)  (0.969)  (0.012)  (0.841)  (0.505) 
Time & IS 
dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 58,080  7,517  13,560  6,570  28,860 
Clusters 12,654  3,746  4,961  4,413  8,447 
r2_p 0.265  0.248  0.169  0.173  0.263 






Table A3-3. Marginal effects of logit regression clustered by investment objectives (Panel A) or funds (Panel B).Yearly 
regressions. The dependent variable is equal to one for every year for funds that were liquidated within the window 
specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every year for funds that have not exited the market before 
the end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns. The surviving funds are requested to remain operational for at 
least 6 months following the end of the corresponding period. Returns (Flows) are the cumulative net returns (flows) in the 
12 months before a fund’s board information was reported to SEC. Size is a fund’s total net assets in the month 1-year 
before a fund’s board information was reported. Age is the number of years a fund was in operation till the month its board 
information was reported. Turnover is the latest reported turnover ratio by CRSP before the month a fund’s board 
information was reported. FF-size is the size of the family a fund belongs to in the month when board information was 
reported. FF-spec is the style specialisation in a family in the month when board information was reported. P-values in 











 Panel A. Clustered by investment style 
Returns -0.039***  -0.064***  -0.007  0.018  -0.057*** 
 (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.677)  (0.200)  (0.000) 
Flows -0.001***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.001*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.034***  -0.012***  -0.012***  -0.009***  -0.024*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age -0.036***  -0.007**  -0.006  -0.001  -0.020*** 
 (0.000)  (0.041)  (0.244)  (0.922)  (0.001) 
Turnover -0.001  0.004*  -0.004  0.004***  -0.003 
 (0.713)  (0.062)  (0.157)  (0.000)  (0.291) 
FF–size -0.012***  -0.010***  -0.011***  -0.007***  -0.004* 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.099) 
FF–spec -0.047  -0.004  -0.026  0.004  -0.032 
 (0.118)  (0.838)  (0.281)  (0.874)  (0.312) 
Time & IS 
dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 48,498  6,896  11,676  5,791  26,836 
Clusters 55  35  33  24  51 
r2_p 0.265  0.370  0.305  0.246  0.278 
LL 
-13075   -653.8   -1304   -527.6  -5397 
Panel  B. Clustered by fund 
Returns -0.039***  -0.064***  -0.007  0.018  -0.057*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.647)  (0.133)  (0.000) 
Flows -0.001***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.001*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.000) 
Size -0.034***  -0.012***  -0.012***  -0.009***  -0.024*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age -0.036***  -0.007  -0.006  -0.001  -0.020*** 
 (0.000)  (0.140)  (0.199)  (0.864)  (0.000) 
Turnover -0.001  0.004*  -0.004  0.004***  -0.003 
 (0.591)  (0.075)  (0.147)  (0.001)  (0.164) 
FF–size -0.012***  -0.010***  -0.011***  -0.007***  -0.004*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.003) 
FF–spec -0.047**  -0.004  -0.026  0.004  -0.032 
 (0.036)  (0.802)  (0.132)  (0.855)  (0.114) 
Time & IS 
dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 48,498  6,896  11,676  5,791  26,836 
Clusters 9,840  3,306  4,202  3,874  7,615 
r2_p 0.265  0.370  0.305  0.246  0.278 








Table A3-4. Marginal effects of logit regression clustered by investment objectives (Panel A) or funds (Panel B).Yearly 
regressions. The dependent variable is equal to one for every year for funds that were merged within a family within the 
window specified at the top of the columns, and it is equal to zero for every year for funds that have not exited the market 
before the end of the periods as specified at the top of the columns. The surviving funds are requested to remain operational 
for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding period. Returns (Flows) are the cumulative net returns (flows) 
in the 12 months before a fund’s board information was reported to SEC. Size is a fund’s total net assets in the month 1-
year before a fund’s board information was reported. Age is the number of years a fund was in operation till the month its 
board information was reported. Turnover is the latest reported turnover ratio by CRSP before the month a fund’s board 
information was reported. FF-size is the size of the family a fund belongs to in the month when board information was 
reported. FF-spec is the style specialisation in a family in the month when board information was reported. P-values in 











 Panel A. Clustered by investment style 
Returns -0.062***  -0.038  -0.101***  0.047**  -0.039*** 
 (0.000)  (0.328)  (0.000)  (0.043)  (0.000) 
Flows -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.043***  -0.022***  -0.023***  -0.009***  -0.021*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.037***  0.021  0.026***  0.013**  0.030*** 
 (0.000)  (0.143)  (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.000) 
Turnover 0.005  0.002  -0.004  -0.006***  0.001 
 (0.135)  (0.552)  (0.345)  (0.002)  (0.587) 
FF–size -0.004  -0.010***  -0.006  -0.002  0.002 
 (0.227)  (0.000)  (0.109)  (0.191)  (0.266) 
FF–spec -0.084*  0.007  -0.101*  -0.023  0.004 
 (0.054)  (0.861)  (0.092)  (0.434)  (0.837) 
Time & IS 
dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 51,792  6,501  13,009  6,077  25,821 
Clusters 48  32  35  25  44 
r2_p 0.268  0.172  0.137  0.162  0.244 
LL 
-18147   -1509   -3648   -803.4   -5041 
Panel  B. Clustered by fund 
Returns -0.062***  -0.038*  -0.101***  0.047***  -0.039*** 
 (0.000)  (0.098)  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.000) 
Flows -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size -0.043***  -0.022***  -0.023***  -0.009***  -0.021*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.037***  0.021**  0.026***  0.013**  0.030*** 
 (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.001)  (0.013)  (0.000) 
Turnover 0.005*  0.002  -0.004  -0.006*  0.001 
 (0.090)  (0.517)  (0.278)  (0.054)  (0.466) 
FF–size -0.004**  -0.010***  -0.006**  -0.002  0.002 
 (0.035)  (0.000)  (0.018)  (0.136)  (0.111) 
FF–spec -0.084***  0.007  -0.101**  -0.023  0.004 
 (0.005)  (0.847)  (0.043)  (0.402)  (0.824) 
Time & IS 
dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 51,792  6,501  13,009  6,077  25,821 
Clusters 9,840  3,306  4,202  3,874  7,615 
r2_p 0.268  0.172  0.137  0.162  0.244 






I. The interacted effects of Return and ExcComp on fund exits (Chapter 3) 
Table A3-5. Logit regressions for liquidations and mergers on board characteristics including the interaction terms of Returns and ExcComp, on the samples before and after the NNM by Fsize, Fage, and 
investment objectives. The regressions are clustered by investment objectives and investment companies. P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical 
significance 
 Non-GFC  GFC 
 Matched sample  Whole sample 
 
Matched sample  Whole sample 
 Liquidation Merger  Liquidations Merger Liquidation Merger  Liquidations Merger 
Return*ExcComp 0.000 0.000  0.015 0.019  0.000 0.002*  -0.028 0.052 
 (0.196) (0.783)  (0.510) (0.312)  (0.997) (0.087)  (0.566) (0.445) 
Return -0.006** -0.006**  -0.760*** -1.080***  -0.032** -0.020  -0.250 0.311 
 (0.026) (0.012)  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.026) (0.187)  (0.726) (0.724) 
ExcComp 0.025*** -0.007  0.023*** 0.001  -0.064** 0.129***  0.008 0.059*** 
 (0.002) (0.307)  (0.001) (0.836)  (0.018) (0.000)  (0.641) (0.000) 
Ownership -0.089* 0.071  -0.056* 0.177*  -0.324* -0.075  -0.148*** -0.003 
 (0.070) (0.314)  (0.056) (0.081)  (0.053) (0.684)  (0.009) (0.982) 
Inderatio -0.303 6.785***  -0.957 5.898***  4.443 9.174***  1.568 1.836 
 (0.726) (0.000)  (0.165) (0.000)  (0.195) (0.001)  (0.413) (0.230) 
Bsize -0.036 0.057**  -0.040 0.053***  0.015 0.175  -0.094 0.164** 
 (0.300) (0.035)  (0.192) (0.006)  (0.899) (0.119)  (0.224) (0.014) 
Bage 0.028 -3.199**  0.613 -1.396  6.619 4.133  3.347 -1.377 
 (0.982) (0.025)  (0.518) (0.185)  (0.216) (0.299)  (0.278) (0.614) 
Btenure 0.211 -0.189  0.275 0.040  0.154 -0.165  0.394 0.710* 
 (0.381) (0.276)  (0.261) (0.787)  (0.828) (0.739)  (0.237) (0.063) 
Nfunds 0.198** 0.193**  0.119 0.056  -0.653** 0.083  0.039 -0.219 
 (0.049) (0.050)  (0.134) (0.456)  (0.044) (0.834)  (0.885) (0.313) 
Disp.ExcComp -0.008 -0.001  -0.011 0.000  0.094 -0.124**  0.000 -0.006 
 (0.384) (0.923)  (0.150) (0.950)  (0.187) (0.021)  (0.994) (0.793) 
Disp.Bage 3.617* -3.526*  1.758 -4.223***  15.561** -15.372**  13.770** -8.668** 
 (0.056) (0.055)  (0.248) (0.007)  (0.037) (0.030)  (0.014) (0.029) 
Disp.Btenure 0.471** -0.378*  0.587*** 0.190  -0.185 -0.828  -0.107 -0.200 
 (0.025) (0.064)  (0.001) (0.270)  (0.816) (0.235)  (0.844) (0.713) 
Fsize -0.307*** -0.168***  -0.459*** -0.339***  -0.725*** -0.244  -0.488*** -0.310*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.205)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Fage -0.529*** -0.329**  -0.217** 0.277**  0.447 -0.419  -0.073 0.357 
 (0.001) (0.016)  (0.039) (0.012)  (0.364) (0.484)  (0.811) (0.161) 
Flow -0.017*** -0.014***  -0.021*** -0.015***  -0.015** -0.023***  -0.010*** -0.029*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.015) (0.000)  (0.006) (0.000) 
Turnover -0.073 -0.060  -0.083* -0.004  0.437*** 0.086  0.364*** 0.020 
 (0.214) (0.341)  (0.091) (0.933)  (0.004) (0.685)  (0.000) (0.870) 
Constant 0.448 7.204  -5.336 -6.067  -25.780 -21.275  -14.043 -0.477 
 (0.933) (0.218)  (0.175) (0.182)  (0.212) (0.185)  (0.291) (0.966) 
IS&Time dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 3,723 4,565  25,344 25,620  198 234  3,530 3,528 
r2_p 0.209 0.203  0.293 0.242  0.268 0.353  0.262 0.245 
ll -2021 -2498  -4530 -5607  -100.4 -104.4  -346.1 -430.1 
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J. Logit regressions for the exit funds and the funds that have not exited the market till 
the end of the periods of investigation (Chapter 3) 
Table A3-6. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment objectives and investment companies after matching 
for Fsize, Fage, and investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every observation for funds that were 
liquidated during the non-GFC periods (before Sep 2007, or after Mar 2009) and it is equal to zero for every observation for the 
funds that have not exited the market at the end of the the periods of investigation. The observations cover the non-GFC period.  
P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 
                  
Return -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.023) (0.043) (0.020) (0.017) (0.023) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019) 
ExcComp 0.004***       0.005*** 
 (0.004)       (0.000) 
Ownership  -0.010      -0.017* 
  (0.205)      (0.057) 
Inderatio   0.080     -0.045 
   (0.618)     (0.775) 
Bsize    -0.007    -0.006 
    (0.207)    (0.311) 
Bage     0.136   0.010 
     (0.546)   (0.965) 
Btenure      0.040  0.037 
      (0.380)  (0.399) 
Nfunds       0.008 0.036** 
       (0.624) (0.050) 
Disp.ExcComp -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.263) (0.210) (0.183) (0.254) (0.180) (0.196) (0.187) (0.321) 
Disp.Bage 0.559 0.789** 0.734** 0.676** 0.745** 0.679* 0.756** 0.626* 
 (0.105) (0.020) (0.031) (0.049) (0.026) (0.050) (0.023) (0.069) 
Disp.Btenure 0.090** 0.083** 0.075** 0.085** 0.079** 0.081** 0.073* 0.092** 
 (0.012) (0.024) (0.038) (0.022) (0.027) (0.024) (0.056) (0.016) 
Fsize -0.053*** -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.056*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fage -0.116*** -0.106*** -0.115*** -0.113*** -0.115*** -0.120*** -0.113*** -0.104*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Flow -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Turnover -0.013 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.012 
 (0.215) (0.195) (0.146) (0.169) (0.138) (0.131) (0.143) (0.277)          
IS&Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,825 3,736 3,825 3,825 3,825 3,825 3,825 3,736 
r2_p 0.200 0.196 0.193 0.194 0.193 0.194 0.193 0.208 













Table A3-7. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment objectives and investment companies after matching 
for Fsize, Fage, and investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every observation for funds that were 
liquidated during the GFC period (between Sep 2007 and Mar 2009) and it is equal to zero for every observation for the funds 
that have not exited the market at the end of the periods of investigation. The observations cover the GFC period.  P-values in 
brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 
                  
Return -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004* -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005* 
 (0.100) (0.109) (0.115) (0.094) (0.168) (0.138) (0.121) (0.059) 
ExcComp -0.006       -0.006 
 (0.112)       (0.183) 
Ownership  -0.033      -0.016 
  (0.205)      (0.505) 
Inderatio   0.311     0.463 
   (0.484)     (0.438) 
Bsize    -0.042**    -0.030 
    (0.017)    (0.227) 
Bage     0.764   0.729 
     (0.271)   (0.350) 
Btenure      0.001  -0.046 
      (0.991)  (0.679) 
Nfunds       -0.025 -0.032 
       (0.584) (0.587) 
Disp.ExcComp 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.003 
 (0.671) (0.618) (0.986) (0.503) (0.545) (0.724) (0.634) (0.781) 
Disp.Bage 3.455*** 3.312*** 3.401*** 2.982*** 3.771*** 3.420*** 3.211*** 3.131*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
Disp.Btenure -0.342*** -0.275** -0.300** -0.208* -0.302** -0.306** -0.276** -0.204 
 (0.005) (0.025) (0.015) (0.073) (0.012) (0.012) (0.034) (0.116) 
Fsize -0.111*** -0.104*** -0.096*** -0.109*** -0.093*** -0.099*** -0.100*** -0.112*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fage 0.063 0.069 0.046 0.069 0.038 0.053 0.055 0.067 
 (0.419) (0.396) (0.563) (0.370) (0.631) (0.523) (0.501) (0.378) 
Flow -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.002** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.002** 
 (0.015) (0.020) (0.026) (0.031) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) 
Turnover 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.079*** 0.062*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.064*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)          
IS&Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 203 202 203 203 203 203 203 202 
r2_p 0.223 0.224 0.215 0.243 0.219 0.213 0.214 0.264 














Table A3-8. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment objectives and investment companies after matching 
for Fsize, Fage, and investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every observation for funds that were 
merged during the non-GFC periods (before Sep 2007, or after Mar 2009) and it is equal to zero for every observation for the 
funds that have not exited the market at the end of the periods of investigation. The observations cover the non-GFC period.  P-
values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 
                  
Return -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.004) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) 
ExcComp -0.000       -0.001 
 (0.717)       (0.226) 
Ownership  0.043**      0.015 
  (0.012)      (0.252) 
Inderatio   1.219***     1.233*** 
   (0.000)     (0.000) 
Bsize    0.014***    0.010** 
    (0.005)    (0.042) 
Bage     -0.647**   -0.651** 
     (0.019)   (0.014) 
Btenure      -0.077**  -0.031 
      (0.017)  (0.329) 
Nfunds       0.068*** 0.037** 
       (0.000) (0.043) 
Disp.ExcComp 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.418) (0.422) (0.860) (0.583) (0.332) (0.341) (0.675) (0.939) 
Disp.Bage -0.630* -0.808** -0.439 -0.540 -0.878*** -0.535 -0.424 -0.630* 
 (0.057) (0.015) (0.163) (0.106) (0.008) (0.103) (0.215) (0.066) 
Disp.Btenure 0.032 0.015 0.017 0.013 0.018 0.011 -0.001 -0.066* 
 (0.407) (0.653) (0.655) (0.745) (0.640) (0.780) (0.976) (0.082) 
Fsize -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.028*** -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.032*** -0.035*** -0.032*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fage -0.062** -0.066** -0.070*** -0.062** -0.059** -0.056* -0.056** -0.061** 
 (0.036) (0.026) (0.009) (0.034) (0.044) (0.058) (0.048) (0.016) 
Flow -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Turnover -0.009 -0.013 -0.010 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.462) (0.323) (0.407) (0.503) (0.464) (0.457) (0.364) (0.357)          
IS&Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,695 4,570 4,695 4,695 4,695 4,695 4,695 4,570 
r2_p 0.137 0.143 0.182 0.141 0.140 0.140 0.146 0.201 














Table A3-9. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment objectives and investment companies after matching 
for Fsize, Fage, and investment objectives. The dependent variable is equal to one for every observation for funds that were 
merged during the GFC period (between Sep 2007 and Mar 2009) and it is equal to zero for every observation for the funds that 
have not exited the market at the end of the periods of investigation. The observations cover the GFC period.  P-values in 
brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 
                  
Return -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.002 
 (0.742) (0.461) (0.998) (0.499) (0.720) (0.599) (0.514) (0.391) 
ExcComp 0.020***       0.016*** 
 (0.000)       (0.000) 
Ownership  0.049      -0.010 
  (0.352)      (0.720) 
Inderatio   2.015***     1.389*** 
   (0.000)     (0.000) 
Bsize    0.029*    0.020 
    (0.062)    (0.218) 
Bage     0.937   0.502 
     (0.182)   (0.409) 
Btenure      0.043  0.018 
      (0.612)  (0.802) 
Nfunds       0.053 0.015 
       (0.221) (0.801) 
Disp.ExcComp -0.004 -0.002 -0.019** -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.018** 
 (0.609) (0.732) (0.015) (0.533) (0.862) (0.764) (0.695) (0.019) 
Disp.Bage -2.019** -0.817 -1.947* -0.509 -0.103 -0.641 -0.403 -1.922** 
 (0.027) (0.468) (0.060) (0.636) (0.928) (0.549) (0.710) (0.043) 
Disp.Btenure 0.026 -0.098 -0.111 -0.178 -0.086 -0.057 -0.114 -0.099 
 (0.789) (0.395) (0.284) (0.126) (0.444) (0.632) (0.329) (0.365) 
Fsize -0.038 -0.042 -0.037* -0.031 -0.035 -0.037 -0.041 -0.032 
 (0.186) (0.101) (0.079) (0.227) (0.166) (0.143) (0.114) (0.180) 
Fage -0.013 -0.018 -0.091 -0.038 -0.044 -0.045 -0.038 -0.069 
 (0.873) (0.836) (0.252) (0.670) (0.614) (0.610) (0.667) (0.396) 
Flow -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Turnover 0.009 -0.005 0.008 0.006 -0.006 -0.001 -0.003 0.018 
 (0.802) (0.913) (0.817) (0.893) (0.905) (0.984) (0.948) (0.560)          
IS&Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 
r2_p 0.263 0.134 0.223 0.137 0.131 0.124 0.127 0.327 














Table A3-10. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment objectives and investment companies. The dependent 
variable is equal to one for every observation for funds that were liquidated during the non-GFC periods (before Sep 2007, or 
after Mar 2009), and it is equal to zero for every observation for funds that remained operational at the end of periods of 
investigation. The observations cover the non-GFC period. P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% 
statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance  
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 
                  
Return -0.041*** -0.035*** -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.037*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
ExcComp 0.001***       0.001*** 
 (0.003)       (0.001) 
Ownership  -0.002      -0.003* 
  (0.197)      (0.057) 
Inderatio   -0.022     -0.051 
   (0.529)     (0.130) 
Bsize    -0.002    -0.002 
    (0.149)    (0.211) 
Bage     0.062   0.033 
     (0.198)   (0.489) 
Btenure      0.014  0.013 
      (0.242)  (0.280) 
Nfunds       -0.001 0.006 
       (0.864) (0.130) 
Disp.ExcComp -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.114) (0.137) (0.138) (0.154) (0.108) (0.103) (0.120) (0.168) 
Disp.Bage 0.078 0.124* 0.107 0.089 0.123 0.097 0.104 0.091 
 (0.297) (0.093) (0.153) (0.233) (0.102) (0.207) (0.170) (0.227) 
Disp.Btenure 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.018** 0.020*** 0.019** 0.019** 0.018** 0.029*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.019) (0.001) 
Fsize -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fage -0.011** -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* -0.010** -0.012** -0.010* -0.011** 
 (0.032) (0.096) (0.072) (0.083) (0.050) (0.027) (0.063) (0.041) 
Flow -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Turnover -0.004 -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* 
 (0.118) (0.089) (0.092) (0.097) (0.096) (0.081) (0.098) (0.092)          
IS&Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 27,216 25,511 27,216 27,216 27,216 27,216 27,216 25,511 
r2_p 0.286 0.284 0.282 0.283 0.283 0.283 0.282 0.292 














Table A3-11. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment objectives and investment companies. The dependent 
variable is equal to one for every observation for funds that were liquidated during the GFC periods (between 2007 and Mar 
2009), and it is equal to zero for every observation for funds that remained operational  at least the end of periods of investigation. 
The observations cover the non-GFC period. P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical 
significance, * - 10% statistical significance 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 
                  
Return -0.006 -0.000 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 -0.003 
 (0.764) (0.997) (0.748) (0.749) (0.717) (0.751) (0.670) (0.850) 
ExcComp 0.000       0.000 
 (0.528)       (0.514) 
Ownership  -0.004***      -0.004*** 
  (0.003)      (0.007) 
Inderatio   0.002     0.028 
   (0.973)     (0.540) 
Bsize    -0.004**    -0.003 
    (0.033)    (0.136) 
Bage     0.114   0.078 
     (0.137)   (0.301) 
Btenure      0.000  0.009 
      (0.976)  (0.251) 
Nfunds       -0.006 0.003 
       (0.230) (0.633) 
Disp.ExcComp -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.428) (0.858) (0.416) (0.974) (0.333) (0.442) (0.622) (0.932) 
Disp.Bage 0.344*** 0.294*** 0.353*** 0.310*** 0.408*** 0.353*** 0.308*** 0.331** 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.017) 
Disp.Btenure -0.017 -0.003 -0.018 -0.009 -0.018 -0.018 -0.013 -0.003 
 (0.207) (0.782) (0.189) (0.487) (0.175) (0.183) (0.285) (0.824) 
Fsize -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fage -0.004 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.567) (0.931) (0.567) (0.742) (0.473) (0.558) (0.586) (0.832) 
Flow -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.013) 
Turnover 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)          
IS&Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,996 3,723 3,996 3,996 3,996 3,996 3,996 3,723 
r2_p 0.223 0.240 0.222 0.232 0.228 0.222 0.225 0.253 














Table A3-12. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment objectives and investment companies. The dependent 
variable is equal to one for every observation for funds that were merged during the non-GFC periods (before Sep 2007, or after 
Mar 2009), and it is equal to zero for every observation for funds that remained operational at the end of the periods of 
investigation. The observations cover the non-GFC period. P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% 
statistical significance, * - 10% statistical significance  
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 
                  
Return -0.068*** -0.073*** -0.060*** -0.068*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.069*** -0.066*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ExcComp 0.001***       0.000 
 (0.005)       (0.670) 
Ownership  0.020***      0.011* 
  (0.010)      (0.078) 
Inderatio   0.347***     0.363*** 
   (0.000)     (0.000) 
Bsize    0.004***    0.003*** 
    (0.002)    (0.005) 
Bage     0.014   -0.085 
     (0.816)   (0.205) 
Btenure      -0.008  0.002 
      (0.385)  (0.847) 
Nfunds       0.011*** 0.003 
       (0.005) (0.468) 
Disp.ExcComp 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 
 (0.112) (0.032) (0.789) (0.141) (0.084) (0.076) (0.093) (0.921) 
Disp.Bage -0.257*** -0.279*** -0.217** -0.207** -0.231*** -0.228** -0.183* -0.263*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.022) (0.009) (0.010) (0.050) (0.008) 
Disp.Btenure 0.026** 0.019* 0.020* 0.017 0.022* 0.020* 0.017 0.012 
 (0.023) (0.061) (0.078) (0.168) (0.054) (0.079) (0.145) (0.251) 
Fsize -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.021*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fage 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.017*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) 
Flow -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Turnover -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.836) (0.519) (0.885) (0.873) (0.824) (0.837) (0.735) (0.903)          
IS&Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 27,487 25,783 27,487 27,487 27,487 27,487 27,487 25,783 
r2_p 0.206 0.208 0.232 0.206 0.203 0.204 0.206 0.239 















Table A3-13. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment objectives and investment companies. The dependent 
variable is equal to one for every observation for funds that were merged during the GFC periods (between 2007 and Mar 2009), 
and it is equal to zero for every observation for funds that remained operational at the end of the periods of investigation. The 
observations cover the non-GFC period. P-values in brackets. *** - 1% statistical significance, ** - 5% statistical significance, 
* - 10% statistical significance  
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 
                  
Return 0.024 0.029 0.030 0.030 0.027 0.020 0.028 0.019 
 (0.314) (0.249) (0.205) (0.192) (0.249) (0.402) (0.238) (0.440) 
ExcComp 0.002***       0.002*** 
 (0.000)       (0.000) 
Ownership  0.005      -0.001 
  (0.391)      (0.892) 
Inderatio   0.102**     0.045 
   (0.027)     (0.321) 
Bsize    0.005***    0.005** 
    (0.009)    (0.024) 
Bage     0.103   -0.038 
     (0.166)   (0.662) 
Btenure      0.026**  0.020* 
      (0.036)  (0.087) 
Nfunds       -0.004 -0.004 
       (0.237) (0.545) 
Disp.ExcComp 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.582) (0.678) (0.916) (0.963) (0.673) (0.646) (0.585) (0.915) 
Disp.Bage -0.284*** -0.169* -0.237** -0.146 -0.154* -0.189** -0.215** -0.265** 
 (0.006) (0.083) (0.011) (0.121) (0.093) (0.041) (0.016) (0.030) 
Disp.Btenure 0.004 -0.011 -0.005 -0.013 -0.002 0.004 0.001 -0.006 
 (0.788) (0.485) (0.731) (0.278) (0.865) (0.795) (0.951) (0.699) 
Fsize -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fage 0.016** 0.013 0.016** 0.016** 0.017** 0.015** 0.017** 0.011 
 (0.025) (0.125) (0.030) (0.032) (0.025) (0.045) (0.022) (0.151) 
Flow -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Turnover -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.001 
 (0.510) (0.418) (0.417) (0.326) (0.265) (0.223) (0.261) (0.890)          
IS&Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,964 3,716 3,964 3,964 3,964 3,964 3,964 3,716 
r2_p 0.202 0.171 0.172 0.176 0.167 0.177 0.165 0.227 
ll -475.2 -478.3 -493.1 -491.0 -496.1 -490.5 -497.2 -446.0 
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 K. Investment styles in each sector in the U.K. mutual fund market (Chapter 4) 
Table A4-1. Four sectors classified according to IMA investment styles and Morningstar Global Category in 
the U.K. mutual fund market. 
A. Domestic equity sector 
IMA Sector Global Category 
UK Equity Income UK Equity Large Cap 
UK All Companies UK Equity Mid/Small Cap 
UK Smaller Companies 
B. Domestic non-equity sector 
IMA Sector Global Category 
UK Gilts Aggressive Allocation 
UK Index Linked Gilts Allocation 
£ Corporate Bond Flexible Allocation 
£ Strategic Bond Cautious Allocation 
£ High Yield High Yield Fixed Income 
UK Equity and Bond Income Inflation Linked 
Mixed Investment 0-35% Shares Moderate Allocation 
Mixed Investment 20-60% Shares Sterling Fixed Income 
Mixed Investment 40-85% Shares Sterling Money Market 
Flexible Investment 
UK Direct Property  
Property Other 
Money Market 
Short Term Money Market 
UK Zeros  
C. Global equity sector 
IMA Sector Global Category 
Japan Asia Equity 
Japanese Smaller Companies Asia ex-Japan Equity 
Asia Pacific Excluding Japan Emerging Markets Equity 
Asia Pacific Including Japan Energy Sector Equity 
China/Greater China Europe Equity Large Cap 
North America Global Equity Large Cap 
North American Smaller Companies Global Equity Mid/Small Cap 
Europe Excluding UK India Equity 
European Smaller Companies Islamic Equity 
Global Japan Equity 
Global Emerging Markets Long/Short Equity 
Global Equity Income Natural Resources Sector Equity 
Specialist Other Equity 
Technology and Telecommunications Real Estate Sector Equity 
 US Equity Large Cap Blend 
 US Equity Large Cap Growth 
D. Global non-equity sector 
IMA Sector Global Category 
Global Bonds Capital Protected 
Global Emerging Markets Bond Euro Fixed Income 
Protected Global Fixed Income 
Personal Pensions Guaranteed 
Targeted Absolute Return Market Neutral 
Volatility Managed Miscellaneous 
 Multialternative 
 Other Alternative 
 Other Europe Fixed Income 
 Other Europe Money Market 
 Other Fixed Income 
 Property-Direct 
 Target Date 2000-2020 
 US Fixed Income 
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L. Sector characteristics in the U.K. mutual fund industry (Chapter 4) 
Table A4-2. Total net assets of each sector by year, in billion British pounds. 
 DE GE DNE GNE 
2000 26.581 25.954 9.860 0.429 
2001 30.601 29.881 12.843 0.285 
2002 26.564 25.586 13.886 0.423 
2003 38.094 38.376 18.652 0.618 
2004 38.935 33.402 18.025 0.791 
2005 55.608 56.767 28.506 1.418 
2006 61.763 57.704 33.619 2.654 
2007 73.280 85.158 50.805 3.312 
2008 54.957 64.561 41.683 4.429 
2009 69.966 84.355 54.003 7.647 
2010 71.980 98.938 63.642 9.332 
2011 66.750 85.537 66.507 10.242 
2012 82.208 92.676 75.598 11.630 
2013 84.301 101.851 80.495 11.298 
2014 80.507 104.242 81.363 11.582 
2015 73.739 98.163 77.112 12.798 
2016 75.291 112.948 82.974 17.183 
2017 79.090 130.895 92.738 23.444 
2018 60.309 108.972 85.110 16.397 
 
Table A4-3. Average market share in each sector. 
 DE GE DNE GNE 
2000 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.036 
2001 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.032 
2002 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.031 
2003 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.029 
2004 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.026 
2005 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.026 
2006 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.023 
2007 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.022 
2008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.019 
2009 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.017 
2010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.017 
2011 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.018 
2012 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.018 
2013 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.018 
2014 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.018 
2015 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.019 
2016 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.019 
2017 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.019 





Table A4-4. The market share of the largest 5 families in each sector. 
 DE GE DNE GNE 
2000 0.554 0.757 0.497 0.998 
2001 0.457 0.689 0.422 0.925 
2002 0.451 0.664 0.393 0.870 
2003 0.440 0.581 0.359 0.766 
2004 0.469 0.525 0.325 0.742 
2005 0.461 0.525 0.358 0.677 
2006 0.373 0.477 0.348 0.740 
2007 0.394 0.479 0.318 0.635 
2008 0.401 0.440 0.296 0.541 
2009 0.404 0.406 0.320 0.549 
2010 0.397 0.408 0.351 0.548 
2011 0.399 0.407 0.381 0.543 
2012 0.438 0.421 0.385 0.522 
2013 0.359 0.394 0.353 0.488 
2014 0.352 0.401 0.352 0.430 
2015 0.352 0.388 0.351 0.435 
2016 0.360 0.381 0.343 0.530 
2017 0.370 0.378 0.376 0.562 
2018 0.386 0.414 0.419 0.500 
 
  
Table A4-5. The HHI of each sector in the UK mutual fund industry. 
 DE GE DNE GNE 
2000 0.064 0.116 0.072 0.270 
2001 0.048 0.101 0.058 0.190 
2002 0.048 0.095 0.056 0.158 
2003 0.046 0.077 0.048 0.123 
2004 0.050 0.060 0.041 0.115 
2005 0.046 0.064 0.045 0.144 
2006 0.043 0.048 0.042 0.079 
2007 0.045 0.050 0.037 0.130 
2008 0.045 0.044 0.032 0.068 
2009 0.047 0.040 0.034 0.054 
2010 0.049 0.040 0.034 0.071 
2011 0.053 0.040 0.036 0.085 
2012 0.055 0.040 0.042 0.098 
2013 0.043 0.040 0.048 0.109 
2014 0.037 0.039 0.042 0.112 
2015 0.037 0.037 0.038 0.118 
2016 0.034 0.037 0.035 0.090 
2017 0.033 0.043 0.036 0.074 










Table A4-6. The ratio of the number of new funds over the number of existing funds in each sector. 
 DE GE DNE GNE 
2000 0.064 0.131 0.136 0.078 
2001 0.070 0.076 0.092 0.061 
2002 0.088 0.068 0.099 0.060 
2003 0.067 0.059 0.110 0.137 
2004 0.054 0.051 0.084 0.130 
2005 0.085 0.088 0.127 0.107 
2006 0.080 0.072 0.101 0.099 
2007 0.058 0.086 0.105 0.207 
2008 0.045 0.063 0.113 0.267 
2009 0.042 0.073 0.058 0.167 
2010 0.032 0.053 0.097 0.201 
2011 0.051 0.060 0.050 0.146 
2012 0.036 0.070 0.092 0.101 
2013 0.030 0.068 0.075 0.096 
2014 0.013 0.037 0.060 0.041 
2015 0.034 0.059 0.062 0.068 
2016 0.026 0.036 0.058 0.058 
2017 0.029 0.055 0.046 0.104 




M. Quarterly logit regressions for the matched samples without clusters (equivalent regressions for Tables 4-7 and 4-8 in Chapter 4) 
Table A4-7. Marginal effects of logit regressions on matched samples without clusters. The matching is done by fund size, age and investment objective, with replacement. The dependent 
variable equals to one for every quarter for the funds that exited within the period specified at the top row, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for the funds that have not exited the market 
before the end of the periods as specified at the top row. The surviving funds are requested to remain operation for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding period (Panel A) 
and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B). Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3-month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till 
the end-month of current quarter. Size, and family size are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. ***-1% statistical significance, **-5% 
statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance. 
 Panel A. plus 6 months  Panel A. plus 0 month 
 1/2000-12/2017 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2017 1/2000-12/2017 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2017 
Return -0.104**  -0.218  -0.371  -0.199***  -0.104**  -0.038  -0.343  -0.200*** 
 (0.011)  (0.712)  (0.465)  (0.003)  (0.012)  (0.948)  (0.487)  (0.003) 
Size 0.012***  -0.104***  0.008  -0.006***  0.012***  -0.110***  0.013  -0.006*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.692)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.567)  (0.000) 
Age -0.003***  0.005  -0.002  -0.002***  -0.003***  0.006  -0.002  -0.002*** 
 (0.000)  (0.442)  (0.385)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.312)  (0.422)  (0.000) 
Flow -0.004***  -0.006*  -0.008***  -0.007***  -0.004***  -0.006**  -0.008***  -0.007*** 
 (0.000)  (0.065)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.036)  (0.002)  (0.000) 
Family size -0.010***  0.087**  -0.021  -0.017***  -0.011***  0.086**  -0.023  -0.018*** 
 (0.000)  (0.018)  (0.342)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.021)  (0.299)  (0.001) 
Family specialisation -0.234***  -0.381*  -0.250*  -0.242***  -0.230***  -0.318  -0.219  -0.235*** 
 (0.000)  (0.068)  (0.089)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.133)  (0.114)  (0.000)                 
                
IS &Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 29,798  167  434  15,817  29,890  174  438  15,833 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 16,675 /13,123  61/106  226/208  8,811 /7,006  16,675 /13,215  63/111  226/212  8,811 /7,022 
No. of exit/surviving funds 675/482  18/18  58/55  620/464  671/485  15/15  56/54  588/448 
No. of clusters 1,153  28  110  1,035  1,156  30  110  1,036 
r2_p 0.0206  0.229  0.0454  0.0219  0.0204  0.235  0.0454  0.0218 




Table A4-8. Marginal effects of logit regressions on matched samples without clusters. The matching is done by fund size, age, fund-family, and investment objective, with replacement. The 
dependent variable equals to one for every quarter for the funds that exited within the period specified at the top row, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for the funds that have not exited 
the market before the end of the periods as specified at the top row. The surviving funds are requested to remain operation for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding period 
(Panel A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B). Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3-month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in 
operation till the end-month of current quarter. Size, and family size are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. ***-1% statistical significance, 
**-5% statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance. 
 Panel A. plus 6 months  Panel A. plus 0 month 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
Return -0.083  -0.497  0.254  -0.109  -0.081  -0.505  0.254  -0.111 
 (0.128)  (0.201)  (0.720)  (0.174)  (0.138)  (0.196)  (0.720)  (0.167) 
Size -0.052***  -0.190***  -0.080***  -0.066***  -0.050***  -0.193***  -0.080***  -0.063*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age -0.004***  0.011  -0.001  -0.005***  -0.004***  0.012  -0.001  -0.006** 
 (0.000)  (0.181)  (0.874)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.159)  (0.874)  (0.000) 
Flow -0.005***  -0.009***  -0.006*  -0.008***  -0.005***  -0.009***  -0.006  -0.008*** 
 (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.090)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.090)  (0.000) 
Family size 0.025***  0.265***  0.007  0.023***  0.024***  0.263**  0.007  0.023*** 
 (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.889)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.889)  (0.000) 
Family specialisation 0.096***  0.942**  -0.367  0.027  0.095***  0.915***  -0.367  0.025 
 (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.403)  (0.387)  (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.403)  (0.423)                 
                
IS &Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 16,400  101  259  8,232  16,494  103  259  8,279 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 8,753/7,647  43/58  129/130  4,624/3,608  8,753/7,741  44/59  129/130  4,624/3,655 
No. of exit/surviving funds 338/246  8/8  28/27  291/213  338/247  9/9  28/27  291/214 
No. of clusters 584  16  55  504  585  18  55  505 
r2_p 0.0644  0.604  0.0998  0.100  0.0630  0.604  0.0998  0.0977 





N. Quarterly logit regressions clustered by investment styles (Chapter 4) 
Table A4-9. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment objectives. The dependent variable equals to one for every quarter for the funds that exited within the period specified 
at the top row, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for the funds that have not exited the market before the end of the periods as specified at the top row. The surviving funds are requested 
to remain operation for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding period (Panel A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B). Quarterly returns/flows are 
(not annualised) cumulative 3-month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till the end-month of current quarter. Size, and family size are the mean statistics of the three 
variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. ***-1% statistical significance, **-5% statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance. 
 Panel A. plus 6 months  Panel A. plus 0 month 
 1/2000-12/2017 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2017 1/2000-12/2017 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2017 
Return -0.131***  -0.037*  -0.043  -0.109***  -0.127***  -0.033  -0.043  -0.106*** 
 (0.000)  (0.083)  (0.303)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.159)  (0.283)  (0.000) 
Size -0.030***  -0.007***  -0.010***  -0.029***  -0.030***  -0.007***  -0.010***  -0.029*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age -0.017**  0.006*  0.008  -0.014**  -0.016**  0.006*  0.008  -0.013** 
 (0.011)  (0.071)  (0.140)  (0.020)  (0.013)  (0.057)  (0.121)  (0.024) 
Flow -0.343***  -0.023*  -0.086***  -0.361***  -0.337***  -0.024*  -0.082***  -0.355*** 
 (0.000)  (0.073)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.060)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Family size -0.014***  0.001  -0.003  -0.011***  -0.015***  0.002  -0.002  -0.011*** 
 (0.001)  (0.415)  (0.586)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.383)  (0.591)  (0.001) 
Family specialisation -0.101***  -0.001  -0.014  -0.085***  -0.098***  0.001  -0.014  -0.083*** 
 (0.005)  (0.963)  (0.593)  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.964)  (0.600)  (0.002) 
                                
Objective&Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 99,805  6,275  7,534  67,475  100,861  6,315  7,749  68,194 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 17,586/82,219  71/6,204  222/7,312  8,988/58,487  17,586/83,275  71/6,244  222/7,527  8,988/59,206 
No. of exit/surviving funds 754/2,263  19/779  58/1,389  634/2,261  754/2,289  19/789  58/1,429  634/2,287 
No. of clusters 54  14  23  54  54  14  23  54 
r2_p 0.160  0.281  0.144  0.200  0.159  0.274  0.141  0.197 




Table A4-10. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment objectives, on the four sectors separately. The dependent variable equals to one for every quarter for the funds that 
exited the market between January 2000 and December 2017, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for the funds that have not exited the market before the end of the sample period. The 
surviving funds are requested to remain operation for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding period (Panel A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel 
B). Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3-month returns/flows. Age is the number of years in operation till the end-month of current quarter. Size, and family size are the 
mean statistics of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. ***-1% statistical significance, **-5% statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance.  
 Panel A. plus 6 months  Panel A. plus 0 month 
 DE  DNE  GE  GNE 
 
         DE        DNE         GE GNE 
Return -0.096***  -0.150***  -0.088***  -0.132 -0.093***  -0.144***  -0.087***  -0.131 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.283)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.284) 
Size -0.036***  -0.024***  -0.038***  -0.021***  -0.036***  -0.024***  -0.038***  -0.021*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.002  -0.029*  -0.019***  -0.029**  0.003  -0.028*  -0.019***  -0.029** 
 (0.784)  (0.050)  (0.002)  (0.039)  (0.726)  (0.058)  (0.002)  (0.049) 
Flow -0.318***  -0.301***  -0.390***  -0.411***  -0.312***  -0.292***  -0.385***  -0.411*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Family size 0.000  -0.019***  -0.022***  -0.023***  0.000  -0.020***  -0.022***  -0.023*** 
 (0.932)  (0.005)  (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.926)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.004) 
Family specialisation -0.004  -0.241***  0.037  -0.214  0.001  -0.237***  0.037  -0.216 
 (0.946)  (0.000)  (0.387)  (0.121)  (0.991)  (0.000)  (0.390)  (0.117)                 
                
Objective&Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 21,749  41,208  33,961  4,933  21,983  41,865  34,114  4,958 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 4,232/17,517  6,804/34,404  6,289/27,672  721/4,212  4,232/17,751  6,804/35,061  6,289/27,825  721/4,237 
No. of exit/surviving funds 160/380  293/1,053  258/685  43/145  160/385  293/1,069  258/689  43/146 
No. of clusters 6  21  22  8  6  21  22  8 
r2_p 0.136  0.184  0.189  0.172  0.136  0.181  0.189  0.170 







Table A4-11. Marginal effects of logit regressions on matched samples clustered by investment objectives. The matching is done by fund size, age and investment objective, with replacement. 
The dependent variable equals to one for every quarter for the funds that exited within the period specified at the top row, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for the funds that have not 
exited the market before the end of the periods as specified at the top row. The surviving funds are requested to remain operation for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding 
period (Panel A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B). Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3-month returns/flows. Age is the number of years 
in operation till the end-month of current quarter. Size, and family size are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. ***-1% statistical significance, 
**-5% statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance. 
 Panel A. plus 6 months  Panel A. plus 0 month 
 1/2000-12/2017 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2017 1/2000-12/2017 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2017 
Return -0.105***  -0.218  -0.371  -0.199***  -0.104***  -0.038  -0.343  -0.200*** 
 (0.000)  (0.374)  (0.277)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.899)  (0.326)  (0.000) 
Size 0.012**  -0.104**  0.008  -0.006  0.012**  -0.110**  0.013  -0.006 
 (0.021)  (0.046)  (0.760)  (0.238)  (0.019)  (0.041)  (0.600)  (0.236) 
Age -0.003***  0.005  -0.002  -0.002*  -0.003***  0.006  -0.002  -0.002* 
 (0.000)  (0.600)  (0.178)  (0.053)  (0.000)  (0.502)  (0.202)  (0.056) 
Flow -0.004***  -0.006  -0.008***  -0.007***  -0.004***  -0.006*  -0.008***  -0.007*** 
 (0.000)  (0.178)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.080)  (0.002)  (0.000) 
Family size -0.010  0.087  -0.021  -0.017  -0.011  0.086  -0.023  -0.018* 
 (0.377)  (0.346)  (0.691)  (0.103)  (0.349)  (0.358)  (0.644)  (0.092) 
Family specialisation -0.234***  -0.381  -0.250  -0.242**  -0.230***  -0.318  -0.219  -0.235** 
 (0.004)  (0.558)  (0.520)  (0.012)  (0.004)  (0.624)  (0.574)  (0.016) 
                                
Objective&Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 29,798  167  434  15,817  29,890  174  438  15,833 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 16,675 /13,123  61/106  226/208  8,811 /7,006  16,675 /13,215  63/111  226/212  8,811 /7,022 
No. of exit/surviving funds 675/482  18/18  58/55  620/464  671/485  15/15  56/54  588/448 
No. of clusters 51  11  23  53  51  12  23  53 
r2_p 0.0206  0.229  0.0454  0.0219  0.0204  0.235  0.0454  0.0218 







Table A4-12. Marginal effects of logit regressions on matched samples clustered by investment objectives. The matching is done by fund size, age, fund-family, and investment objective, with 
replacement. The dependent variable equals to one for every quarter for the funds that exited within the period specified at the top row, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for the funds 
that have not exited the market before the end of the periods as specified at the top row. The surviving funds are requested to remain operation for at least 6 months following the end of the 
corresponding period (Panel A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B). Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3-month returns/flows. Age is the 
number of years in operation till the end-month of current quarter. Size, and family size are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. ***-1% 
statistical significance, **-5% statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance. 
 Panel A. plus 6 months  Panel A. plus 0 month 
 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
Return -0.083**  -0.497  0.254  -0.109*  -0.081***  -0.505  0.254  -0.111* 
 (0.010)  (0.273)  (0.697)  (0.082)  (0.005)  (0.261)  (0.697)  (0.059) 
Size -0.052***  -0.190***  -0.080**  -0.066***  -0.050***  -0.193***  -0.080**  -0.063*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.029)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.029)  (0.000) 
Age -0.004*  0.011  -0.001  -0.005**  -0.004*  0.012  -0.001  -0.006** 
 (0.077)  (0.484)  (0.897)  (0.015)  (0.061)  (0.450)  (0.897)  (0.011) 
Flow -0.005***  -0.009**  -0.006  -0.008***  -0.005***  -0.009**  -0.006  -0.008*** 
 (0.000)  (0.015)  (0.222)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.017)  (0.222)  (0.000) 
Family size 0.025***  0.265**  0.007  0.023**  0.024***  0.263**  0.007  0.023** 
 (0.002)  (0.022)  (0.860)  (0.016)  (0.005)  (0.034)  (0.860)  (0.021) 
Family specialisation 0.096  0.942*  -0.367  0.027  0.095  0.915  -0.367  0.025 
 (0.112)  (0.097)  (0.411)  (0.731)  (0.111)  (0.113)  (0.411)  (0.750)                 
                
Objective&Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 16,400  101  259  8,232  16,494  103  259  8,279 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 8,753/7,647  43/58  129/130  4,624/3,608  8,753/7,741  44/59  129/130  4,624/3,655 
No. of exit/surviving funds 338/246  8/8  28/27  291/213  338/247  9/9  28/27  291/214 
No. of clusters 30  7  15  28  30  8  15  28 
r2_p 0.0644  0.604  0.0998  0.100  0.0630  0.604  0.0998  0.0977 





Table A4-13. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment objectives on matched samples, on the four sectors separately. The matching is done by fund size, and fund age, with 
replacement. The dependent variable equals to one for every quarter for the funds that exited the market between January 2000 and December 2017, and it is equal to zero for every quarter for 
the funds that have not exited the market before the end of the sample period. The surviving funds are requested to remain operation for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding 
period (Panel A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B). Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3-month returns/flows. Age is the number of years 
in operation till the end-month of current quarter. Size, and family size are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. ***-1% statistical significance, 
**-5% statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance.  
  Panel A. plus 6 months   Panel A. plus 0 month 
  DE   DNE   GE   GNE 
  
DE   DNE   GE   GNE 
Return -0.142***  -0.213***  -0.108***  -0.225 -0.146***  -0.212***  -0.105***  -0.225 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.480)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.480) 
Size 0.005  0.011  0.003  -0.028**  0.005  0.010  0.003  -0.028** 
 (0.558)  (0.233)  (0.848)  (0.012)  (0.559)  (0.272)  (0.852)  (0.012) 
Age -0.003***  -0.010**  -0.004  -0.016***  -0.003***  -0.010**  -0.004  -0.016*** 
 (0.003)  (0.019)  (0.141)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.027)  (0.140)  (0.000) 
Flow -0.004***  -0.003**  -0.004***  -0.006***  -0.004***  -0.003**  -0.004***  -0.006*** 
 (0.001)  (0.019)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.016)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Family size 0.030**  -0.029  0.005  -0.024  0.030**  -0.032*  0.005  -0.024 
 (0.031)  (0.140)  (0.610)  (0.229)  (0.027)  (0.081)  (0.638)  (0.229) 
Family specialisation -0.056  -0.598***  0.190  -0.340*  -0.054  -0.595***  0.192  -0.340* 
 (0.757)  (0.000)  (0.113)  (0.096)  (0.763)  (0.000)  (0.108)  (0.096) 
                                
IS &Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 7,343  11,069  9,847  1,899  7,336  11,203  9,848  1,899 

















No. of exit/surviving funds 145/101  257/198  219/153  33/49  145/100  260/201  219/153  33/49 
No. of clusters 5  18  17  5  5  19  17  5 
r2_p 0.0387  0.111  0.0424  0.0715  0.0397  0.104  0.0425  0.0715 




Table A4-14. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment objectives on matched samples, on the four sectors separately. The matching is done by fund size, fund age, and 
fund-family, with replacement. The dependent variable equals to one for every quarter for the funds that exited the market between January 2000 and December 2017, and it is equal to zero 
for every quarter for the funds that have not exited the market before the end of the sample period. The surviving funds are requested to remain operation for at least 6 months following the 
end of the corresponding period (Panel A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B). Quarterly returns/flows are (not annualised) cumulative 3-month returns/flows. 
Age is the number of years in operation till the end-month of current quarter. Size, and family size are the mean statistics of the three variables respectively over the three months in a quarter. 
***-1% statistical significance, **-5% statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance.  
 Panel A. plus 6 months  Panel A. plus 0 month 
  DE   DNE   GE   GNE 
  
DE   DNE   GE   GNE 
Return -0.138***  -0.279***  -0.084**  -0.441 -0.143***  -0.280***  -0.088**  -0.414 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.219)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.239) 
Size -0.038***  -0.020**  -0.036  -0.038  -0.036***  -0.016**  -0.033  -0.032 
 (0.007)  (0.017)  (0.112)  (0.281)  (0.006)  (0.043)  (0.136)  (0.325) 
Age 0.000  -0.009*  -0.002  0.004  -0.000  -0.009**  -0.002  0.006 
 (0.975)  (0.067)  (0.416)  (0.781)  (0.864)  (0.048)  (0.261)  (0.706) 
Flow -0.005***  -0.002*  -0.004***  -0.001  -0.005***  -0.002*  -0.003***  -0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.083)  (0.000)  (0.337)  (0.000)  (0.076)  (0.000)  (0.232) 
Family size 0.051**  -0.024  0.030  0.013  0.048**  -0.024  0.030  0.002 
 (0.016)  (0.316)  (0.184)  (0.591)  (0.019)  (0.284)  (0.156)  (0.941) 
Family specialisation 0.153  -0.157  0.104  -2.586***  0.177  -0.159  0.117  -2.639*** 
 (0.343)  (0.303)  (0.358)  (0.000)  (0.250)  (0.259)  (0.319)  (0.000)                 
                
IS &Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 5,649  8,825  7,449  876  5,807 
 8,832  7,425  915 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 3,098/2,551  5,286/3,539  4,180/3,269  527/349  3,209/2,598  5,286/3,546  4,180/3,245  527/388 
No. of exit/surviving funds 107/69  215/123  148/100  24/16  110/70  215/123  148/99  24/18 
No. of clusters 4  16  14  5  5  16  14  5 
r2_p 0.053  0.101  0.0795  0.263  0.0535  0.106  0.081  0.278 






O. Monthly logit regressions clustered by funds (Chapter 4) 
Table A4-15. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by funds. The dependent variable equals to one for every month for the funds that exited within the period specified at the top row, 
and it is equal to zero for every month for the funds that have not exited the market before the end of the periods as specified at the top row. The surviving funds are requested to remain operation 
for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding period (Panel A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B). ***-1% statistical significance, **-5% statistical 
significance, *-10% statistical significance. 
  Panel A. plus 6 months  Panel A. plus 0 month 
1/2000-12/2017 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2017 1/2000-12/2017 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2017 
Return -0.096***  -0.016  -0.030***  -0.107***  -0.093***  -0.012  -0.030***  -0.104*** 
 (0.000)  (0.468)  (0.008)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.579)  (0.006)  (0.000) 
Size -0.031***  -0.006***  -0.009***  -0.030***  -0.031***  -0.006***  -0.009***  -0.030*** 
 (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age -0.014*  0.008  0.007  -0.011*  -0.013*  0.008*  0.007  -0.011 
 (0.066)  (0.108)  (0.147)  (0.089)  (0.074)  (0.100)  (0.140)  (0.107) 
Flow -0.002***  0.000  -0.000***  -0.002***  -0.002***  0.000  -0.000***  -0.002*** 
 (0.000)  (0.524)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.557)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Family size -0.016***  0.001  -0.003  -0.012***  -0.016***  0.001  -0.002  -0.012*** 
 (0.000)  (0.625)  (0.296)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.597)  (0.303)  (0.000) 
Family specialisation -0.108***  -0.006  -0.016  -0.089***  -0.104***  -0.004  -0.015  -0.086*** 
 (0.000)  (0.835)  (0.398)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.895)  (0.406)  (0.000)                         
                
IS &Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 297,547  19,158  24,094  205,433  300,599  19,282  24,771  207,612 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 52,696/244,851  205/18,953  623/23,471  28,294/177,139  52,696/247,903  205/19,077  623/24,148  28,294/179,318 
No. of exit/surviving funds 757/2,277  22/816  58/1,423  660/2,275  757/2,303  22/826  58/1,464  660/2,301 
No. of clusters 3,034  838  1,522  2,935  3,060  848  1,522  2,961 
r2_p 0.157  0.249  0.160  0.194  0.157  0.243  0.157  0.191 




Table A4-16. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by funds, on the four sectors separately. The dependent variable equals to one for every month for the funds that exited the market 
between January 2000 and December 2017, and it is equal to zero for every month for the funds that have not exited the market before the end of the sample period. The surviving funds are 
requested to remain operation for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding period (Panel A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B). ***-1% statistical 
significance, **-5% statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance.  
 Panel A. plus 6 months  Panel A. plus 0 month 
  DE   DNE   GE   GNE 
  
         DE        DNE         GE GNE 
Return -0.093***  -0.138***  -0.067***  -0.219* -0.091***  -0.131***  -0.067***  -0.217* 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.074)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.075) 
Size -0.037***  -0.025***  -0.039***  -0.022***  -0.037***  -0.025***  -0.039***  -0.022*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.009) 
Age 0.003  -0.025**  -0.016  -0.024  0.003  -0.024**  -0.016  -0.023 
 (0.859)  (0.022)  (0.179)  (0.404)  (0.841)  (0.027)  (0.172)  (0.417) 
Flow -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.002***  -0.002*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Family size 0.001  -0.018***  -0.023***  -0.023*  0.001  -0.019***  -0.023***  -0.024* 
 (0.952)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.091)  (0.947)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.082) 
Family specialisation -0.009  -0.241***  0.037  -0.201  -0.004  -0.236***  0.037  -0.203 
 (0.914)  (0.000)  (0.433)  (0.179)  (0.959)  (0.000)  (0.432)  (0.173)                                
                
IS &Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 63,202  120,563  99,263  14,519  63,877  122,421  99,708  14,593 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 12,238/50,964  19,861/100,702  18,437/80,826  2,160/12,359  12,238/51,639  19,861/102,560  18,437/81,271  2,160/12,433 
No. of exit/surviving funds 162/381  293/1,059  259/692  43/145  162/386  293/1,075  259/696  43/146 
No. of clusters 543  1,352  951  188  548  1,368  955  189 
r2_p 0.136  0.178  0.187  0.167  0.135  0.176  0.188  0.165 





Table A4-17. Marginal effects of logit regressions on matched samples clustered by funds. The matching is done by fund size, age and investment objective, with replacement. The dependent 
variable equals to one for every month for the funds that exited within the period specified at the top row, and it is equal to zero for every month for the funds that have not exited the market 
before the end of the periods as specified at the top row. The surviving funds are requested to remain operation for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding period (Panel A) and 
to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B). ***-1% statistical significance, **-5% statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance. 
 Panel A. plus 6 months  Panel A. plus 0 month 
  1/2000-12/2017 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2017 1/2000-12/2017 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2017 
Return -0.148***  0.095  -0.158  -0.238***  -0.147***  0.079  -0.157  -0.235*** 
 (0.000)  (0.644)  (0.280)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.733)  (0.287)  (0.000) 
Size_share 0.006  -0.073***  0.013  -0.010  0.005  -0.078***  0.016  -0.010 
 (0.421)  (0.000)  (0.599)  (0.177)  (0.429)  (0.000)  (0.520)  (0.170) 
Age -0.002  0.011**  -0.003  -0.002  -0.002  0.010*  -0.003  -0.002 
 (0.216)  (0.026)  (0.563)  (0.314)  (0.214)  (0.052)  (0.544)  (0.311) 
Flow_share -0.002***  -0.000  -0.003***  -0.003***  -0.002***  -0.000  -0.004***  -0.003*** 
 (0.000)  (0.656)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.563)  (0.003)  (0.000) 
Family size -0.017*  0.033  -0.015  -0.016  -0.017*  0.048  -0.016  -0.016* 
 (0.053)  (0.293)  (0.590)  (0.106)  (0.052)  (0.165)  (0.580)  (0.099) 
Family specialisation -0.175**  -0.398  -0.240  -0.160**  -0.172**  -0.305  -0.211  -0.154** 
 (0.016)  (0.305)  (0.357)  (0.042)  (0.018)  (0.435)  (0.423)  (0.049)                                
                
IS &Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 98,241  974  1,234  52,628  98,407  922  1,236  52,792 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 53,184/45,057  587/387  794/440  28,456/24,172  53,633/44,774  590/332  807/429  28,749/24,043 
No. of exit/surviving funds 743/580  41/18  76/46  652/527  749/577  44/15  76/45  658/523 
No. of clusters 1,323  59  122  1,179  1,326  59  121  1,181 
r2_p 0.0187  0.295  0.0545  0.0219  0.0188  0.276  0.0530  0.0221 





Table A4-18. Marginal effects of logit regressions on matched samples clustered by funds. The matching is done by fund size, age, fund-family, and investment objective, with replacement. The 
dependent variable equals to one for every month for the funds that exited within the period specified at the top row, and it is equal to zero for every month for the funds that have not exited the 
market before the end of the periods as specified at the top row. The surviving funds are requested to remain operation for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding period (Panel A) 
and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B). ***-1% statistical significance, **-5% statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance. 
 Panel A. plus 6 months  Panel A. plus 0 month 
  1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
Return -0.095***  -0.633  0.010  -0.143***  -0.093***  -0.599**  0.014  -0.144*** 
 (0.001)  (0.150)  (0.949)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.022)  (0.927)  (0.003) 
Size -0.057***  -0.133*  -0.110***  -0.066***  -0.055***  -0.119***  -0.110***  -0.063*** 
 (0.000)  (0.084)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Age -0.004*  0.019*  0.004  -0.005**  -0.004*  0.017***  0.004  -0.006** 
 (0.095)  (0.088)  (0.640)  (0.038)  (0.069)  (0.000)  (0.640)  (0.022) 
Flow -0.002***  0.000  -0.001  -0.003***  -0.002***  0.000  -0.001  -0.003*** 
 (0.000)  (0.549)  (0.630)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.976)  (0.636)  (0.000) 
Family size 0.040**  -0.037  0.009  0.035*  0.039**  0.021  0.009  0.035* 
 (0.018)  (0.531)  (0.926)  (0.059)  (0.020)  (0.765)  (0.926)  (0.062) 
Family specialisation 0.061  -0.697*  -0.688  -0.005  0.059  -0.698***  -0.688  -0.007 
 (0.599)  (0.086)  (0.384)  (0.965)  (0.606)  (0.004)  (0.384)  (0.954)                                
                
IS &Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 52,721  370  709  27,181  52,967  378  709  27,319 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 27,434/25,287  255/115  383/326  14,979/12,202  28,022/24,945  263/115  383/326  15,309/12,010 
No. of exit/surviving funds 356/284  15/5  32/24  319/252  360/281  17/5  32/24  323/249 
No. of clusters 640  20  56  571  641  22  56  572 
r2_p 0.0740  0.839  0.133  0.103  0.0722  0.726  0.133  0.101 






Table A4-19. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by funds on matched samples, on the four sectors separately. The matching is done by fund size, and fund age, with replacement. The 
dependent variable equals to one for every month for the funds that exited the market between January 2000 and December 2017, and it is equal to zero for every month for the funds that have 
not exited the market before the end of the sample period. The surviving funds are requested to remain operation for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding period (Panel A) and 
to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B). ***-1% statistical significance, **-5% statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance.  
  Panel A. plus 6 months   Panel A. plus 0 month 
  DE   DNE   GE   GNE 
  
DE   DNE   GE   GNE 
Return -0.206***  -0.225***  -0.093***  -0.279 -0.205***  -0.214***  -0.094***  -0.279 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.252)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.252) 
Size -0.007  0.010  0.002  -0.032  -0.007  0.012  0.002  -0.032 
 (0.645)  (0.340)  (0.895)  (0.123)  (0.630)  (0.258)  (0.835)  (0.123) 
Age -0.002  -0.011***  -0.004  -0.012  -0.002  -0.011***  -0.004  -0.012 
 (0.551)  (0.004)  (0.288)  (0.225)  (0.556)  (0.005)  (0.233)  (0.225) 
Flow -0.001**  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.003***  -0.001**  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.003*** 
 (0.012)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.011)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Family size 0.019  -0.028*  -0.016  -0.025  0.020  -0.029*  -0.016  -0.025 
 (0.284)  (0.060)  (0.298)  (0.382)  (0.249)  (0.055)  (0.297)  (0.382) 
Family specialisation 0.034  -0.527***  0.116  -0.083  0.039  -0.524***  0.109  -0.083 
 (0.838)  (0.000)  (0.337)  (0.763)  (0.813)  (0.000)  (0.363)  (0.763)                 
                
IS &Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 24,198  35,073  33,420  6,008  24,248  35,285  33,625  6,008 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 12,374/11,824  19,039/16,034  17,854/15,566  2,338/3,670  12,424/11,824  19,386/15,899  18,068/15,557  2,338/3,670 
No. of exit/surviving funds 161/126  272/229  241/185  40/54  162/126  276/228  243/185  40/54 
No. of clusters 287  501  426  94  288  504  428  94 
r2_p 0.0362  0.107  0.0631  0.0698  0.0367  0.103  0.0648  0.0698 





Table A4-20. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by funds on matched samples, on the four sectors separately. The matching is done by fund size, fund age, and fund-family, with 
replacement. The dependent variable equals to one for every month for the funds that exited the market between January 2000 and December 2017, and it is equal to zero for every month for the 
funds that have not exited the market before the end of the sample period. The surviving funds are requested to remain operation for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding 
period (Panel A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B). ***-1% statistical significance, **-5% statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance.  
 Panel A. plus 6 months  Panel A. plus 0 month 
  DE   DNE   GE   GNE 
 
DE   DNE   GE   GNE 
Return -0.144***  -0.280***  -0.048  -0.458 -0.138***  -0.280***  -0.047  -0.434 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.198)  (0.187)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.209)  (0.209) 
Size -0.035**  -0.017  -0.029**  -0.051*  -0.036**  -0.014  -0.030**  -0.051* 
 (0.040)  (0.127)  (0.041)  (0.076)  (0.036)  (0.214)  (0.034)  (0.071) 
Age -0.002  -0.008**  -0.003  0.008  -0.002  -0.009**  -0.003  0.009 
 (0.543)  (0.042)  (0.486)  (0.653)  (0.577)  (0.030)  (0.482)  (0.624) 
Flow -0.001**  -0.001***  -0.002***  -0.002*  -0.001**  -0.001***  -0.002***  -0.002* 
 (0.012)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.081)  (0.014)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.082) 
Family size 0.053*  -0.010  0.023  0.058  0.049*  -0.010  0.025  0.054 
 (0.059)  (0.614)  (0.265)  (0.204)  (0.081)  (0.615)  (0.236)  (0.230) 
Family specialisation 0.156  -0.190  0.219  -2.332***  0.170  -0.191  0.214  -2.334*** 
 (0.460)  (0.232)  (0.146)  (0.003)  (0.422)  (0.228)  (0.154)  (0.003) 
                                
IS &Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 18,822  27,423  24,472  3,040  18,994  27,431  24,512  3,093 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 10,065/8,757  15,864/11,559  13,805/10,667  1,955/1,085  10,238/8,756  16070/11,361  13,964/10,548  2,008/1,085 
No. of exit/surviving funds 119/83  221/146  165/122  29/18  120/83  223/144  167/120  30/18 
No. of clusters 202  367  287  47  203  367  287  48 
r2_p 0.0584  0.0946  0.0740  0.188  0.0557  0.0986  0.0736  0.187 






P. Monthly logit regressions clustered by investment styles (Chapter 4) 
Table A4-21. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment styles. The dependent variable equals to one for every month for the funds that exited within the period specified at the 
top row, and it is equal to zero for every month for the funds that have not exited the market before the end of the periods as specified at the top row. The surviving funds are requested to remain 
operation for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding period (Panel A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B). ***-1% statistical significance, **-5% 
statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance. 
  
Panel A. plus 6 months   Panel A. plus 0 month 
1/2000-12/2017 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2017 1/2000-12/2017 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2017 
Return -0.096***  -0.016  -0.030***  -0.107***  -0.093***  -0.012  -0.030***  -0.104*** 
 (0.000)  (0.511)  (0.005)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.620)  (0.004)  (0.000) 
Size -0.031***  -0.006***  -0.009***  -0.030***  -0.031***  -0.006***  -0.009***  -0.030*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age -0.014**  0.008**  0.007  -0.011*  -0.013**  0.008**  0.007  -0.011* 
 (0.030)  (0.027)  (0.134)  (0.054)  (0.035)  (0.022)  (0.116)  (0.065) 
Flow -0.002***  0.000  -0.000***  -0.002***  -0.002***  0.000  -0.000***  -0.002*** 
 (0.000)  (0.565)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.606)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Family size -0.016***  0.001  -0.003  -0.012***  -0.016***  0.001  -0.002  -0.012*** 
 (0.000)  (0.573)  (0.518)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.545)  (0.515)  (0.000) 
Family specialisation -0.108***  -0.006  -0.016  -0.089***  -0.104***  -0.004  -0.015  -0.086*** 
 (0.002)  (0.840)  (0.480)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.898)  (0.485)  (0.002) 
                                
IS &Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 297,547  19,158  24,094  205,433  300,599  19,282  24,771  207,612 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 52,696/244,851  205/18,953  623/23,471  28,294/177,139  52,696/247,903  205/19,077  623/24,148  28,294/179,318 
No. of exit/surviving funds 757/2,277  22/816  58/1,423  660/2,275  757/2,303  22/826  58/1,464  660/2,301 
No. of clusters 54  14  23  54  54  14  23  54 
r2_p 0.157  0.249  0.16  0.194  0.157  0.243  0.157  0.191 







Table A4-22. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by funds, on the four sectors separately. The dependent variable equals to one for every month for the funds that exited the market 
between January 2000 and December 2017, and it is equal to zero for every month for the funds that have not exited the market before the end of the sample period. The surviving funds are 
requested to remain operation for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding period (Panel A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B). ***-1% statistical 
significance, **-5% statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance.  
 Panel A. plus 6 months  Panel A. plus 0 month 
  DE   DNE   GE   GNE 
  
         DE        DNE         GE GNE 
Return -0.093***  -0.138***  -0.067***  -0.219 -0.091***  -0.131***  -0.067***  -0.217 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.154)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.153) 
Size -0.037***  -0.025***  -0.039***  -0.022***  -0.037***  -0.025***  -0.039***  -0.022*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 0.003  -0.025*  -0.016***  -0.024  0.003  -0.024  -0.016***  -0.023 
 (0.703)  (0.097)  (0.007)  (0.115)  (0.654)  (0.108)  (0.007)  (0.135) 
Flow -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.002***  -0.002*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Family size 0.001  -0.018***  -0.023***  -0.023***  0.001  -0.019***  -0.023***  -0.024*** 
 (0.921)  (0.007)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.907)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.003) 
Family specialisation -0.009  -0.241***  0.037  -0.201  -0.004  -0.236***  0.037  -0.203 
 (0.880)  (0.000)  (0.370)  (0.149)  (0.941)  (0.000)  (0.372)  (0.144) 
                                
IS &Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 63,202  120,563  99,263  14,519  63,877  122,421  99,708  14,593 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 12,238/50,964  19,861/100,702  18,437/80,826  2,160/12,359  12,238/51,639  19,861/102,560  18,437/81,271  2,160/12,433 
No. of exit/surviving funds 162/381  293/1,059  259/692  43/145  162/386  293/1,075  259/696  43/146 
No. of clusters 6  21  22  8  6  21  22  8 
r2_p 0.136  0.178  0.187  0.167  0.135  0.176  0.188  0.165 








Table A4-23. Marginal effects of logit regressions on matched samples clustered by investment styles. The matching is done by fund size, age and investment objective, with replacement. The 
dependent variable equals to one for every month for the funds that exited within the period specified at the top row, and it is equal to zero for every month for the funds that have not exited the 
market before the end of the periods as specified at the top row. The surviving funds are requested to remain operation for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding period (Panel 
A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B).  ***-1% statistical significance, **-5% statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance. 
 Panel A. plus 6 months  Panel A. plus 0 month 
  1/2000-12/2017 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2017 1/2000-12/2017 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2017 
Return -0.148***  0.095  -0.158  -0.238***  -0.147***  0.079  -0.157  -0.235*** 
 (0.000)  (0.666)  (0.305)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.795)  (0.316)  (0.000) 
Size_share 0.006  -0.073***  0.013  -0.010*  0.005  -0.078***  0.016  -0.010* 
 (0.321)  (0.001)  (0.438)  (0.084)  (0.331)  (0.001)  (0.305)  (0.079) 
Age -0.002***  0.011***  -0.003*  -0.002*  -0.002***  0.010***  -0.003*  -0.002* 
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.084)  (0.051)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.063)  (0.054) 
Flow_share -0.002***  -0.000  -0.003***  -0.003***  -0.002***  -0.000  -0.004***  -0.003*** 
 (0.000)  (0.704)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.624)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Family size -0.017**  0.033  -0.015  -0.016**  -0.017**  0.048  -0.016  -0.016** 
 (0.046)  (0.279)  (0.778)  (0.047)  (0.045)  (0.135)  (0.772)  (0.041) 
Family specialisation -0.175**  -0.398  -0.240  -0.160*  -0.172**  -0.305  -0.211  -0.154 
 (0.044)  (0.424)  (0.513)  (0.092)  (0.048)  (0.529)  (0.579)  (0.104)                                
                
IS &Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 98,241  974  1,234  52,628  98,407  922  1,236  52,792 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 53,184/45,057  587/387  794/440  28,456/24,172  53,633/44,774  590/332  807/429  28,749/24,043 
No. of exit/surviving funds 743/580  41/18  76/46  652/527  749/577  44/15  76/45  658/523 
No. of clusters 54  14  23  54  54  14  23  54 
r2_p 0.0187  0.295  0.0545  0.0219  0.0188  0.276  0.0530  0.0221 







Table A4-24. Marginal effects of logit regressions on matched samples clustered by investment styles. The matching is done by fund size, age, fund-family, and investment objective, with 
replacement. The dependent variable equals to one for every month for the funds that exited within the period specified at the top row, and it is equal to zero for every month for the funds that 
have not exited the market before the end of the periods as specified at the top row. The surviving funds are requested to remain operation for at least 6 months following the end of the 
corresponding period (Panel A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B). ***-1% statistical significance, **-5% statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance. 
 Panel A. plus 6 months  Panel A. plus 0 month 
  1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 1/2000-12/2014 1/2000-8/2007 9/2007-3/2009 4/2009-12/2014 
Return -0.095***  -0.633  0.010  -0.143***  -0.093***  -0.599*  0.014  -0.144*** 
 (0.001)  (0.213)  (0.954)  (0.006)  (0.000)  (0.091)  (0.935)  (0.002) 
Size -0.057***  -0.133***  -0.110***  -0.066***  -0.055***  -0.119***  -0.110***  -0.063*** 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Age -0.004**  0.019***  0.004  -0.005***  -0.004**  0.017***  0.004  -0.006*** 
 (0.033)  (0.000)  (0.228)  (0.006)  (0.024)  (0.000)  (0.228)  (0.005) 
Flow -0.002***  0.000  -0.001  -0.003***  -0.002***  0.000  -0.001  -0.003*** 
 (0.000)  (0.362)  (0.701)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.979)  (0.707)  (0.000) 
Family size 0.040***  -0.037  0.009  0.035***  0.039***  0.021  0.009  0.035*** 
 (0.000)  (0.477)  (0.890)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.824)  (0.889)  (0.000) 
Family specialisation 0.061  -0.697*  -0.688  -0.005  0.059  -0.698**  -0.688  -0.007 
 (0.234)  (0.080)  (0.202)  (0.929)  (0.244)  (0.013)  (0.202)  (0.909)                                
                
IS &Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 52,721  370  709  27,181  52,967  378  709  27,319 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 27,434/25,287  255/115  383/326  14,979/12,202  28,022/24,945  263/115  383/326  15,309/12,010 
No. of exit/surviving funds 356/284  15/5  32/24  319/252  360/281  17/5  32/24  323/249 
No. of clusters 32  7  14  30  32  7  14  30 
r2_p 0.0740  0.839  0.133  0.103  0.0722  0.726  0.133  0.101 







Table A4-25. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment styles on matched samples, on the four sectors separately. The matching is done by fund size, and fund age, with 
replacement. The dependent variable equals to one for every month for the funds that exited the market between January 2000 and December 2017, and it is equal to zero for every month for the 
funds that have not exited the market before the end of the sample period. The surviving funds are requested to remain operation for at least 6 months following the end of the corresponding 
period (Panel A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B).  ***-1% statistical significance, **-5% statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance.  
  Panel A. plus 6 months   Panel A. plus 0 month 
  DE   DNE   GE   GNE 
  
DE   DNE   GE   GNE 
Return -0.206***  -0.225***  -0.093***  -0.279 -0.205***  -0.214***  -0.094***  -0.279 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.321)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.321) 
Size -0.007  0.010  0.002  -0.032***  -0.007  0.012  0.002  -0.032*** 
 (0.363)  (0.297)  (0.919)  (0.000)  (0.367)  (0.223)  (0.879)  (0.000) 
Age -0.002**  -0.011**  -0.004  -0.012***  -0.002**  -0.011**  -0.004  -0.012*** 
 (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.225)  (0.002)  (0.035)  (0.046)  (0.155)  (0.002) 
Flow -0.001***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.003***  -0.001***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.003*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Family size 0.019**  -0.028  -0.016*  -0.025*  0.020***  -0.029  -0.016*  -0.025* 
 (0.010)  (0.219)  (0.064)  (0.065)  (0.001)  (0.205)  (0.060)  (0.065) 
Family specialisation 0.034  -0.527***  0.116  -0.083  0.039  -0.524***  0.109  -0.083 
 (0.738)  (0.000)  (0.403)  (0.760)  (0.685)  (0.000)  (0.430)  (0.760)                 
                
IS &Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 24,198  35,073  33,420  6,008  24,248  35,285  33,625  6,008 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 12,374/11,824  19,039/16,034  17,854/15,566  2,338/3,670  12,424/11,824  19,386/15,899  18,068/15,557  2,338/3,670 
No. of exit/surviving funds 161/126  272/229  241/185  40/54  162/126  276/228  243/185  40/54 
No. of clusters 5  19  16  6  5  19  16  6 
r2_p 0.0362  0.107  0.0631  0.0698  0.0367  0.103  0.0648  0.0698 





Table A4-26. Marginal effects of logit regressions clustered by investment styles on matched samples, on the four sectors separately. The matching is done by fund size, fund age, and fund-
family, with replacement. The dependent variable equals to one for every month for the funds that exited the market between January 2000 and December 2017, and it is equal to zero for every 
month for the funds that have not exited the market before the end of the sample period. The surviving funds are requested to remain operation for at least 6 months following the end of the 
corresponding period (Panel A) and to stay operational within the corresponding period (Panel B). ***-1% statistical significance, **-5% statistical significance, *-10% statistical significance.  
 Panel A. plus 6 months  Panel A. plus 0 month 
  DE   DNE   GE   GNE 
 
DE   DNE   GE   GNE 
Return -0.144***  -0.280***  -0.048**  -0.458 -0.138***  -0.280***  -0.047**  -0.434 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.030)  (0.213)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.029)  (0.228) 
Size -0.035*  -0.017**  -0.029  -0.051**  -0.036*  -0.014*  -0.030  -0.051** 
 (0.088)  (0.027)  (0.144)  (0.021)  (0.079)  (0.080)  (0.129)  (0.015) 
Age -0.002  -0.008*  -0.003  0.008  -0.002  -0.009*  -0.003  0.009 
 (0.218)  (0.096)  (0.311)  (0.444)  (0.264)  (0.081)  (0.298)  (0.398) 
Flow -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.002***  -0.002  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.002***  -0.002 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.171)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.169) 
Family size 0.053**  -0.010  0.023  0.058*  0.049**  -0.010  0.025  0.054 
 (0.011)  (0.678)  (0.217)  (0.092)  (0.022)  (0.664)  (0.192)  (0.139) 
Family specialisation 0.156  -0.190  0.219  -2.332***  0.170*  -0.191  0.214*  -2.334*** 
 (0.102)  (0.251)  (0.101)  (0.000)  (0.072)  (0.230)  (0.095)  (0.000)                 
                
IS &Time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 18,822  27,423  24,472  3,040  18,994  27,431  24,512  3,093 
Obs. for exit/surviving funds 10,065/8,757  15,864/11,559  13,805/10,667  1,955/1,085  10,238/8,756  16070/11,361  13,964/10,548  2,008/1,085 
No. of exit/surviving funds 119/83  221/146  165/122  29/18  120/83  223/144  167/120  30/18 
No. of clusters 6  18  15  6  6  18  15  6 
r2_p 0.0584  0.0946  0.0740  0.188  0.0557  0.0986  0.0736  0.187 
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